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Abstract 
 
 
This research investigates whether the introduction of Payment By Results (PbR) into the 
National Health Service aligned clinical and managerial incentives and improved output, 
quality, quantity and productivity.  
The methodology applies three data collection techniques; in-depth interviews; 
documentary data; and numerical data for each of four foundation trust (FT) case studies. 
The results indicate that the case studies had not produced consistent and sustained 
improvements in productivity and did not appear particularly engaged with productivity 
improvement, or cost control or in the relationship between these factors and tariff under 
PbR. Boards of directors did not appear to focus on productivity; and the use of service line 
reporting, to allow clinicians and managers of hospitals to drive productivity improvement, 
was not widely available at board or clinical level.  
The results also demonstrated the dominance of Monitor, the FT regulator, in influencing 
the agenda of FT boards. It suggests that, without central direction and/or external pressure, 
FTs will not focus on productivity and quality issues. 
The policy significance of these results are that (a) with the lack of alignment of clinical and 
managerial incentives, it is unlikely that FTs will be able to produce a sophisticated and 
targeted review of clinical care pathways to target productivity improvement at areas where 
there is real opportunity for efficiency improvement; and (b) if, as the research results 
suggest, NHS management, and the organisations they lead, respond more effectively to 
central direction and control then, as the NHS enters one of the most financially challenged 
periods of its history, alternative policy options to the development of quasi markets need to 
be considered. The research explores several of these options, including: the roll-back of the 
FT movement, management franchising, creating conditions for increased pressure on 
hospital performance, a more radical introduction of competition, and options for the use of 
social enterprises. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
‘Beginning is easy - continuing is hard’ 
      Japanese Proverb 
1.  RESEARCH AND CONTEXT 
1.1 Current and historical context  
In May 2010, world bond markets started to price the possibility of sovereign debt default 
into bond yields and the prospect of actual sovereign debt default of countries such as 
Greece, Spain and Ireland became a real possibility. There was also a strong indication from 
the credit rating agencies that UK sovereign debt would be subject to a rating downgrade 
inevitably leading to the government facing higher interest rates when issuing its gilts. The 
newly elected Liberal-Conservative coalition government in the UK therefore placed the 
control of public expenditure at the centre of government policy to settle international 
markets and demonstrate that the UK economy could control its ever increasing thirst for 
growth based upon the expansion of credit. 
The British Government’s resulting commitment to reduce public expenditure by an 
average of 25 per cent across all departments (excluding the NHS and International 
Development), with contingency plans for 40 per cent in some cases, left UK public sector 
services with the challenge of reviewing the spectrum of the services they provide, the input 
of resources they commit to providing them; the method of service delivery employed and 
the outputs that citizens can and should expect. In essence, the public sector is being forced 
to address the key ingredients of productivity, and will need significantly to improve 
productivity in its public services in the next few years or see large-scale service cuts.  
In July 2009, Appleby, Crawford and Emmerson outlined three potential scenarios for the 
NHS based on three sets of real funding conditions that could apply 2010 onwards. The 
‘arctic‘ scenario  projected real funding cuts of 2 percent per annum for 2010 to 13; ‘cold’  
assumed zero real growth and ‘tepid’  assumed real growth of 2 per cent for the next three 
years. The report concluded that, in conditions of ‘arctic’ funding, average NHS 
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productivity improvement of 7.4 per cent per annum would be required if service output 
and quality were to be maintained; in the best scenario, ‘tepid’ average productivity growth 
of 3.4% per annum would be necessary. Given that the Office of National Statistics most 
recent estimates for NHS productivity between 1997 and 2007 indicates that NHS 
productivity actually fell 4.3 per cent during the period (an average fall of 0.4 per cent per 
year) (ONS, 2009) the delivery of productivity improvement in the NHS is now the most 
critical challenge facing the service. 
The Liberal–Conservative coalition government which came to power in May 2010 initially 
indicated that real spending on the NHS would continue to rise in real terms in the post 
election period, therefore indicating a cold to tepid funding environment. Commentary by 
the chairman of the House of Commons Health Select Committee (Stephen Dorrell, former 
Conservative Secretary of State for Health) and others have indicated that the government 
should not ring fence health from potential real reductions in funding.  Therefore many in 
the NHS expected a financial settlement in the October 2010 central government spending 
review to reflect ‘cold’ to ‘arctic’ funding conditions with the greater requirement for 
productivity improvement. In fact the outcome of the review resulted in a hcadline 0.1% 
real increase in funding, which, when adjusted for projected inflation in the 2011 financial 
year, resulted in a real increase of only £24 million on a budget of over £100bn (Appleby 
2011). The need for productivity improvement was therefore intensified. 
The NHS productivity dilemmas of today need to be placed in the context of the improved 
NHS funding heralded by the first New Labour Government of Tony Blair in 2000.  In July 
2000 Prime Minister Blair and his Secretary of State for Health, Alan Milburn, faced with 
growing political concern about Britain’s international performance on various health 
outcomes (particularly cancer and coronary heart disease), launched the NHS Plan (the 
Plan). The relatively poor performance on health outcomes was exemplified by World 
Health Organisation data for deaths from heart disease for the three years to 1998 (WHO, 
1998) that showed UK death rates per 100,000 population to be four times higher than in 
Japan, three times higher than France and materially higher than even the United States. 
The Plan aimed to improve key health outcomes in England by 2008,  promising several 
years of increased real funding of 7.5% per annum. The Government’s objective was that 
Britain’s reputation for spending relatively low amounts of its national income (as a 
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percentage of GDP) on health would be rectified with health spend in England targeted to 
rise to 9.4% of GDP by 2008 (DoH 2002). 
Implicit in the Government’s policy of increased spending on the NHS was the 
understanding that England’s relatively poor performance on health outcomes for its 
citizens (when benchmarked against other European countries) was significantly affected by 
the amount of real resources invested in health care.  
It is now a decade since the NHS Plan was introduced. Over recent years increasing concern 
has been expressed as to whether the gains from the increased resources (inputs) devoted to 
health care have produced sufficient benefit (increased outputs) to justify the investment. 
Evidence on the achievement of NHS targets suggests that considerable improvement in 
NHS performance has been secured. For instance, in a large majority of hospital trusts the 
politically sensitive maximum waiting time of 4 hours for 98% of attendances in Accident 
and Emergency has been achieved and the concerted push to achieving the maximum wait of 
two weeks for urgent cancer referrals (to see a specialist consultant) has been met by a vast 
majority of hospitals. The NHS has also managed to bring waiting times from GP referral to 
hospital treatment down to a maximum of eighteen weeks for 90 per cent of all patients.  
This is a significant achievement for an NHS, which in 2000 was renowned for its long 
waiting times. (Indeed patients can now be faced with referral to treatment times that can be 
considered too short to obtain valid consent. For instance, the Liverpool Ocular Oncology 
Centre offers patients with an eye tumour rapid treatment. Surgical removal of the eye is 
usually performed within twenty four hours of initial assessment) 
What is less clear is whether the Plan, and associated increased funding, has led to 
improvements in clinical outcomes. Survival rates published by Cancer Research UK 
suggest that deaths from common cancers, such as breast cancer, have continued to decline 
since the Plan was introduced; but it is not clear whether this was the result of the increasing 
resources devoted to healthcare and the NHS Plan or merely a continuation of a trend 
commenced in the 1970s as clinical interventions have improved. 
There are probably three main areas of concern about the outputs from the Plan and 
subsequent target culture. First, there is anxiety as to whether the achievement of the 
centrally dictated output targets merely transferred resources from non-measured activities 
of the NHS (as suggested by Bevan and Hood, 2006) causing undesired and unexpected 
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consequences. An example of this would be the focus of resources on achieving access 
times as opposed to the quality of clinical outcomes. 
The second concern is that if the amount of additional real resources which have been 
devoted to the acute health sector had been invested in wider public health policies such as 
health education in areas such as diet and lifestyle, then the total health gain for England 
might have been much greater. For instance, Nolte and McKee’s (2004) review of literature 
on avoidable mortality suggests reductions in mortality from stroke may have been as a 
consequence of reduced risk factors (e.g. reduced salt intake) as opposed to being primarily 
driven by direct health care interventions. 
Thirdly, and the area which this thesis addresses, there is the concern that although total 
outputs of the NHS have risen over the course of the Plan, the relative cost of the inputs to 
achieve those outputs have been disproportionately high. As mentioned earlier The Office 
of National Statistics (ONS, 2009) has indicated that national productivity over recent years 
has fallen and commentators have argued that this is in large part due to the relatively low 
increase in measured output compared to the large investment in NHS inputs. 
Concerns about the Plan and its impact on NHS productivity had been identified as early as 
2005; Bosanquet et al (2005) noted that parts of the Plan were costing significantly more 
than initial Department of Health (DoH) projections. For instance, the DoH estimated that 
the GMS contract alone would cost some £300 million more than initially projected.  
Bosanquet et al’s estimate was that by 2010 (assuming NHS productivity remained at its 
2005 levels) there would be a resource gap in the NHS of £6.8 billion. As Bosanquet et al 
noted “We are left with the hope of a productivity miracle to bridge the gap” (2005, p23).  
McGuire and Van Reenen (2005, p 2) also commented: “the stark fact is that NHS outputs 
have grown at a slower rate than NHS inputs implying a sharp decline in NHS 
productivity”. The ONS’s 2009 conclusions that NHS productivity had fallen between 1997 
and 2007 would not therefore have come as a surprise to these commentators. 
 
1.2 Background to the research 
The idea for this research project originated while I was serving on the board of directors of 
an English teaching hospital in 2003. As described earlier, the Plan provided for large 
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increases in real funding for the NHS. In parallel with the implementation of the Plan, 
what were perceived to be tough performance targets for NHS hospitals to deliver were 
introduced into the NHS. My observations during that period suggested that the hospital had 
neither the data nor the inclination to understand the input costs of delivering the services 
and the efficiency of the process of treatment; nor did it have any effective measures for 
demonstrating the added value of the treatments the hospital provided to patients. It also 
appeared that management and clinicians did not have a common agenda. In particular, 
financial efficiency and the delivery of targets appeared to be the domain of managers while 
the focus of clinicians appeared to be around the expansion of services and, not surprisingly, 
the care of individual patients as distinct from the efficient allocation of resources between 
patients to maximise health benefit to the general population. This was born out by some 
systematic studies (Crilly and Le Grand 2004). 
It was in this context that a new funding system for paying NHS hospitals for the treatments 
they delivered (Payment by Results) (PbR) was piloted in 2003 and introduced in the first 
wave of newly established foundation trusts (FTs) in 2004.  PbR is modeled on systems 
implemented in other parts of Europe, including Ireland, Hungary and Portugal, and 
experiences from Australia and the United States. The basis of the system is that a patient 
condition is categorised in a particular cluster of treatments (according to average resource 
use) and is assigned a particular Health Resource Group (HRG). The provider of the 
treatment then receives a prospective payment for that particular treatment. For instance in 
2008-9 a simple varicose vein procedure attracted a payment of £1074 and a primary hip 
replacement £5220. 
In the period covered by this research PbR operated on the basis that the price paid in a 
relevant HRG was set at the average cost of the particular treatment for the NHS. If a 
provider incurred above average cost for the provision of that treatment then the provider 
would make a loss on that patient. Conversely, if the provider’s average cost was below the 
average for the NHS then the provider would make a surplus. At the time of submission of 
this thesis (May 2012) Monitor, the new economic regulator, is reviewing the method of 
setting tariffs under PbR 
A key objective of the introduction of PbR was to encourage providers who are above the 
average cost of delivery to reduce their costs over time in order to generate a financial 
	   11	  
surplus which could then be invested in services. The intention was that, if high cost 
providers either exited the market or made efficiency savings, then over time the average 
cost of each HRG (ceteris paribus) would fall, thus improving NHS productivity. 
For non-foundation trusts (non-FTs) PbR was implemented (in large part) on the 1st  April 
2006 and covered treatments for elective (inpatient and outpatient) care and emergency 
care. The first wave of FTs to be authorised in 2004 have been operating on PbR since their 
date of authorisation, as the opportunity to operate on the PbR payment system together 
with reductions in central control was one of the key incentives for adopting FT status. On 
average around 80% of FT and non-FT income is now covered by PbR. 
The second key element of the reform agenda associated with the Plan, and closely linked to 
the introduction of PbR, was the creation of FTs. For the introduction of PbR to work as an 
effective incentive to drive productivity improvement it was felt that autonomous hospitals, 
outside the day-to-day control of the Secretary of State for Health (although still 
accountable to an independent regulator), needed to be established. This was in effect an 
extension of the autonomy that was given to NHS Trusts in 1990. 
FTs were given the ability to retain cash surpluses generated under PbR and to hold them as 
reserves or invest them in the development of clinical services. This was a very attractive 
‘carrot” for many senior managers and hopefully clinicians. Also the initial drafts of the 
insolvency regime for FTs envisaged the possibility of FTs being subject to several 
elements of the insolvency regime for private companies (with some protection for the 
public assets transferred to FTs when they were first established). This lack of a state 
guarantee in cases of financial failure was to ensure that FTs performed in a financially 
robust manner. A combination of a payment system which allowed hospitals to generate 
surpluses and deficits, with the ‘stick’ of a modified private sector insolvency regime and 
the ‘carrot’ of the freedom to invest surpluses, was intended to create performance and 
productivity levers within the NHS. 
 
1.3   The Research 
In order for the introduction of PbR to be effective in promoting productivity, the ‘carrot’ 
and ‘stick’ will have to impact on both managers and clinicians. Clinicians will be key to 
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improving productivity. As guardians of the clinical pathway (i.e. the process of care by 
which hospitals treat patients) clinicians will need to promote greater efficiency by 
delivering more effective and efficient care for patients with fewer but better clinical 
interventions. Clinicians will need to be the willing leaders in the transformation of their 
clinical services. 
So the central hypotheses of this research is that PbR will align clinical and managerial 
incentives leading to improved output, quality, quantity and productivity. The research uses 
productivity, documentary and interview data from four case study hospitals in England to 
explore this central hypothesis.  
In order that mutuality of interest, or alignment of incentives, between clinicians and 
managers can occur clinicians would need to view the control of inputs, the application of 
efficient processes of care and the maximisation of outputs of the care process (both 
quantity and quality) as one of their key objectives. The introduction of PbR into the NHS 
(which establishes a price for a significant percentage of services provided by hospitals) has 
created an opportunity for clinicians to engage with managers in a conversation about the 
inputs, processes of care and outputs of treatment. PbR (when supported by an appropriate 
financial management system) allows clinicians and managers to understand the costs and 
income of delivering individual services and therefore whether a service is making a surplus 
or relying upon other parts of the hospital to cross subsidise its losses. As FTs need to be 
financially sustainable, services which generate a surplus (or at the very least do not make a 
loss) will be increasingly likely to attract more investment and be expanded. In some cases 
FTs could even cease to provide loss making services altogether if they are not core to the 
hospital and alternative provision is available either within the NHS or provided by the 
private or voluntary sectors. If PbR introduces, into the NHS, a greater ability to understand 
which services are financially sustainable, and which are not, then if we assume that 
clinicians who have worked in a speciality within a hospital for long periods of time, often 
twenty or thirty years, then it is reasonable to assume that they will wish to see that service 
continue and perhaps expand even if it is for reasons of self interest associated with 
continuation of employment (i.e. financial security) and personal status (i.e. not being 
associated with a failing service; or as Le Grand would categorise as knavish behaviour (Le 
Grand 2003). Therefore the ‘carrot ‘of expansion and the ‘stick’ of possible contraction of 
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services could produce an alignment of interest, and incentives between clinicians and 
managers therefore delivering increased output quality, quantity and productivity. 
1.4  Structure 
The thesis follows a conventional approach. Chapter Two sets out the research question and 
methodology including data collection and analysis and identifies the key strengths and 
weaknesses of the approach. Chapter Three develops an overview of the key literature on 
areas including, but not limited to, productivity, payment systems for hospitals and external 
influences on performance. The next three chapters set out the documentary, interview and 
productivity data respectively. The data are then analysed in Chapter Seven. Finally, 
Chapter Eight looks at what has been learnt from the research, including any general 
conclusions, and considers various policy implications. The final chapter also identifies the 
limitations of the research, both in terms of methodology and process, and identifies 
opportunities for further investigation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RESEARCH  QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
“Where observation is concerned, chance favours 
only the prepared mind” 
                                               Louis Pasteur 1822-1895. 
 
This chapter sets out in some detail the central and subsidiary research questions and the 
methodology employed in the research project. 
 
2.1  RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1.1  Central Research Question 
The central research question is to investigate whether the introduction of Payment By 
Results into the National Health Service has aligned clinical and managerial incentives and 
improved output, quality, quantity and productivity. 
This central research question leads to three main subsidiary research questions set out 
below. 
2.1.2  Subsidiary Research Questions 
What is meant by NHS productivity and how has the NHS routinely measured outputs of 
NHS organisations? 
What is meant by clinical and managerial incentives and historically has there been a 
difference between the two groups and their incentives? 
If managers and clinicians have historically had different incentives has the introduction of 
PbR contributed to their alignment? If so, how? 
We can reformulate these research questions as a specific set of hypotheses. 
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2.1.3  Hypotheses 
• For NHS Foundation Trusts to survive they need to establish long term 
financial viability. This is dependent upon improved output quality, quantity and 
productivity; all of these are affected by the introduction of PbR. 
 
• As clinicians wish to see their specialties, and their own clinical positions, 
maintained in their hospitals the introduction of PbR has acted as a performance lever on 
clinicians to operate their clinical services within clear financial constraints. More 
specifically, in order for clinicians to maintain their specialties and clinical positions, PbR 
acted as a lever on them to support the introduction of resource-efficient clinical pathways. 
 
• The introduction of PbR has acted as a performance lever on NHS 
Foundation Trust Boards to improve their information systems, understand the costs of 
individual clinical services and focus management resource on high cost areas. This has led 
to production process improvements. 
 
• There are two primary agents which control NHS Foundation Trusts, 
managers and consultants, and their primacy has been reinforced by the devolution of legal 
ownership of NHS Trust assets from the Department of Health to Foundation Trusts .  
 
• PbR has provided an alignment of incentives for the two key agents in the 
NHS (managers and consultants) leading to improved productivity. 
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2.2 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The intention of the research was to use research methods which allowed the triangulation 
of data, thus providing greater integrity to the conclusions of the research. The simple 
method of achieving triangulation would have been to ask the same question from different 
perspectives but using the same method. My objective was for the research to achieve 
“strong triangulation” by using multiple methods of research to address the same question. 
In particular, in-depth interview data with managers and consultants will be to some extent 
validated by documentary and numerical data. 
 
2.2.1   Case Study Method 
The research was based upon case studies because, as Yin comments, the case study is well 
suited to situations were the “how and why questions are being asked about a contemporary 
set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control” ( Yin, 2003, p. 9). The 
research question is aimed at understanding how and why PbR affects management and 
consultant behaviour, and focuses, on organisational quantity and quality of output. The 
policy and process of PbR is not capable of being influenced by the researcher and the 
introduction of PbR is clearly a contemporary event as the NHS uses PbR as the main 
payment system for NHS commissioned activity.  
Although some quantitative researchers argue against generalising from case study research, 
Yin (2003) argues that multiple case studies (as conducted in this research) allow theoretical 
generalisations (i.e. to generalise a theoretical position, as opposed to determining the 
frequency of occurrences) but not statistical generalisations. The research set out to provide 
a theoretical generalisation of the effect of PbR as a lever on managerial and clinical 
incentives in driving performance within the NHS. 
The case study research design was developed so as to ensure construct, internal and 
external validity as well as reliability. Construct validity was supported by identifying the 
specific changes which were studied, relating them directly to the objectives of the study 
and ensuring that the indicators chosen to measure the changes actually reflected the 
change. For example, specific change might be board level focus on output and the measure 
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might be the focus by the board on such issues. Construct validity was reinforced by 
having multiple sources of evidence, such as documentary and interview data. 
As the case studies were exploratory in nature a key issue was maintaining internal validity. 
Specifically, had all the possible factors of causation been identified and are inferences 
about causation correct (e.g not attributing increased board focus on output measures to the 
introduction of PbR when in actual fact the board focused more upon quality output 
measures because of concerns of board liability for corporate manslaughter). Internal 
validity concerns were addressed by directly considering rival explanations of possible 
inferences on causation in the analysis chapter. 
As previously stated the research aimed to provide a degree of theoretical generalisability 
beyond the individual case studies. External validity of the research is therefore very 
important. If the research can show that any findings are replicated in a number of the 
separate case studies then direct replication of the findings makes it possible to make 
theoretical generalisations. This is identical in analysis to repeating experiments which 
come to the same conclusion and the common results then become generalisable. 
The final issue in the case study design was to minimise the opportunity for bias in that 
design so that, should another researcher use the same case study and the same 
methodology, they would come to the same conclusion. The processes used in the case 
studies have been documented, effectively a case study protocol, to mitigate any concerns 
of design bias. 
In order to increase reliability of the findings four cases were investigated (as opposed to 
focussing on one critical case study). The use of multiple case studies put greater pressure 
on both time and financial resources.  An identical protocol was followed in each case and 
that replication of the findings in a case (as in the replication of an experiment) produced 
greater theoretical generalisability. 
The use of multiple case studies was also a risk control measure. Should one of the case 
studies have been subject to interruption, for instance financial failure of one of the NHS 
Foundation Trusts leading to organisational amalgamation before the research was 
completed. 
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The selection of the NHS Foundation Trusts for inclusion as case studies (and selection 
of interviewees) was based upon qualitative sampling, not statistical sampling as in 
quantitative studies (i.e random sampling in order to make statistical generalisations). Case 
study (and interviewee selection) was based upon purposive sampling (Hansen 2006 p.52) 
which  considered carefully the number and range of situations and views of participants in 
the study and intentionally included an outlier which, in a conventional quantitative 
analysis, would be excluded.  
As noted above, case studies can be representative and generalisable to the extent we are 
trying to establish theories. It is sometimes helpful to either replicate a case study to 
reinforce the previous findings or find a contrasting case study to see if the theoretical 
findings in an initial case can be extended to a contrasting environment. For instance, could 
management and consultant behaviour in a financially viable NHS Trust be identical or 
reinforced in a financially challenged environment? For this reason one of the case studies 
selected was one that had faced financial difficulties and was therefore a contrasting study 
compared to the other three financially robust studies. 
 
2.2.2  Main Case Studies and Selection 
Three criteria were used to identify the four NHS Foundation Trusts (FTs)  to be used in the 
study, namely legal status, strategic health authority and financial condition.  
The structural changes in the NHS, since the introduction of the legal status of FTs, has 
created two forms of acute trust delivering services to patients within the NHS: FTs 
answerable to their members, governors and regulators; and traditional NHS Trusts 
ultimately accountable to the Department of Health. To ensure that any variation in the 
research findings were not affected by the legal status of a case study, all the case studies 
were of FTs . 
FTs, as opposed to NHS Trusts, were selected as, at the time the research was being 
initiated, the growth of the FT sector was significant with the government aiming to have all 
hospitals operating as FTs within a few years. Although this process was not completed by 
the Labour Governments of Blair and Brown, this conversion remains the intention of the 
present Coalition Government (DoH 2010). 
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The NHS has been subject to very different performance cultures within the various 
regions of England. This is best exemplified by the large collective deficits recorded by 
hospitals and primary care trusts in the former strategic health authority (StHA) of 
Hampshire and the Isle of Wight compared with modest surpluses in Dorset and Somerset. 
The selection of FTs as case studies therefore removed this second variable from the 
analysis as FTs are not subject to the control of individual StHAs but instead are regulated 
by a common regulator, Monitor, which applies a legal regulatory framework and therefore 
consistently applied performance rules (Monitor 2011a). 
As indicated earlier the final factor in case study selection was the issue of long term 
financial stability of the relevant FT. The financial stability of the FT was chosen as a factor 
in case study selection as the researcher considered that financial sustainability could be a 
catalyst for general management, and clinicians, to focus on the costs and income of an 
organisation and therefore lead to greater engagement with PbR. At the time of the case 
study selection Monitor (as the lead regulator on financial matters for FTs) operated a 
financial risk rating (FRR) ranging from four (the strongest rating) to one (the weakest 
rating with potential rights for Monitor to intervene). Three of the four case studies (below) 
had good FRR ratings of three or above and therefore underlying financial condition should 
not be a variable impacting upon the results in those three case studies.  
The main case studies were: 
AA NHS Foundation Trust (FRR4) 
This was an established  FT operating in the South East of England. Although not one of the 
first FTs to be authorised by Monitor, it had a track record of achievement as an FT. The 
management team was experienced with leadership from a long serving chief executive and 
had a good record of delivering on national targets. The hospital was based in an affluent 
urban context with several other NHS and private sector providers within relatively close 
proximity. It had a strong record on financial performance. 
CC NHS Foundation Trust (FRR 4) 
This FT was authorised by Monitor in one of the earlier waves of applications. The 
management team was again experienced, with leadership from a long serving chief 
executive. The hospital had a solid record of delivering on national targets but had faced 
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some financial difficulty a few years previously. These issues were effectively resolved 
and at the time of the research the trust had a robust financial record. The hospital was 
based in the South of England and in a rural environment with no alternative NHS, or 
private sector provider, within a reasonable travel distance. 
DD NHS Foundation Trust (FRR 3) 
This trust was also authorised by Monitor in one of the earlier waves of applications. The 
management team was again experienced with leadership from a long serving chief 
executive. The hospital had a solid record of delivering on national targets and had a good 
financial performance. Based in a low density urban environment with good 
communications the local community was served by several NHS hospitals of various sizes 
and private providers were also operating within the locality. 
 
2.2.3    Outlier Case Study 
For the reasons identified in the case study method section (i.e. can the case study findings 
be extended to a contrasting environment) one case study was chosen as an intentional 
outlier in that it had been rated by Monitor as subject to higher financial risk than the main 
cluster of FT’s. It was hoped by including this outlier in the study that any impact of  
differences in underlying financial condition would be highlighted.  
The outlier case study BB NHS Foundation Trust had an FRR2.  It was again based in the 
South of England. It was an early wave FT applicant based in an urban environment but 
serving a relatively poor population. The city where it was located was served by several 
other hospitals (private and public) but by the nature of its population and service portfolio 
the choice of provider was effectively limited. Leadership was provided by a long serving 
chief executive and experienced senior management team. 
 
2.2.4  Interview Method 
Key research technique texts such as Bechhofer and Paterson (2000) argue that, because 
most researchers believe they can interview, other methods of investigation should be first 
explored to ensure that the interview is the most appropriate research method  to be used. 
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As the aim of this research was to obtain strong triangulation in the research results, 
reliance purely on numeric and documentary data was not appropriate and therefore an 
additional method of data collection was required. 
The aim of the research was not only to identify what had happened, but how and why it 
had happened and the research was therefore explanatory in nature. The research question 
was also contemporary as most of the key players in delivery of the Plan were still either in 
post or accessible. For these reasons the use of case studies, based upon a small number of 
quality interviews, was considered an appropriate method of data collection (Yin 2003). 
The data acquired from the interviews was intended to produce both descriptive information 
concerning decision making on such issues as rationalisation of health care production 
processes, and also provide explanations as to why, or why not, these changes occurred. The 
interviews also allowed further investigation of the issues which emerged from the 
document review including, in particular, explanations of causation of behaviour trends 
established in the documents.  
There were no simple academic criteria that could be applied for selecting the interview 
respondents but the criteria the research employed will be outlined and justified. Bauer and 
Gaskell (2000) note that an individual researcher can probably cope with 15-25 individual 
interviews.  As the research included two other data sets the study aimed to interview 4-5 
people in each case study FT, a maximum of 16-20 interviews. Eighteen interviews were 
finally completed. 
The basic criteria the study used to choose respondents was to identify individuals who 
would be information-rich. As Bauer and Gaskell note “The real purpose of qualitative 
research is not counting opinions or people but rather exploring the range of opinions” 
(Bauer and Gaskell 2000 p.41). For this reason the research attempted to identify both key 
supporters and opponents of changes within each of the case studies for interview. 
There are four main types of interview: structured, semi-structured, unstructured and 
informal interviews. These can be individual or group interviews and the method of 
conducting the interview can be in person, by telephone, video link or web based. 
The first interviews were all individual, and face to face, in order to fully engage the 
participants in the project and develop personal relationships so as to maximise the 
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willingness of the respondents to disclose issues around incentives. Had it been necessary 
to ask follow-up questions, the intention was to employ e-mail and telephone. Video 
conferencing was viewed as unrealistic considering the limited access to this within FTs at 
the time. In the event, the need for follow-up interviews was not apparent and access to such 
senior individuals, for a second time, would have been difficult to achieve. 
Semi-structured/unstructured interviews (unlike a structured interview which has defined 
questions with a narrow range of possible responses) allowed in-depth understanding to be 
obtained by the researcher which in the case of identifying consultant and manager 
incentives was imperative. For this reason the structured interview was discounted because 
of its lack of flexibility and depth. 
The need for the interviews to be efficient, yet flexible, led to the choice of the semi-
structured interview and the discounting of unstructured interviews as insufficiently 
focussed. This enabled the development of an interview guide so that all interviews could 
cover the core areas of investigation yet allow the interviewer to develop the questioning as 
the interview progressed and so develop issues which emerged during the meeting. The 
interview guide which was developed ensured that the questions were open-ended, neutral, 
sensitive and clear (Patton 2002, as stated in Holloway 2005 p45). 
As Hansen (2006) suggests, the interview guide and process was trialled on a limited 
number of participants before the main interviewing commenced, in order to remove 
weaknesses in the style, type or breadth of questions/topics covered. The interview guide 
and process was trialed in two ways. It was first tested with a non-NHS specialist but with 
wide management experience for weaknesses in question meaning and interpretation. The 
guide was adjusted and then tested on a senior executive director of finance, with particular 
experience of the subject matter of the thesis, as a representative of the target group. This 
led to a final modification of the interview guide which is set out in Appendix 1. 
With regard to conducting group or individual interviews the study was structured around 
individual meetings. Although a broader number of respondents could have been captured 
by the use of the group interviews, the intention was to obtain in depth analysis on 
incentives (and depth of understanding) and such disclosure would not have been enhanced 
by group interviews. In addition, many of the respondents were high value senior managers 
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and consultants with time critical schedules and therefore the need to schedule the 
interviews around individual diaries made group interviews impracticable. 
As indicated above the interviews focused upon high level management and senior 
consultants within each FT. With the capacity to interview only four to five respondents in 
each FT interviewee selection was critical. For this reason the key executive member of the 
management team to be interviewed was the director of finance as the holder of that 
position was conversant with the detail of PbR and was responsible (in conjunction with 
other operational managers) for the alignment of average costs of the organisation to be 
broadly in line with the relevant HRGs under PbR. The finance director, often with the 
director of operations, would also be the person responsible for the implementation of any 
cost re-alignment and therefore was likely to be a strong voice for improvement in care 
processes within the FT. 
In each FT two senior clinicians were also identified for interview. Most FTs had a clinician 
who was supportive of system reform and who had driven change in clinical processes and 
this person was the first choice to interview. In each case study the Medical Director was 
successfully recruited to the project to fulfil this role. This proponent of change was 
balanced by a senior consultant who was less supportive of PbR and system reform to 
provide a counter perspective. 
The final target for interview was the manager of the orthopaedics division of the FT. This 
clinical area has a tendency to be subject to heavy competition from the private sector, has 
strong and independently minded clinical leaders and can be the focus point for many of the 
initial PbR reforms. The divisional manager of orthopaedics was therefore considered to be 
in a strong position to assess the causation (or limitations) of output, quality and 
productivity improvements and holds the politically uncomfortable position of high levels 
of contact with consultants yet still being responsible to senior management for systems 
change. This creates potentially an ideal position for obtaining an insight into consultant- 
management incentive alignment. 
In addition to the sixteen people the research intended to have access to, two of the case 
study chief executives also volunteered to be interviewed which provided an additional 
level of insight and further supported the richness of the interview data. 
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As highlighted above the number of interviewees was limited by constraints of both 
access to the case studies and resource available to the researcher. If case study access and 
researcher resources had not been a limiting factor the researcher would have made several 
key changes. Firstly, interviews with non-executive members of the board of directors 
would have been conducted. This would have given a non-NHS view around the research 
question that might have provided challenge to professional NHS views presented. 
Secondly, a larger number of operational managers and members of the consultant body 
would have been interviewed to get a richer understanding of the objectives and incentives 
of clinicians and managers. Thirdly, to improve generalisability, interviewees would have 
been identified from specialties such as medicine where co-morbidity and complexity often 
makes operating under PbR much more complex than within orthopaedics.  
 
2.2.5  Documentary Data 
The objective of the review of the board documentation was to find a high level relationship 
between the introduction of PbR and a drive by the organisation to better understand the 
cost structure of the production units of the FT, and the processes of the organisation (such 
as updating and standardisation of clinical pathways for specific treatments). 
The advantages of using documentary data was that due to the Freedom of Information Act 
(FoI) large amounts of this data could be accessed as of legal right, much of it being 
accessible via electronic means. In the event FoI requests were not required as all four FT 
case studies continued to provide access to non –commercially sensitive board papers 
(commonly referred to as Part 1 papers) via their publicly accessible hospital websites. At 
the time the research commenced, access to the case studies and their data had been 
considered a significant threat to the viability of the project. This risk did not materialise. 
The document review required a coherent, transparent, reliable and valid coding system 
(Bauer and Gaskell 2000).  It was intended that a computer assisted coding package be used 
but as Bauer points out “computers, useful as they are, are unlikely to replace the human 
coder” (Bauer and Gaskell 2000). The researcher considered the use of NVIVO 7 and 
ATLAS.ti 5 but,  after trialling both packages and comparing them to the results of a more 
labour intensive windows document search based approach, the windows search engine was 
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adopted. Although much more labour intensive, and possibly subject to greater human 
error when searching the documents, the researcher found that the technique was more 
effective in identifying the context in which key words and phrases were being used and 
therefore increased the quality of the results, particularly from an analysis/interpretation 
perspective. 
The material reviewed focussed on the documents which provided a strategic overview of 
the FTs focus and recorded high level organisational performance issues. These were the 
board minutes of the FT case studies, as effective boards should focus on high level 
performance issues and activity/quality and outcomes data (Machell, Gough and Steward 
2009).  
The researcher also considered reviewing board sub-committee minutes where delegated 
authority had been given by the board to a committee to assess hospital 
performance/productivity and quality issues. Although these documents might have 
provided more detailed information, effective boards would have required the key issues 
raised in those committees to be formally reported to the board (Cadbury 2002, p. 99) and 
therefore be recorded within the board’s minutes.  
In addition, access to minutes of board sub-committees are not as commonly available to 
the public as board minutes (although the content may technically be available by use of the 
provisions of FoI). On balance the researcher concluded that the time burden of securing 
access to the documents and then conducting systematic searches was not justified as the 
key learning from the material would have been highly likely to have been recorded in the 
main board minutes.  
 
2.2.6  Output data 
In addition to the collection of documentary and interview data, the research project also 
identified whether each of the case studies had shown evidence of improving productivity in 
the period leading up to, and during, the collection of documentary and interview data. 
The researcher considered two approaches to the collection of this data. Option one was to 
collect primary activity and cost data for each of the four case studies, either on a hospital-
wide basis or by reviewing several distinct data sets focussing upon some key specialties, 
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for example orthopaedics. The alternative approach was to use a data set, or combination 
of data sets, which had been collected nationally using a standardised methodology and the 
project could therefore avoid key weaknesses associated with primary data collection. 
Three key factors influenced the approach taken. Firstly, the collection of primary cost and 
activity data, when combined with the collection and analysis of the documentary and 
interview data previously outlined, would have made the research project too substantial for 
a PhD given the limitations of time and resource.  
Secondly, the case study FTs had allowed access to the researcher on the basis that the 
research project would require limited involvement from staff and senior management. 
Initial soundings of the case studies indicated that the requirement for data access, and 
greater hospital staff engagement in the research, would have materially prejudiced access 
to the FTs.  
Finally, at the time that the research was being conducted, FTs were becoming increasingly 
reluctant to allow outside parties access to data which might be considered commercially 
sensitive, one of the consequences of creating a quasi-market in public services. Up to date 
cost data relating to specific specialties would have been considered commercially sensitive 
and therefore presented a significant risk with regard to the potential withdrawal of access 
rights to the four case studies. 
As a consequence of the above factors the researcher considered that the identification of 
proxies for productivity for each of the case studies, using national data sets, presented the 
most efficient method of identifying whether each of the case studies had shown signs of 
productivity improvement over a set period.  
The research project therefore used two data sets as an indication of the levels of 
productivity in each of the case studies. Firstly, the relative cost index (RCI) of each of the 
FTs in the study for the period 2005-6 to 2007-8 were analysed. The RCI is calculated by 
the DoH by collecting cost data from each provider, the average cost of providing services 
in England is then calculated with the average being denoted as an index number of 100. 
Those providers with an RCI of over 100 are therefore relatively expensive service 
providers with those below 100 being relatively cheap. This data set was particularly useful 
as it identified the FTs relative cost position against other NHS hospitals in England. 
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Therefore improvement in productivity above that of other hospitals  would be indicated 
by a falling RCI for that FT. 
The second data set used in the study was produced by the DoH’s Institute of Innovation & 
Improvement which benchmarked NHS Trusts against several key productivity metrics 
based upon the Ten High Impact Changes for productivity which the Institute highlighted in 
2004 (Modernisation Agency 2004). The research used four of the data sets available: 
length of stay (LoS), day case rate, pre-operative bed days and emergency re-admissions 
within 14 days. 
The first three indicators were selected because they are closely related to the process of 
care.  As improvements in productivity within a hospital are only likely to result from 
addressing the core business of the unit, the process of care, these indicators were 
considered a good proxy for process improvement and therefore productivity. The fourth 
indicator, emergency re-admissions within 14 days, was chosen in order to give a broad 
indicator as to what might have happened to the quality of output in the same period. 
Increases in unintended re-admissions after treatment were considered a good proxy 
measure for declining quality. 
More detail on the data sets and their limitations are set out in Chapter Six. The next chapter 
introduces some of the key literature which informed the construction of the research. 
2.2.7  Timing 
The timing of the research was driven by three main factors. Firstly, FTs had been chosen 
for the research as they were being identified as the high performing hospitals within the 
system but the first FT was not authorised until 2004. It was therefore considered necessary 
to allow the FT movement to become established before research could effectively be 
conducted. 
Secondly, access to the case studies needed to be secured. Approaches were made in the 
spring of 2007 and access secured during August 2007. It was therefore important to 
proceed as quickly as possible. 
Thirdly, the researcher was studying part time and therefore the interviews were conducted 
at a time he could take unpaid leave. The period September to March 2007-8 met this 
requirement. 
	   28	  
 
2.3 RESEARCH ETHICS 
The research was based upon three data sets; productivity data, documentary data and 
interview data involving human participants. 
The productivity and documentary data was all in the public domain. The productivity data 
was accessed through the publicly available Department of Health information portal and 
related to organisations rather than individuals. The documentary data was derived from 
publicly available board minutes, accessed through information portals of the hospitals 
identified as the case study sites. In both cases these data sets did not provide any ethical 
issues for the research. 
The third data set was derived from one to one interviews with very senior NHS clinicians 
and managers within the NHS conducted by the researcher. Due to the seniority, status and 
experience of the individuals interviewed all participants had the legal capacity to give 
consent and were not in any way vulnerable, in terms of giving meaningful consent, to either 
participation in the interviews or the use of the information generated from those interviews.  
All participants in the interview process gave their consent to be interviewed and for the 
information to be used in this research project on an anonymised basis. In line with research 
ethics the research has been conducted on the basis of those consents. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
‘To be conscious that you are ignorant 
is a great step to knowledge’ 
    Benjamin Disraeli 
 
This chapter considers the five main areas of literature which provided the basis for this 
research project.  It is not intended to be an exhaustive summary of the literature, but aims 
to identify and to evaluate some key material.  
 3.1 Meaning and measurement of productivity 
The measurement of productivity has become the focus of much debate over recent years as 
the need to show that NHS productivity has risen, with the implementation of the Plan, has 
become politically important. 
In May 2001 the Office of National Statistics (ONS) embarked on a project to measure 
productivity in public services. The objective was to resolve the problem that, in the 
marketed sector of the economy, better quality products and services are accommodated in 
productivity measures ”by adjusting downwards the price indices used to deflate the money 
value of the output” (Pritchard 2001 p67). The non-marketed sector of the economy 
(including health services produced by government free at the point of consumption) have 
historically been analysed on the basis that inputs to the production process are a proxy for 
output therefore ignoring any concept of added value. It had also been assumed that 
productivity in the non-marketed sector was constant over time.  
In October 2004 the ONS report concluded that using the definition of productivity as 
“the ratio of NHS outputs to NHS inputs, after separating out the impact of pay and price 
increases”
NHS productivity had fallen during the period 1995 -2003 with output growing by 28 per cent 
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and NHS inputs by between 32 and 39 per cent for the same period (ONS 2004 p.40). 
The ONS report concluded that over the period 1995-2003 the average annual change in 
NHS productivity had either shown no change or had declined by as much as 1% annually. 
The report was explicit in its conclusion that this took no account of improvements in 
quality. Finally, the ONS report noted that the bundle of services carried out by the NHS 
changes over time and if the bundle of services analysed no longer reflects the current focus 
of NHS activity (which in a dynamic clinical environment continuously changes) then the 
reliability of the bundle for a proxy of NHS activity will not be accurate. 
It should be noted that the aging NHS information systems do not often capture changes in 
output as a consequence of process change; for example, the shift of procedures from 
inpatient to outpatient settings (such as hernia and eye surgery). As outpatient procedures do 
not consume resources associated with bed occupancy (e.g overnight nursing cover, feeding 
and hotel services), ceteris paribus, this process change can represent a significant 
productivity variation. This limits the accuracy of the ONS analysis. 
McGuire and Van Reenen argued that the complication with measuring the output of the 
service sector in general (and the NHS in particular) is the “multidimensional nature of 
output and the importance of quality variation within the sector”(McGuire and Van Reenen 
2003 p1). They therefore agree with the ONS as to the importance of the content of the 
service bundle for analytical purposes. 
The express limitations set out in the ONS report must therefore raise significant questions 
about the usefulness of the report in determining whether NHS productivity has changed or 
not. As the Plan prioritised improvements in quality as an objective then the failure of the 
report to take account of quality change is a material limitation. A key question must be to 
what extent the achievement of access targets, such as accident and emergency department 
waits, contribute to quality and whether improved health outcomes (such as falls in mortality 
for circulatory disease and strokes) can be attributed to health care quality improvements. 
The exclusion of variations in quality from the ONS’s assessment of productivity has been 
criticised by many commentators including Dan Berwick (2005). Berwick correctly notes 
that NHS productivity should refer the ratio of inputs (in which he includes labour capital 
and supplies) to that of outputs. Berwick clearly argues that by using activity as a proxy for 
productivity we are using “misleading shortcuts” (Berwick 2005 p.976) and this is not 
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acceptable despite the difficulty in assessing productivity in a more precise manner. 
The weakness of the ONS report is also highlighted by Berwick in terms of the significance 
which is given to different forms of activity when assessing output. In particular, he 
comments that one inpatient treatment is weighted 14 times heavier than an outpatient visit 
despite producing identical clinical outputs. 
At a time when the NHS has a strategic objective of transferring many of its activities from an 
inpatient to an outpatient setting Berwick’s criticism of the methodology for weighting 
activity is clearly important, as is his criticism of non-use of real outcome measurement. 
In parallel to the ONS work Professor A.B Atkinson (with support from the ONS and other 
government bodies) was asked to address the issue of how to measure non-marketed output 
(Atkinson 2005). Many of the key recommendations of the final report were focussed upon 
methodological issues for the compilation of national accounts (and therefore beyond the 
scope of this review) but some recommendations are directly relevant to the issue of how we 
measure NHS productivity change. 
Atkinson challenges the historical method of measuring non-marketed output as not only 
unacceptable on public accountability grounds (i.e. because productivity was assumed to be 
constant in public services politicians were not held accountable for poor public sector 
efficiency) but also on the basis that the accuracy of input data is in question. The assumption 
that input is equal to output is to carry over inaccuracy in input measures into final output. 
For example, Atkinson notes the lack of measures for capital service inputs which are a 
material element of NHS inputs. 
Atkinson’s recommendations included a clear need to build in quality change into output 
growth, a move to direct output measurement and a review of appropriate input deflators (in 
particular pay and price deflators should be sufficiently separated to take account of changes 
in the balance of inputs over time). 
With regard to quality Atkinson argues that it should be measured on a case by case basis but 
that three criteria: differentiation of service (if applicable), success of activity or contribution 
to attributable outcome (if contribution can be “directly and confidently attributed to the 
service”) should be the basis of the measure. Specific recommendations include collecting 
new information and attributing values to changes in health outcomes and treatment patterns, 
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such as quality standards in general practice, speed of access to elective treatment, 
accident and emergency waiting times, ambulance emergency response times and patient 
experience (through the national patient survey programme). 
Atkinson’s conclusion that quality is fundamental to assessing non-marketed output (and 
therefore productivity) is intuitively appealing. It is interesting to note that many of his 
proposed measures (such as access times and patient experience) relate directly to those 
targets set in the government’s national performance framework for the NHS. Critics could 
see this as a method for inflating productivity growth by means which have added no 
tangible value to the nation’s health, but may have given the electorate a belief that the NHS 
is improving. 
Commentators, such as Bevan and Hood (2006), note that some of the above performance 
measures have had unexpected negative effects on the NHS (including reductions in quality) 
as the targets have produced undesired producer behaviour. 
They have argued that gaming has occurred in response to performance targets. They cite 
underperformance in areas which have not been subject to the performance framework, for 
instance the closure of ambulance units in rural areas (thus reducing service quality) and the 
opening of additional units in already well provided urban areas to achieve targets for 
category A calls. They also note that Bristol has achieved its ophthalmology waiting times by 
cancelling/delaying follow-up outpatient appointments thus causing at least 25 patients to 
unnecessarily lose their vision over a two year period (Bevan and Hood 2006). 
Any measure of quality, for productivity purposes, must capture changes in quality that occur 
including the unexpected effects of the performance framework itself. As noted, a key 
element of NHS output which Atkinson wished to capture is success of activity/ contribution 
to outcome. If we first consider success of activity much (yet not all) of the NHS’s outcome 
data is focussed on mortality rates. Thus for cancer, and other conditions with a high 
incidence of mortality, such data is routinely collected and could be incorporated into quality 
output measures. 
Leatherman and Sutherland have produced some of the leading work in this area and have 
analysed data on outcome rates over time. For example, they show that between 1993-2003 
mortality rates from stroke for people over 75 years declined by approximately a third in 
England. The limitation of the data is that it does not establish that the fall in mortality is 
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“directly and confidently attributed to the service” (Leatherman and Sutherland 2006). 
Due to the lack of attribution the outcome data (in its present form) would not be sufficient as 
evidence of improved health resulting from health care. 
As a direct result of the recommendations in the Atkinson Review the ONS now makes an 
attempt to adjust NHS output figures to take account of changes in quality. Healthcare 
quality adjustments fall into two broad categories: service responsiveness to user needs 
(represented by the annual National Patient Survey (which includes patient views on 
information and communication, choice and safety)); and service success in delivering 
intended outcomes ( this considers short term survival, health gain following treatment in 
hospital and changes in waiting times. On average the quality adjustment to total output has 
added 0.5% annually between 2001-9 inclusive (ONS 2011 p12). 
The most recent step forward which will allow the ONS to adjust output to more accurately 
reflect the quality of the service delivered is the development of the patient reported outcome 
measures (PROMs) for several surgical interventions including hip and knee replacement. 
Devlin and Appleby note that although the ONS has attempted to make adjustments to 
national output data to reflect changes in quality to date there has been ‘a lack of any data 
directly bearing on this’ (Devlin and Appleby 2001 p. 59). Devlin and Appleby’s view is that 
when PROMs are extended over a wider range of interventions then this will be an effective 
data base for more accurately adjusting output measures to reflect quality. This view is 
supported by the ONS (ONS 2011 p .23). 
The overwhelming need to be able to measure the outcomes of the NHS has resulted in a key 
development over recent years. In the absence of robust outcome measures, the NHS has 
increasingly relied upon care process measures as a proxy for quality measurement. The 
same approach has been used by the NHS as quality indicators for regulatory compliance 
(please see section 3.5 below).  
McGlynn noted that the UK had the “most extensive use of process quality measures to date” 
(McGlynn 2009, p17); in 2004 the UK government invested an additional £1 billion of public 
funds in rewarding general practitioner practices in England for achieving various care 
quality process measures set out in the Department of Health’s Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (2004). This framework allocated points to general practioner practices which 
achieved various process measures. 
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In the acute setting, the introduction of higher levels of payment for hospitals achieving  
prescribed processes of care, which are considered to provide better outcomes, are reflected 
in the creation of best practice tariffs (BPT’s) under PbR. For instance, the BPT for stroke 
aims to reduce the ‘ significant unexplained variation in practice’ by setting standards for 
urgent brain imaging and reporting (DoH 2010 p. 50). 
The impact of the above literature for this research is that the productivity data for the four 
case studies in Chapter Six will not accurately reflect changes in the quality of output 
occurring during the period of this research. As a consequence the productivity metrics, and 
RCI data presented, will either understate or overstate changes in productivity. This is a 
general limitation faced by research in this field and is noted within the Chapter Six. 
 
3.2 NHS Productivity 
As noted in 3.1 above the ONS concluded that NHS productivity had fallen during the period 
1995 -2003 with output growing by 28 per cent and NHS inputs by between 32 and 39 per 
cent for the same period (ONS 2004). This picture of declining, or at best static, productivity 
is confirmed by various later studies looking at different parts of the NHS.  
The National Audit Office’s (NAO) review of the contract for general practice services in 
England concluded that a key element of the DoH’s business case to the Treasury for the new 
GP contract (the delivery of a year-on-year increase in productivity of 1.5%) was not 
delivered and in fact ONS adjusted GP services figures for 2005-6 show an actual year-on-
year productivity decline of 2.5% (NAO 2008 p. 9). 
The hospital sector has also demonstrated a similar record on productivity in the last decade. 
The NAO’s 2010 report on hospital productivity notes that ONS quality adjusted data for 
hospital productivity shows a decline of 1.4% per year compared to an NHS overall decline 
of over 0.2% (NAO 2010 p. 6). 
The Centre for Health Economics (Street and Ward 2009 p.iii) as noted by Appleby and Ham 
(2010 p.7) conclude that within these general conclusions on NHS productivity certain years 
have shown some improvement, in particular from 2004-5 to 2007-8, as a greater number of 
patients have been seen, subjected to shorter waiting times and treated to a higher standard; 
outputs have risen at a higher rate than inputs. 
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The most recent report on NHS productivity for 2009 (ONS 2011) indicates provisional 
figures for productivity growth of 0.7% in 2009. If one takes into account that estimates for 
increases in quality of output added 1.1% to the 2009 output figure then, given the ONS’s  
concerns about the reliability of the quality adjustments the initial estimates of productivity, 
improvement in 2009 should be treated with caution. 
The NAO concluded that the poor productivity record of the NHS hospital sector was a 
consequence of NHS managers not focusing sufficiently on NHS productivity but instead on 
‘the delivery of national performance targets and delivering financial balance. The national 
focus on quality of care has meant that clinical staff have not been performance managed 
with regard to the cost or efficiency of their activities’(NAO 2010 p.8). An alternative view 
is presented by Smith in his prescription for a world class NHS, he notes that most of the 
extra expenditure up to 2006-7 ‘has been eaten up by administration and staffing costs’ 
(Smith 2007 p. 43). He is particularly critical of the national pay agreements for consultants 
and nursing staff. Smith’s view is partly supported by the Kings Fund’s analysis which 
attributes £1.7 billion of the £4.5 billion increase in hospital and community health funding 
in 2006-7 directly to pay pressures (approximately forty per cent) (Kings Fund 2006 p.2-3). 
For the purposes of this research the evidence for NHS productivity for the 2000-2010 
suggests that overall NHS productivity has fallen by 0.2 percent per year (and in the hospital 
sector by 1.4 percent) (NAO 2010) but within that overall position between 2004-2008 the 
NHS has shown some productivity gains (Appleby and Ham 2010). As the data collection 
occurred during the period that NHS productivity showed some improvement then it is 
possible that the productivity metrics and RCI data in Chapter Six may demonstrate some 
productivity improvement. 
3.3  Competition and Choice 
Burgess, Propper and Wilson (2005) reviewed the main economic research literature 
attempting to identify what evidence had been produced as to whether choice (i.e service 
provision by several providers in competition with one another) leads to improved outcomes 
in education and health care. 
Burgess et al (2005) note that choice has been attractive to policy makers because (by 
applying standard economic analysis of the private firm) the expectation is that by competing 
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for consumers, private entities improve in efficiency; both in cost and quality. Implicit 
therefore is that the discipline of choice can provide similar gains in the public sector. 
The authors conclude that, for the health sector, choice will certainly create competition 
between hospitals but this will cause consolidation within the provider market with such 
mergers reducing the potential benefits of competition. Hospitals are likely to specialise in 
some treatments (and discontinue others) effectively reducing competition in those 
specialities and that there will be increased variation in the treatment received by individual 
patients. They suggest the benefits will include lower hospital costs (this is supported by the 
international evidence in 8.4) and improved quality as providers are forced to differentiate 
their health products by quality criteria as opposed to price. Burgess et al suggest that, in 
light of the potential for market consolidation by hospital mergers, the DoH will require a 
pro-competition policy. Competition provides a challenge for the NHS in that historically the 
achievement of stability has been the modus operandi of the system.
Le Grand (1999) notes that the NHS’s introduction of an internal market in the 1990’s had 
minimal impact upon the health system because central government retained large amounts of 
control and the motivations of managerial and professional groups within the system had not 
been fully understood. Or as Le Grand commented “ the motivations for change were 
relatively weak, especially when compared to the pressures for stability from outside” (Le 
Grand 1999, p33). Le Grand’s argument is that for the internal market to be effective, the 
patient’s agent (the GP in this case) requires incentives to respond to market signals and there 
needs to be a lack of constraint on the agent to respond. He argues the degree of control 
exercised by health authorities, in order to avoid provider instability, was significant and this 
limited the ability and willingness of GPs to respond to market signals and change 
commissioning behaviour. 
Burgess et al (2005) identified two key problems with increased competition. Firstly, that if 
the price for a procedure is too low then quality may fall as providers either exit from that 
product line (the most expensive may exit but they may be providing the higher quality 
product) and skimping and dumping of patients may occur. This involves avoiding the 
treatment of the more complex patient within each HRG while attracting the less expensive 
by offering higher perceived consumer quality. Quality may of course constitute superior 
hotel type facilities (from the patient’s perspective) as opposed to any clinical superiority. 
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Will choice actually be exercised? Burgess et al also note that in the DoH’s choice pilot 
schemes (urban centres Manchester and London) patient choice was facilitated by good 
administrative and information support to patients along with financial support to cover 
travel. It is highly unlikely that the information, technical and financial support will be 
available on a full system roll-out. 
Le Grand (1999) provides some indication of what can be expected in a more quasi market 
environment in his review of the NHS internal market (“IM”) in the 1990’s. Although, as 
mentioned earlier, he thinks the impact of the IM was minimal (because of government 
control and behaviour of clinicians and managers) he does identify some key themes. He 
tentatively argues that a very crude measure of productive efficiency (pre and post the 
internal market) indicates that post reform this improved by about a third from 1.5% to 2% 
(Le Grand 1999 p.30). He also argues GPs who were fund holders (i.e. controlled delegated 
budgets) generally obtained better and faster responses from the acute providers on behalf of 
their patients. On this basis we might therefore expect competition (if exercised) to promote 
efficiency and quality. 
Criticism of the IM often focuses upon transaction costs associated with managing provider 
contracts. Le Grand acknowledges administrative costs of the NHS increased from 8-11% 
between 1991-2 to 1995-6 (Le Grand 1999 p30) but he argues the output and other 
improvements during the period outweigh this cost. 
Both Burgess and Le Grand support the concept of choice and competition and suggest that 
improvements in efficiency and quality can be produced in such an environment. The key 
concerns are that Burgess et al argue that the market may well consolidate (especially for 
providers) thus sustaining what are often local provider monopolies. Le Grand raises the 
prospect that the inability of the government to cease controlling the NHS, coupled with not 
understanding the motivations of key players in the quasi market, may limit the effect of 
system reform. In either situation the potential gain from the current government’s reforms 
could be muted. Or as Klein concluded on the IM “the outcome was less catastrophic than its 
opponents feared and less radical than its proponents hoped” (Klein 2001 p.115). 
Other concerns expressed by some critics of competition and choice in the health sector, that 
such policies lead to service inequality, was partially addressed by Cooper, McGuire, Jones 
and Le Grand (2009) in their review of reductions in waiting times access across socio-
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economic groups in England. Although their research could not attribute the reduction of 
waiting times between 2005-2007 to the introduction of patient choice and competition into 
the NHS, as several policy variables (such as increased funding and waiting time targets) 
were acting concurrently, they did conclude that the introduction of patient choice and 
competition had not led to the inequitable distribution of access to treatment, in terms of 
waiting time, across socio-economic groups. If anything, it appeared that during the whole 
data period, 1997-2007, variation in access times to treatment by socio-economic group had 
actually declined. 
Dixon and Le Grand (2006) also argue that even in the absence of choice and competition in 
the NHS, inequities in the demand and supply of NHS services by socio-economic group 
already exist. For example, variation in knowledge, costs of access (e.g. transport) and 
capabilities of service users impact on service access. Dixon and Le Grand argue that choice 
and competition policies, if designed well, can actually reduce inequity by providing users 
with agents (or key workers) to support the patient in exercising their choices effectively. 
The concern that competition can have the effect of reducing quality in service provision was 
addressed by Gaynor, Moreno-Serra and Propper (2010) in their review of 13 million NHS 
admissions. They concluded that death rates, and lengths of stay, were lower in areas of the 
country which had multiple providers suggesting that competition can lead to higher quality. 
The authors noted that as commissioners could only procure services on the basis of quality 
(price being set under the PbR payment system) the potential negative consequences of 
competition leading to commissioning by price rather than quality was not evident. Their 
conclusion was that the structure of the pricing system in an internal market was therefore a 
factor in ensuring competition promoted quality. 
In addition, recent research by Bloom, Propper, Seiler and Van Reenen (Revised 2011) 
applied a new management capability survey tool to English hospitals and they concluded 
that the presence of a competing hospital in a district is associated with a significant higher 
rating of management capability within those hospitals (as indicated by their survey tool) and 
that this higher management capability is associated with improved clinical outcomes. In 
particular, they observed that heart attack survival rates are 9.5 per cent higher in these 
contested hospitals compared to hospitals not facing competition. 
As indicated above there is a body of academic opinion that is strongly opposed to the 
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introduction of competition and choice into public services. In broad terms the opposition 
can be categorised as flowing from two perspectives. Firstly, writers such as Allyson Pollock 
object to the use of competition and choice on the basis that the market progressively 
undermines “comprehensiveness, universality and equity” (Pollock 2004, p17). David 
Marquand takes a similar view arguing that putting the delivery of public services into the 
market domain undermines the service ethic of the public domain which he believes is the 
true guarantor of quality (Marquand 2004). 
This perspective was developed further by writers such as Peter Smith who argued that the 
Kennedy Report in 2001, into infant mortality at the Bristol Royal Infirmary (BRI) (which 
identified that failures in organisational culture with respect to safety, accountability, 
openness and teamwork) means that policy makers can’t assume that the objectives of the 
principal (for instance citizens or patients) correspond to the objectives of the agent (the 
clinician). He argued that the solutions to the cultural issues identified at the BRI would be 
restricted by competitive behaviour that would impact adversely on the willingness of  
professional groups to share experience, learn and undertake activities that are outside 
contractual requirements. 
The second body of opposition to competition in health originates from a more economic/ 
evidence based perspective. The classic argument for the non-applicability of 
competition/markets to solutions for health care delivery was articulated by Kenneth Arrow 
in 1963. Arrow argued that the asymmetry of information between providers of health care 
and the patient (as the consumer) meant that the patient was unable to seek the best product 
at the lowest price or to access complete information as would happen in a traditional market 
(Arrow 1963). As medical science advances this is probably even more the case now than in 
1963. In the NHS context it is often argued that general practitioners (GPs) act as agents for 
patients and overcome the problem of asymmetric information by advising the patient on 
what is available within the market. But as treatment options become more complex, and 
GPs become more involved in rationing services to patients through their role as 
commissioners within clinical commissioning groups, it is becoming less clear that they can 
effectively fill that role. 
Burgess et al (2006) conducted an international review of evidence on the effects of 
competition between hospitals and other providers, and apart from the United States, they 
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found limited evidence to conclude whether competition promoted or was detrimental to 
efficiency or quality. From the US evidence they found that if prices were fixed then quality 
and costs can benefit from competition. However the research also identified problems that 
arise from competition. 
Firstly, Burgess et al found that the asymmetry of information (which Arrow identified) was 
evident in the US with the information provided not being in a form that patients could use. 
The research also identified that there was evidence of cream skimming (where providers 
tried to attract patients they believed they could treat for a cost less than the fixed fee). This 
might lead to access problems for patients with more complex needs. The authors considered 
this to be a potential problem for the UK as PbR could promote provider behaviour that 
encouraged market entry by providers that delivered a narrow bundle of services for a less 
complex group of patients (i.e skimming). In addition, fixed prices can create an incentive 
not to treat more ill patients (dumping) or at the very least not to intervene as actively with 
this group (skimping).
The body of evidence on the impact of competition in health policy within the UK is slowly 
building and the international evidence is inconclusive although that from the United States, 
(mostly from California) is more developed. At present the research from England is 
inconclusive. The concern is that the research is largely based on data from the period before 
significant financial pressure was applied to the NHS and the responses of organisations 
might be very different under conditions of financial pressure. 
From the point of view of this research it is clear that competition has the potential to change 
behaviour, for instance Burgess et al’s concerns about cream skimming and dumping of 
patients potentially impacting upon quality. Marquand’s observation concerning the service 
ethic and Smith’s concern about the market driving different behaviours of staff concerning 
quality improvement. Conversely, competition (when aligned with PbR) might have an 
impact upon clinicians and managers to minimise the effect on their services from 
competitors or take advantage of market opportunities to expand successful services. 
Competition will therefore be a term that is searched in the document review to ascertain if 
competition has had any effect on the focus of the board of directors of each case study. 
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3.4  Experience of PbR 
The following acronyms are used in this section: 
DRG-Diagnosis related group; 
ECG-Electrocardiogram; 
LoS-Length of stay; 
PbR-Payment by Results; and 
PPS-Prospective payment system. 
 
PbR is the English prospective payment system (PPS) for acute care delivered by private or 
public providers but funded by the NHS. As PPSs have been introduced in various health 
care systems including Portugal, Hungary, Australia and the United States the probable 
impact of PbR can be ascertained by reviewing some key international literature as well as 
that from the England. 
Farrar and Yi et al (2009) examined whether the introduction of PbR was associated with 
changes in costs, volume and quality of care during the initial period of the introduction of 
PbR into the NHS for the years 2003-4 and 2005-6. They concluded that using the proxy 
measures of quality of in-hospital mortality, 30 day post surgical mortality and emergency re-
admission after treatment of a hip fracture there had been no measurable changes in the 
quality of care. In addition they found evidence that the average length of stay had fallen and 
day case rates had increased in hospitals subject to PbR faster than non PbR hospitals in the 
control group (i.e hospitals in Scotland and non FT hospitals not subject to PbR in the early 
period of implementation). Although total activity had also increased with the introduction of 
PbR, the research was not able to attribute this increased activity solely to PbR because the 
government had also introduced performance targets to increase the speed of patient access to 
treatment at the same time as PbR had been introduced. The research could not separate these 
effects. Subject to the limitations that the data covers the early period of the implementation 
of PbR when hospital behaviours might not have fully adjusted to the incentives introduced 
by the prospective payment system and that the quality indicators adopted might not be easily 
impacted by quality of care changes (particularly the two mortality indicators) the research 
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suggests that PbR might create incentives to reduce costs of care delivery and PbR’s 
introduction did not lead to a deterioration in quality. 
Shelley and Farrar et al (2011) develop the above thinking further noting that the combination 
of PbR and the wider NHS reforms introduced in the first decade of this century have been 
associated with reductions in unit costs, and if the above research is correct, no deterioration 
in quality. They note that that conclusion does not take account of the transaction and other 
costs associated with the reforms and the introduction of PbR which they indicate could be 
significant. They point out that the increase in the level of activity that appears to have 
occurred in the acute sector, at the same time as the impact of PbR has been felt, may well be 
more around policy initiatives on waiting times for access (e.g 18 week referral to treatment 
targets) rather than PbR stimulating increased activity by hospitals as they try to maximise 
income. They also note that if PbR is to be extended to other specialties then the tariff needs 
to better reflect case mix (to avoid providers trying to take the easy cases with lower costs 
(cream skimming)) and tariff setting will have to become more sophisticated. 
Dismuke and Sena (1999) noted that in the Portuguese system Diagnosis Related Groups 
(DRGs) were introduced to replace a retrospective payment system for public hospitals. They 
reviewed the effect of the introduction of the DRG payment system on several diagnostic 
processes including the electrocardiogram (ECG). Dismuke found evidence that the length of 
stay (LoS) for the most frequently occurring DRG’s declined. In addition, she noted that the 
intensity of treatment devoted to each admission also declined. Based upon the three 
diagnostic technologies reviewed (including EEG) Dismuke concludes the increased use of 
these technologies may be leading to increased efficiency and productivity. 
However, as Dismuke noted, reductions in LoS, or reduced intensity of treatment per 
admission, do not necessarily lead to greater efficiency. Although Dismuke does not 
expressly raise the issues of value for money and quality, poorer clinical outcomes caused by 
reduced LoS need to be taken into account when considering whether improved efficiency 
has been achieved. She also notes that Portuguese hospitals may have suffered from moral 
hazard (because of the marginal payment effect) in that hospitals reduce the intensity of 
treatment per patient in order to avoid having to cover the higher costs. Presumably the 
incentive will be particularly strong if the hospital’s current cost of delivering the treatment 
is above the relevant DRG (i.e. a loss making activity). 
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Getzen (2004) commenting on the United State’s experience of DRGs observes that the 
US benefited from a reduction in the rate of increase in costs in Part A Medicare expenditure 
(i.e. inpatient treatment). He notes this cost control measure had an impact on hospital costs 
generally, and that the pricing system forced activity into Part B Medicare expenditure (i.e 
outpatient and day surgery). Medicare has used PPS to apply pressure to control the real 
increase in prices paid under each DRG. 
If the US process of controlling the increase in the annual uplift in prices was applied to the 
PbR system then this could be used as a driver for promoting greater efficiency within the 
acute sector of the NHS. This seems a clear possibility under PbR as the tariff setting process 
for each HRG within PbR for 2006-7 assumed an efficiency saving of 2.5% and in 2010-11 
and 2011-12 tariff uplift was only 1.5% and 0% respectively therefore assuming significant 
productivity improvements (DoH 2011). The tariff has therefore been uplifted by less than 
NHS annual cost increases to reflect this. 
Morrisey and Sloan  et al (1988) found that there was a dramatic reduction of 9% in the 
average LoS for Medicare patients in the first year of PPS (Morrisey 1988 p. 52). This has 
led Morrisey and others to argue that such dramatic reductions in LoS over such a short 
period may not be clinically justified.
Steinwald and Dummit (1989) looked at DRG creep, where the average case mix across 
DRGs of patients treated increases over time. They argue payments to hospitals rise in the 
early periods of PPS not because of the annual updating process (e.g. increased rates to reflect 
inflation for each DRG) but because of increases in recorded case mix. They calculate that for 
the period 1983-88 the cumulative formal update saw less than an 8% rise in payments 
compared to 20% for case mix charges (Steinwald and Dummit 1989 p.35). 
Steinwald et al argue that the increased case mix is due to three factors: improved coding; 
treating more poorly patients (i.e. real change in illness); and intentional gaming of the 
system. They contend that much of the initial DRG creep in the US was a rational 
consequence of the system by which the accuracy of coding is improved (as it is the basis of 
charging). In addition, PPS encourages the treatment of less ill patients in non-acute settings 
(thus increasing the average complexity of those treated in hospitals). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests this is currently happening in the English system. Great 
commercial emphasis is being placed by hospitals on improving coding (including the 
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recruitment of more specialist coders) and the move to coding systems based upon 
the proposed electronic patient record. Procedures, such as simple ophthalmic work, is 
moving to non-acute care settings leaving more complex procedures in the hospital. 
The improvement in coding accuracy by English NHS hospitals has been noted by the Audit 
Commission in its annual reviews of coding accuracy. Provisional data for the year 2010-11 
indicates that of the 30 high risk trusts audited by the Commission 87% of the organisations 
showed improved coding accuracy for inpatient activity and 83% for outpatient activity 
(Audit Commission 2011 p.1). 
Finally for the US, Ginsburg and Grossman (2005) argue that if PPS becomes misaligned 
with the average costs of hospitals (for individual procedures) then expansion and 
contraction of services can occur at variance with patient need. Ginsburg and Crossman 
particularly identify new technology focussed procedures where productivity in the delivery 
of the care improves quickly (i.e. care processes improve and updated versions of the 
technology produce gains). Because individual provider cost information is not readily 
available in the US, this often results in the PPS system providing hospitals with greater 
profit margins on DRGs which have made productivity gains. This encourages over 
provision of those services and can lead to supplier induced demand. 
The Ginsburg and Crossman research is based upon interviews with senior managers in the 
health sector and is not supported by detailed data but if the findings are correct then how 
PbR operates to distort margins on each HRG may impact on service provision. As PPS in the 
USA sets DRG payments based on average prices charged by providers (as opposed to 
average costs under PbR) the degree of variation in margins should be less severe. An annual 
relative cost index is calculated within the NHS and is used to set PbR payments (DoH 2010).  
What may be important in the English system is the impact of HRG payments on early 
implementers of change. For instance, the wide use of coronary artery stents by major 
teaching hospitals in the UK was not reflected in the average cost of early versions of 
the relevant HRG. The impact of this was to significantly increase the risk of 
expanding coronary services for some major hospitals.  
Langenbrunner and Wiley (2002) have looked at hospital payment mechanisms in transition
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countries (i.e. the former Eastern Bloc countries) and note that payment system changes 
create new drivers for hospitals in the delivery of services. They observe that the method 
chosen to count exactly what a hospital does is fundamental to the introduction of a payment 
method. The logic is for the care package to be broken down to its constituent parts and the 
hospital will be rewarded for adding as many ingredients as possible into the patient’s care 
package to maximise fee income. This, as Wiley et al note, results in reductions in quality 
(i.e. unnecessary procedures) and increases in overall expenditure. 
Langenbrunner and Wiley also observed that since the early 1990’s Hungary has used 
payment per discharge taking into account types of cases and case mix (i.e. a modification of 
the USA DRG). Unlike the US system the total health spend is subject to a global 
expenditure cap and each of the constituent elements of the health system (primary care, 
outpatient care and inpatient care) have their own monetary caps within the global figure. 
Wiley also observes that each of the sectors share of total spend has been stable since the 
system’s introduction in 1992. 
Experience in Hungary suggests that admissions to hospital may rise. For instance, hospital 
admissions per 100 rose from 21.8 to 24.2 between 1990 and 1996 (Wiley 2002 p.166). In 
addition, if outpatient treatment of a condition occurs (as opposed to inpatient) and outpatient 
treatment is reimbursed at a lower rate (such as the 0.7 coefficient applied to the inpatient 
rate in Hungary) then there is no incentive to move treatment to outpatient settings. In 
addition, Hungary has witnessed DRG creep with the case mix index increasing from 0.97 to 
1.10 between 1993 and 1996 (Orosz 1999 and 1997). 
Langenbrunner  and Wiley have also found that excess hospital capacity has increased post 
the introduction of PPS and it has failed to stimulate structural change in the acute sector. 
What is also of interest is that they observe that where bed capacity has been removed there 
has been no corresponding reduction in the number of employees. Physician and specialist 
doctor numbers increased by 27 and 12 per cent respectively between 1990 and 1996 (Wiley 
2002 p.166). They credit the expansion of the medical workforce (during what was a period 
of difficult employment conditions in the wider Hungarian economy) to structural rigidities 
in the health care labour market caused by statutory employment protection rights (Public 
Servants Act and Civil Servants Act). 
Goes and Zhan (1995) noted that after the introduction of the PPS for hospitals in California 
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in the 1980s providers which demonstrated the most effective integration of doctors with 
hospitals produced lower operating costs. Hurst and Williams (2012) note previous studies, 
including  Burns and Muller (2008), which indicate that doctor and hospital management 
behaviours that produce integration include, amongst other factors: behaviours which 
indicate hospital doctors trust the hospital management executives; that there is doctor 
involvement in clinical decision making;, that consistent doctor and hospital executive 
leadership persists over time; and that programmes for doctor leadership development are 
promoted. 
Three key concerns therefore arise from the international experiences of PbR. Firstly PbR 
should promote a shift to greater use of outpatient treatment. The concern would be that this 
driver could be dampened by reimbursing outpatient treatment at an inappropriately low rate 
compared to inpatient work. This would encourage the Hungarian effect where total acute 
sector admissions continued to rise.
The second concern would be the emergence of DRG creep and/or reductions in treatment 
intensity in some cases. The current concern in the NHS is that acute providers will “game” 
the payment system so at to maximise reward under PbR. Any rational organisation would 
wish to achieve full payment for the work it carries out (under whatever system) and 
therefore FT and non-FTs are recruiting staff to, and improving the quality of, their coding 
systems. It is  likely that at least a one-off transition period of DRG/HRG creep will occur in 
the UK as coding improves and under-recording of complexity ceases. The question is will 
the regulatory controls under PbR be sufficient to ensure coding is not “inflated” to an 
inappropriate HRG? 
The final concern would be that because of restrictions on the restructuring of the health 
worker labour force (as in Hungary) structural change and reductions in capacity (where 
required) to align costs with PbR tariff will not occur. The Royal Colleges, health sector 
unions and politically imposed restraints by central government may well stop the acute 
sector labour force being substantially reduced during any necessary system re-modelling. 
Recent comment from the media over several thousand potential redundancies in non-FTs 
(Spring 2010) indicates that political/social restrictions on the ability to reduce worker head 
count may be substantial. In addition, recent industrial action by public sector workers 
(including health workers) against changes in pension rights (December 2011) suggests 
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changes in terms and conditions of employment will be equally problematic. 
For the purposes of this research the above evidence suggests that PPS, like PbR, can be 
effective in reducing costs (for example Dismuke and Sena (1999)). This suggests that PbR 
could contribute to cost reductions, but does not provide any evidence for how this might be 
caused. For instance, did the PPS system lead to the alignment of clinical and managerial 
incentives thus contributing to cost reduction?  There is no strong evidence in the above 
literature that PPS leads to reductions in the quality of care, particularly from the English 
evidence, for example Farrar and Yi et al (2009). As the semi- structured interviews with 
clinical and managerial leaders will cover issues of quality, further evidence may be 
identified as to whether PPS can impact on service quality. It is particularly hoped that this 
research will build on Goes and Zhan’s (1995) and Hurst and Williams’s (2012) observations 
that clinical engagement with cost and income data contribute to delivering reductions in 
costs . 
3.5  Determinants of Hospital Behaviour 
3.5.1  External 
The NHS has a history of being a centrally funded national service but, as Klein notes, with a 
desire by ministers to devolve responsibility for how those funds are spent (Klein 2001). A 
key policy consequence of the desire to delegate management responsibility was the “brisk 
and decisive” report (Klein 2001 p. 124) commissioned from Sir Roy Griffiths (former chief 
executive of Sainsburys Plc) in 1988. This report heralded the establishment of a professional 
group of managers which as Ferlie, Ashburner  et al (2006) note have become both better 
paid, subject to tougher appraisal and have much less job security. This group of professional 
managers have become the leaders of a decentralised NHS. 
The process of decentralisation of the NHS has been progressive, firstly by the creation of 
NHS Trusts which, while still accountable to the Secretary of State (SofS), became legally 
responsible for the staff they managed and the services and care they provided (DoH 1990). 
In 2004 this decentralisation was further extended with the creation of FTs which were no 
longer accountable to the SofS but notionally to their members (via governors elected from 
their membership) and the regulators (in particular Monitor the FT regulator) and ultimately 
to Parliament (DoH 2003). As Dr John Reid (the then SofS) noted  ‘Parliament would have 
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to address their questions to the Trust chair” and by implication no longer to an elected 
politician (Edwards and Fall 2005 p.191). 
In tandem with the movement to greater operational control of the delivery of NHS services 
to hospitals (by NHS Trusts or FTs)  there developed an NHS culture of target setting and 
assessment of organisations  against those targets. And as Flynn  notes the NHS has mostly 
shown improvement as ‘targets concentrate efforts to their achievement” (Flynn 2009 
p.271).An example of this target setting is the accident and emergency maximum four hour 
waiting target which the NHS has generally achieved. Professor Steve Kelman, when noting 
the impact of the measure found that the use of the target to be an “efficiency enhancing 
improvement in treatment technologies” (Barber 2007 p.170 ).  
In the case of NHS Trusts, organisations have been performance managed against those 
targets by strategic health authorities (Higgins and Bradshaw et al 2005) and in the case of 
FTs by the FT regulator, Monitor (Monitor 2011a). The process of establishing a professional 
cadre of managers, decentralising operational control of the NHS, and the use of performance 
management, have become key elements of the phenomenon known as new public 
management (Ferlie et al 1996). 
The FT regulator’s role is two fold. Firstly, it is responsible for the authorisation of an NHS 
Trust to become an FT, assessing an organisation’s capacity and capability to operate as an 
autonomous NHS healthcare provider independent of the powers of direction of the SofS. 
Secondly, when it has authorised the provider, Monitor regulates the operation of that FT to 
ensure it complies with its terms of authorisation (Talbot-Smith and Pollock 2007 p.112). 
Through its role Monitor considers itself to be able to bring significant external pressure on 
organisations as evidenced by its effective action with regard to thirty FTs with performance 
issues since 2004 (Monitor 2010 p.1). 
In the event that Monitor determines that an FT is in ‘significant breach’ of its terms of 
authorisation Monitor has wide powers under section 52 of the Health and Social Care 
(Community Health and Standards) Act 2003 to require specific action of the board of 
directors, and in some cases removal of members of the board. For example , the removal of 
the chair of the board of directors of Bradford Teaching Hospitals Foundation Trust in 2004 
(Talbot-Smith and Pollock 2007, p113) and Colchester University Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust in 2009 ( FTGA 2010). 
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The other main regulatory pressure on FTs is from the care quality commission (CQC ) 
and its earlier incarnations i.e the Commission for Health Improvement. The CQC sets 
minimum standards for care processes (e.g respect and dignity) and then inspects FTs for 
compliance (Walshe 2003). The CQC has the legal power to stop FTs providing services if 
the FT fails to meet the standards of registration (CQC 2009) although to date Monitor has 
acted as the lead regulator for FTs and the CQC’s concerns have been channeled through 
Monitor : for example, quality concerns at Basildon and Thurrock University Hospitals FT 
were formally actioned through a Monitor section 52 notice requiring specific quality 
improvements (Monitor 2009a). Therefore, although FTs will be subject to external pressures 
from various parts of the health sector, for example the CQC and vested interests such as the 
British Medical Association and various Royal Colleges, Monitor appears to be a very 
influential external influence on FTs. 
3.5.2  Internal (governance) 
The governance structure of FTs removed accountability to the DoH and replaced it with 
compliance with a regulatory framework (discussed above) and local accountability to the 
members and governors of the FT. Dixon and Storey et al (2010) conducted a study which 
examined how FTs were being held accountable and by whom. The research based upon 
interviews with 75 respondents (mainly FT directors and governors) between 2006 and 2009 
found that  vertical accountability to the DoH had been replaced by accountability to the 
Council of Governors who were elected by the FT members to hold the board of directors to 
account for the performance of the FT. This is similar in many ways to the way in which 
shareholders hold the directors of private and public companies to account for the delivery of 
the strategic objectives of those companies. The research concluded that the ability of 
governors to effectively hold boards of directors to account was weak and in the absence of 
effective primary accountability to the governors at local level the FT regulator, Monitor had 
to a large extent filled the gap. The research concluded that FT boards of directors continue to 
look upwards in terms of accountability to Monitor, rather than downwards to their members 
(via the governors of the FT) and other local accountability mechanisms such as 
accountability to local commissioners of NHS services (i.e primary care trusts at the time the 
article was written), Overview and Scrutiny Committees and Local Involvement were also 
considered to be weak. 
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Allen and Keen et al (2012) looked at four case studies involving over a hundred 
interviews, observation of meetings and review of NHS documents) to explore the impact of 
external governance and internal governance on the FT case studies. The research noted that 
although FTs outperform NHS Trusts that performance pre-dates the move to FT status. In 
terms of the impact of FT external governance (i.e freedom from the traditional DoH 
performance management but subject to operating within a regulated quasi-market subject to 
the Monitor licence) the research found that the potential for Monitor to use its intervention 
powers affected the behaviour of FT directors when it came to the focus on the relationship 
with Monitor. With respect to internal governance and the board of directors accountability to 
the members and governors of the hospital governors interviewed had mixed views about 
their ability to hold the board of directors to account for the performance of the hospital. The 
research also noted that the ability of FTs to retain any surpluses generated by PbR made PbR 
as a mechanism influential on the FT. The research noted that the national tariff under PbR 
produced incentives to reduce costs but that some clinicians had concerns about this incentive 
as it translates practically into a push to discharge patients early. 
The internal governance results noted by Allen and Keen et al (2012) above were supported 
by Lewis and Hinton (2008) in their one -year case study of Homerton Hospital in London. 
The study involved interviews with governors and directors, observation of meetings and a 
review of documents. The authors noted that the governors’ perception was that they had little 
impact on the decisions of the hospital during the case study period and both directors and 
governors lacked clarity on the role of governors. This lack of clarity as to governor function 
significantly restricted the development of the new governance model potentially leading to 
an accountability gap. Vertical accountability to the DoH had been removed but local 
accountability to the population served by the hospital was not fully developed. 
Anand and Exworthy et al (2012) also conducted research based on 52 interviews with senior 
NHS managers and explored the extent to which FTs had the incentives and capacity to 
respond to the increased autonomy provided by FT status. They noted that the independence 
provided by FT status (for example the ability to retain cash  surpluses) provided an 
opportunity to develop and improve services for those managers who wanted to, but that 
increased autonomy does not imply that it will be exercised. This is particularly if FT 
managers are risk adverse and those managers perceive that they are more individually 
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exposed by exercising that autonomy rather than diffusing their responsibility upwards 
through a hierarchy. The authors argue that this risk averseness of managers has to some 
extent restricted the delivery of the policy objective that FT autonomy would promote 
innovation. FTs have the legal ability to exersise discretion but a combination of NHS 
managers having operated for long periods of time in a centralised culture, having limited 
entrepreneurial skills and capacity, and the fear of destabilising good local relationships has 
inhibited FTs’ willingness to exercise that autonomy. 
The above research suggests that due to failures in the internal governance regime for FTs (be 
it due to cultural behaviours of NHS executives to look to Whitehall for command and control 
or the increasingly directional approach of Monitor due to the perceived inability of 
governors to hold boards of directors to account for the performance of their FTs) FT boards 
of directors are significantly influenced by Monitor. As part of the semi-structured interviews, 
and the documentary review, these issues will be further explored.  
 
3.5.3  Internal (clinical and managerial) 
In addition to governance structures impacting on organisational behaviours individual staff 
behaviours will clearly have an impact.  
A review by Addicott (2011) into social enterprise in healthcare looked at how a combination 
of local autonomy (for instance through a social enterprise either directly owned (e.g share 
ownership) or indirectly owned through a trust structure) combined with staff engagement can 
contribute to innovation. For the purposes of this research one of Addicott’s key conclusions 
was that theoretical staff enpowerment, for instance through direct or indirect ownership of a 
social enterprise, does not itself lead to staff engagement and innovation. Addicott noted that 
one of the key policy drivers for promoting the social enterprise policy in health is to bring 
employee involvement into decision making and she noted that the literature supports the 
view that it is the staff engagement in decision making which is associated with a stronger 
tendency for social enterprise innovation rather than staff ownership of the organisation. 
From her interviews with FT chief executives she concluded greater staff engagement with 
decision making was being developed, for instance the introduction of service line 
management (where business decision making and accountability rests at service level with 
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staff being more engaged in decision making). The question for this research is the degree 
to which PbR in the four FT case studies has contributed to staff involvement in decision 
making and therefore innovation and productivity.  
Graham and Steele (2001) have looked at the motivation of doctors and managers. They 
conducted a survey of 85 managers and 44 doctors in which they had to prioritise thirteen 
motivating factors. Hospital managers, general practice managers and hospital consultants all 
prioritised the ‘desire to deliver a good quality service’ as their top priority. GPs within the 
group prioritised ‘working in a productive team’ as their top motivating factor. It would 
appear that, at least in the hospital context, this gives some support to the belief that clinicians 
and managers are working to the same broad objectives. In earlier research Steele conducted a 
survey of managers in the public, private and not-for profit sectors involving detailed 
interviews with over 400 respondents either in person or by telephone. The most common 
goal identified by public sector managers was to provide a service to the community (1999). 
In terms of manager motivation this lends support to Steele’s later research above. 
If we move our attention to clinical motivation Mathie (1997) conducted questionnaire 
research based upon 42 responses (a small sample) on what motivated consultants to adopt 
change within their working environment. The main findings were that clinicians are 
motivated to change behaviour if it frees up time and the change is perceived to improve the 
quality of care. It is not surprising that time is a high value commodity for clinicians but it is 
interesting that they appear, from this research, willing to adopt change in order that they 
have more of it. The question would be what would they use that released time for: more 
public work; private work; or leisure and family? 
Nantha (2013) looked at the intrinsic motivation of doctors (i.e the ability to pursue an 
activity/challenge based on ones interest and ability to do so) rather than providing tangible 
rewards. He argues that clinicians perform best when intrinsic motivation is maximised 
arguing that cultures of standardisation (thus reducing clinical autonomy) deadlines, 
environmental pressure and financial rewards undermine intrinsic motivation and therefore 
reduce clinicians performance. This is supported by Humphrey and Russell (2004). They 
interviewed 60 surgeons and physicians (who had NHS and private practice earnings) with 
the objective of identifying what was attractive to them in working in private practice 
compared to their NHS role. In addition to the financial reward associated with personal self 
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interest the respondents identified strategic influence (as they brought in paying clients), 
clinical autonomy (they could select their own teams), a sense of being valued (they received 
peer approval by being asked to work with colleagues) and ability to realise their individual 
clinical aspirations (ability to innovate and try new approaches) as reasons for working within 
private practice. This latter research provides real incite into clinical motivation. 
From the point of view of this research project the above results suggest that if PbR allows 
clinicians to enagage in decision making with general managers( providing strategic 
influence) and clinicians acquire greater respect for engaging with that process (peer 
approval) then it is possible that clinical engagement with PbR might be effective. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DOCUMENT REVIEW 
 
‘The fish rots from the head’ 
Chinese proverb 
 
 
4.1 PURPOSE 
As indicated in chapter Two, the research set out to investigate whether the introduction of 
PbR in four acute sector FTs led to an alignment of clinical and managerial incentives leading 
to improved output, quality, quantity and productivity (and if so) the reasons for this.  A 
document review was undertaken as part of a triangulation of data which included interviews 
with senior NHS staff (see the next chapter), a review of board minute documents (set out in 
this chapter) and a high level analysis of productivity data (set out in chapter six). 
The objective of reviewing the board minutes was to identify the degree to which the boards 
of directors, as the directing mind of each of the four case studies, had focussed upon activity, 
quality and productivity issues during their time as FTs and to identify any changes in that 
focus over the period of the research. In addition, it was hoped that an indication of possible 
drivers for that focus would be identified. 
 
4.2 METHOD 
4.2.1  Board minutes in context 
Prior to the creation of FTs the vast majority of issues discussed in formal board meetings 
were minuted in some detail and made available for public inspection. This has resulted in 
board minutes being readily available on the websites of NHS organisations and historically 
has led to relatively straightforward access to board-level documentary data. 
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As the board minutes of NHS trusts are generally detailed they provide an excellent source of 
information with regard to why decisions are made and the concerns expressed in coming to 
those decisions. In addition, as the boards of NHS trusts are unitary (i.e. they contain 
executive and non-executive directors who have the same statutory liability under the law) 
the challenge that good non-executives bring to the decision-making process assists in 
identifying the motives and rationale for decisions. Due to issues arising from personal legal 
liability for negligent decisions non-executives are often keen to have the full reasons for 
decisions recorded to prove due diligence and limit their legal exposure. This makes NHS 
board minutes a potentially rich source of data. 
The traditional limit to this extensive disclosure has been matters reserved to what are 
technically known as Part II of the board meetings where issues of a highly commercial or 
delicate clinical nature would be discussed in private. Part II elements of NHS board 
meetings have traditionally covered a small number of issues (often because the Chairmen of 
these organisations have believed in transparency in public service decision-making) and 
under these conditions Part II constraints would not have been material in limiting the 
effectiveness of documentary reviews in identifying a board of directors’ focus and motives.  
With the creation of FTs, and the modus operandi of the new organisations believing that 
they operated in a quasi-market environment within the NHS, there was a significant risk that 
large amounts of detail would be omitted from the Part I minutes of the FT (fully disclosable) 
and moved into Part II of the meeting.  This concern was tested by reviewing a small 
selection of board meeting minutes of each case study prior to attaining FT status and 
identifying the degree of change. 
If this had proved to be a material concern then the case study trusts would have been 
approached for access to Part II minutes or, ultimately, the disclosure provisions of the FoI 
(2000) could have been used to require disclosure. In the event neither of these options were 
required as the case studies continued to report in a broadly similar way. 
As the quasi-market for health becomes more established there may be an increasing amount 
of information that is placed in the Part II agenda and a reduction in the number of public 
board meetings. This could well impact on future research that uses FT documentary data. 
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As indicated in chapter Two it would have been possible to search other types of 
documents as part of the review. In particular, a review of the operational management team 
minutes (often referred to as HMT) could have been undertaken as HMT deals more with the 
operational delivery of the services and often involves clinicians and management in the 
decision making process. These documents may have been a good source of data. 
However, two practical reasons made access to these documents unrealistic. Firstly, HMT 
minutes are not considered by hospitals to be public documents and therefore gaining access 
to electronic versions of this material would have involved significant additional time costs 
both for the researcher and hospital staff. Secondly, the chief executives of each of the case 
studies made access to their hospitals conditional upon ensuring that, apart from the 
interview time given by senior management, the research would not involve further resource 
implications for the FTs. The provisions of the FoI could of course have been used to secure 
access to the documents but this would no doubt have led to the withdrawal of co-operation 
by many of the case studies and as Machell, Gough and Steward (2009) note, effective 
boards will ensure key issues resulting from debates in committees, immediately below the 
board, are formally reported to the board. If good corporate governance is being followed 
this information will be recorded in the board minutes. 
The document review looked at a selection of board minutes made available on each case 
study’s public websites for a period of twelve months prior to the date of September 2007. 
The cut-off date of September 2007 for the end of the documentary review was chosen as it 
provided sufficient data to review and sufficient time for initial results of the review to 
inform the content of the semi-structured interviews discussed in chapter five. 
 
4.2.2  Search terms 
The next step after selecting the appropriate documents to review was to identify the phrases, 
words or context to search. On the basis that the central research question was looking at 
issues around PbR, quality, quantity of output and productivity these words, and a series of 
words and phrases commonly associated with the concepts, were searched. The phrases were 
identified in two main ways. Firstly, the central research question key words, for example 
‘PbR’ were noted, and as part of the literature review, phrases that were commonly 
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associated with the central research key terms were recorded and used in the documentary 
search. For example, Department of Health (DoH) technical guidance on PbR for the 
financial year 2003-4 extensively used ‘tariff ‘ as a substitute for price under PbR (DoH 
2003). Tariff was therefore used as a search term. The second approach was to search key 
terms in the central research question in the Collins English Dictionary. For example, a 
phrase associated with ‘productivity’ in the Collins English Dictionary is to ‘maximise 
output’ (Collins 2007). This phrase was one of the additional search terms identified in 4.2.3 
below. 
An anonymised example of the search criteria, search results and an example board minute 
with highlighted search results are set out in Appendix One and Appendix Two respectively.  
The original search focused upon productivity and involved a search of the words 
productivity, cost control (i.e control of the inputs to the production process) and efficiency 
which technically is the focus upon the process of production but in the health service is used 
loosely to mean productivity in many circles. As is explained later in this chapter the search 
criteria for identifying focus on productivity were extended. 
As the research was looking at the drivers for productivity improvement the use of the word 
productivity represented a good starting point. Historically productivity has not been a term 
used in everyday operations of the NHS and therefore alternatives were sought which were 
constituent parts of the productivity equation. As mentioned, efficiency was identified as an 
alternative to productivity as it focuses upon the production process using the inputs. In 
addition, the search included cost control, a common term; focus in the NHS is a focus upon 
the inputs of the production process as reflected in the institutionalised cost improvement 
programme.. 
The documents were also searched for possible drivers for productivity including financial 
balance, quality, service line reporting, the regulator Monitor, Payment by Results and Value 
for Money. In the case of payment by results the abbreviation PbR was also searched as was 
SLR in the case of service line reporting. 
As NHS trusts had historically had a statutory duty to balance revenue and expenditure over 
a three-year period (often referred to as financial balance), the researcher concluded this 
might be a strong potential driver for boards of directors looking at productivity.  
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As quality of care had been a strong focus of government policy since the NHS Plan had 
been introduced in 2000 quality of care was thought to be a potential driver for 
improvements in productivity as doctors (and clinicians more generally) were seeing the 
process of care (i.e. the series of interactions the patient is exposed to during treatment) as 
being critical to quality, including reducing delays in that journey without any increase in 
inputs. All things being equal this would be a driver for productivity. 
It was also felt that Monitor, as the lead regulator of FTs, had a unique power over these 
organisations in that the regulator could cancel an organisation’s right to operate by revoking 
its licence and had wide statutory powers of intervention including, but not limited to, the 
removal of members of the board under Section 52 of the National Health Service Act 2006. 
With this power of intervention it was felt Monitor might be able to affect an FT’s 
operational behaviour and the board’s focus. Monitor was therefore used as a search term. 
An example of the potential influence of Monitor is exemplified by Monitor introducing the 
concept of service line reporting (SLR) into the FT sector of the NHS. Historically, the NHS 
has operated large businesses (often larger than many FTSE 250 listed companies) without 
understanding the individual cost components of a patient’s treatment and the associated 
payment that the hospital receives for providing that intervention. SLR is the process by 
which cost data is collected on clinical areas are compared with the associated revenue 
allowing the effective management of individual services. Monitor anticipates that SLR will 
lead to improved financial performance as a consequence of improved reporting to 
management teams and boards of directors, and resultant productivity improvement. As well 
as searching Monitor in the documents, the researcher concluded that SLR would also be an 
appropriate search term. 
The final driver of productivity searched in the board minutes was Payment by Results. As 
explained in Chapter One this is the prospective payment system by which acute trusts 
receive payment for the services they provide to commissioners. Since 2006-7 the payment 
system has been uplifted by at least 2.5% less than the rise in the average costs of delivery of 
those services. As this payment system is fundamental to the financial sustainability of the 
FTs it would be expected that boards would be focusing large amounts of attention on 
ensuring that the services they deliver were being delivered at, or below, the payment 
received under PbR (i.e. below or at tariff). PbR was therefore searched within the board 
	   59	  
minutes. 
As many of the search phrases and words were often mentioned several times in one sentence 
(but clearly only referring to one event) the search method used required not only identifying 
the phrase word used but also analysing the context in which it was used. Directors also have 
words in their job titles, for instance quality, which would over emphasise quality as a board 
focus if the method used to review the documents was not able to contextualise the initial 
results. 
As outlined in Chapter Two, three options were identified for conducting the document 
search: NVIVO 7, Atlas.ti 5 and Microsoft Word search facility. The three options were 
trialed for effectiveness but the researcher found that the systematic word search offered by 
Microsoft Word allowed investigation of the context in which the word was used (for 
example, occurred within a director’s job title) and also permitted a judgement to be made as 
to whether the repeated use of the word or phrase represented a new occurrence or merely a 
repetition in the identical context. 
In order to test the methodology of using Microsoft Word as the search technique a selection 
of documents were searched by the researcher.  A third party then conducted the same search 
using the same methodology and the results were compared. In each case, the results of the 
searchers produced the same number of positive search results identifying the same 
explanation of the context. 
As previously mentioned, the context in which the word or phrase occurs in the document 
search is significant and the research methodology employed therefore required a means of 
identifying not only, where and how many times the search term(s) were used but the context 
in which they were used. For example, it would be misleading, if a search result for ‘quality’ 
were recorded and interpreted as the board having a meaningful conversation about the 
quality of care if the word ‘quality’ had merely been recorded because it was in the title of 
one of the directors of the board. For this reason all the documents were read by the 
researcher at the time the word search was conducted. This approach also provided assurance 
to the researcher that board conversations concerning subjects such as productivity had not 
been unrecorded merely because the search term had not been written in the board minute. 
The unintended consequence of this approach was that the researcher also built a wider 
understanding of the agenda faced by each of the case study organisations. This 
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understanding helped the researcher build empathy and engagement with the interviewees 
during the interview process. All the above search criteria were used in the initial search of 
the documents. On completion of the first set of document searches using these criteria there 
was a clear lack of focus by boards on productivity and related terms. In order to ensure that 
the selection of search terms was not too narrow, and therefore under-recording the focus of 
boards on productivity and related issues, a second review of the documents using additional 
search criteria was conducted.  
4.2.3  Additional search terms 
As set out in 4.2.2 above, the search terms and phrases were identified by a combination of 
using the literature review and dictionary searches. This process was also followed with the 
additional search terms but a wider perspective was employed given the results of the first 
search had produced limited evidence of engagement with productivity. For example, in 
selecting the additional search criteria the intention was to identify words and phrases that 
were part of the concept of productivity and in the case of PbR, could be used as a proxy for 
price. Price itself was not used as a search term as FTs are not operating in a pure market 
environment and there is a general reluctance by boards to use normal market terms within 
the service. 
In the case of productivity the above process produced additional search phrases that were 
related to the maximisation of output or minimising of costs. The researcher identified the 
following additional terms to be searched in the second review: maximise revenue, maximise 
income and maximise output. With regard to inputs, the phrases reduce costs, cost 
improvement programme (CIP), length of stay (LoS) and value for money (VFM) were also 
searched. Although CIP is not technically the same as productivity, but VFM is, the NHS has 
a tendency to use the terms loosely and it could therefore be considered a proxy for 
productivity. 
The second set of search terms also sought to identify the degree to which the quasi-market in 
healthcare in England was having an impact on board focus on productivity. The documents 
were therefore searched for competition and choice. 
As the central theme of the research was PbR, and the results of the first searches indicated 
this concept was receiving very limited attention by the relevant boards, the search criteria of 
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tariff (often used as an alternative to price by NHS finance professionals) and relative cost 
index (RCI) (an indicator of relative cost performance, please see Chapter Six) were also 
searched.  
As a consequence of adding the additional search criteria each of the 80 documents reviewed 
have been subjected to 20 different search terms, as opposed to the 11 which were conducted 
initially, and this has provided the document review process with significant rigour. The 
initial findings as to board focus have been robustly tested by the second series of searches. 
4.3 EXAMPLE METHODOLOGY 
The process followed in the review of the documents is set out in Appendix One and 
Appendix Two by reference to an anonymised set of search criteria and results and an 
anonymised board minute respectively. In the case of the search terms and results in 
Appendix One in each case the abbreviated phrase, in brackets, is searched as is the full term. 
For example, each search for item one consisted of a search for PbR as well as a search for 
Payment by Results. The number of positive results is then set out in column two of the 
results table. Column three of the table then states the context in which the term is mentioned. 
For instance, in the example in Appendix One quality is mentioned twice. It is first raised in 
the context of the hospital’s strategy improving the quality of patient care and then with 
regard to quality improvements being linked to financial actions. 
Appendix Two, which has the board minute which relates to the search criteria and results in 
Appendix One, shows the context in which the search result has been identified - this is 
shown by the highlighted test in the board minute. This allows the reader to cross reference 
the example results in Appendix One (including the context used) with the document 
searched. This process has been repeated with each of the documents searched.  
In addition to the recording of the occurrence of each of the search terms in each board 
minute reviewed the researcher then added together the number of occurrences of each search 
term in all the board minutes reviewed for each case study. This number was then divided by 
the number of board minutes reviewed for that case study to give an average incidence of the 
term for the total number of board minutes reviewed for each case study. For example, if 
quality had been recorded a total of 24 times across all the 20 sets of board minutes reviewed 
for a case study then the incidence would be recorded as an incidence of 1.2 (i.e 24 divided by 
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20). The incidence of all the search terms, for each case study, are recorded in Table 4.1 
below. 
4.4 RESULTS 
4.4.1  Document search results 
Table 4.1 below sets out the average incidence of the search results for each of the case 
studies. In broad terms incidence of a term being recorded in the minutes of every board 
meeting reviewed would be denoted by a value of around one. For instance, the average 
incidence of ‘cost control’ in each of the studies varies between 0.9 and 1.18 for different case 
studies; this indicates that board focus on cost control was mentioned in most board meetings 
for each of the case studies. In contrast, ‘value for money’, generally associated with a 
consideration of cost relative to the quality of what is provided, was never mentioned in the 
minutes of any of the board meetings. Was this a possible indication of the lack of 
sophistication in many board debates? The results from the review of the board minutes of the 
four case studies are set out below. 
 
Table 4.1 
Average Incidence of Document Search Criteria 
 
 Case Study Case Study 
AA 
Case 
Study 
BB 
Case 
Study 
DD 
Case 
Study 
CC 
 Word/Phrase 
Searched 
    
1 PbR/ 
Payment By Result 
0.64 0. 7 0.5 0.14 
2 Productivity 0.27 0.24 0.35 0.30 
3 SLE/SLR 0.27 Nil 0.13 Nil 
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Service Line 
Economics/Reporting/Management 
(March/April 
07) 
4 Cost control 0.9 Nil Nil 0.16 
5 Quality/measuring quality 0.45 0.9 0.62 0.81 
6 Financial balance Nil Nil Nil Nil 
7 Efficiency 0.8 0.7 0.32 0.08 
8 Monitor 2.45 2.7 1.4 1.3 
9 Maximise income/revenue/output 0.73 0.5 0.41 0.27 
10 Reduce costs 0.83 Nil Nil 0.08 
11 Cost Improvement Plan (CIP) 0.9 0.2 0.23 Nil 
12 Length of Stay 0.64 0.8 0.61 0.46 
13 Tariff 1.0 1.21 0.9 0.48 
14 Relative Cost Index (RCI) Nil Nil Nil Nil 
15 Value for Money Nil Nil Nil Nil 
16 Choice 0.2 0.08 Nil 0.4 
17 Patient Choice 0.2 0.08 Nil 0.1 
18 Competition Nil Nil Nil 0.1 
 
Notes: 
 
a. Average incidence per document reviewed. 
b. Where alternative search criteria are listed in the table each document has been searched 
for each option separately. 
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4.4.2  Document search results key observations  
The main results from the document search indicate that PbR  or the concept of tariff which is 
often used as an alternative for PbR, was on average mentioned in every board meeting in 
case study AA and BB and slightly less than every board in DD. An interesting observation is 
that in case study CC the frequency of reference to PbR or tariff is half that of the other three 
case studies. Prior to May/June 2007 there is no indication from the board minutes that the 
boards of the case studies conducted a review of costs, income and output in a systemised 
way. Two of the Trusts indicate initial interest in more systematic financial reporting in May 
2007 onwards where service line reporting starts to be mentioned. This may have been 
stimulated by Monitor's support for service line reporting.  
With regard to the key issue of productivity, on average the concept is noted in one in every 
four of all board meetings for each case study and the context in which it is raised in all the 
case studies does not indicate a holistic understanding of productivity (the interaction of 
inputs, process and outputs) but rather the interchangeable use of the term with concepts like 
efficiency. There is no indication that productivity was the cornerstone of decision-making 
within any of the case studies. 
The document search included a commonly used process measure for productivity (length of 
stay ‘LoS’) as it is possible that boards might be focusing upon the ingredients of productivity 
but not using the term itself. It is interesting to note that case study AA was twice as likely to 
consider LoS than its nearest rival BB which mentioned LoS about once in every four board 
meetings. Case study CC did not mention LoS at all and DD about once in every five 
meetings. 
Conversely, the concept of efficiency is referred to much more regularly in case studies AA 
and BB but in the case of CC and DD efficiency is referred to in line with that of 
productivity: in the case of CC on average one in every three board meetings (or once every 
four months) and DD about once a year. Except in the case of BB efficiency is usually 
referred to in the context of the centrally assumed funding assumption that hospitals will 
achieve a specified efficiency saving (for instance 2.5%) and this assumption is taken into 
account when setting the tariff for procedures under PbR. This efficiency assumption often 
translated into a focus upon a reduction in input costs as opposed to improved processes. 
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As mentioned above, all the case studies were subject to the central assumption that they 
would achieve efficiency savings, for example 2.5%, and the conventional method employed 
by the NHS in achieving this was to introduce hospital level cost improvement programmes. 
It was therefore expected that reference to ‘cost improvement programme’, or CIP or ‘cost 
control’ would be a common features of the board minutes. Although ‘cost improvement 
programmes’ were mentioned in approximately one in five board meetings for case studies 
BB and DD it was clear that case study CC did not refer to its CIP. Nor in the case of CC did 
the minutes refer to ‘cost control’ more than once or twice during the period and the same 
with ‘reduce costs’. The absence of focus on ‘cost control’ and ‘cost reduction’ was also 
shared by BB and DD. Case study AA was the clear outlier with respect to focus upon its cost 
improvement programme. In AA’s case its CIP was mentioned in nearly every board meeting. 
In addition to AA’s focus upon its CIP the minutes also indicate that AA also referred to ‘cost 
control’ and ‘reduction in costs’ as the concepts were referred to in a large majority of 
meetings.  
It should be noted that the concept of financial balance (the traditional objective of NHS 
trusts) and the relative cost index (RCI: a key indicator of the relative cost position of an 
English hospital relative to its peers)  are rarely mentioned and the minutes of several case 
studies which the researcher reviewed never refer to the concept of RCI at all. The concept of 
value for money (i.e the consideration of the benefit gained from an action compared to the 
cost of delivery), a notion which the Audit Commission has promoted for more than a decade, 
was not referred to once in any of the meetings searched. 
In the decade of plenty for NHS funding it might have been expected that, rather than a focus 
on cost control, the FTs might have focused on maximising income/revenue. In case study 
AA income maximisation was discussed regularly. In the other case studies, income 
maximisation was not mentioned at all in case study DD, about once in every ten meetings for 
BB and once in every three meetings for CC. 
It would also appear that the traditional target for boards of achieving financial balance (that 
is income and expenditure being broadly in line) was not a focus of the case study boards as 
no results were found for this concept in all the documents. An explanation of this might be 
that within the financial regime under which FTs operate there is an expectation by Monitor 
that, rather than being in financial balance, FTs should generate significant surpluses to 
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support capital and service developments. If this is the explanation, it is interesting how 
quickly FTs moved from the constraint of financial balance not only in the practical sense but 
also in the use of a vocabulary that had been commonplace since the creation of NHS Trusts 
in the early 1990s. 
As the results from the document search did not indicate a strong emphasis on productivity in 
the financial sense, the document review turned its attention to the quality agenda and the 
degree to which these boards had focused on the quality of output given the DoH’s support 
for quality improvement during this period. A strong indication that quality was the focus of 
board attention could of course still lead to evidence to support the notion that productivity 
was at the centre of the board’s attention in the case studies but that focus was on the quality 
of outputs as opposed to minimisation of input cost. 
As the quality agenda was at the fore of central government policy during the period of this 
research, and productivity was receiving little airtime either in DoH directives or in the 
media, it is not surprising that the occurrence of quality in the board minute review showed a 
positive occurrence in all sites, with quality being mentioned at least once in every other 
meeting. Given the profile of quality in the government’s agenda it is surprising that it was 
not more prevalent than the results indicate.  
It is worth noting that when quality was mentioned it was rarely focused upon improvements 
in quality of outcomes or pathways of care. Often the discussion concerns external proxies for 
quality such as complaints or patient surveys. 
Although proxies for quality appeared to be of interest to the boards there was no clear link 
of quality to productivity. In this connection it is worth noting that FT AA, which had the 
highest focus on CIP and cost control terms, mentioned quality significantly less often than 
the three other case studies . 
Part of the quality agenda has been the control of infection within hospitals, in particular 
MRSA. Although not a search term of the research, it is interesting to note that MRSA 
infection rates are regularly recorded in the board minutes of all the case studies. There is a 
strong argument that this is a fundamental aspect of quality but the focus of discussion at 
boards appears to be on achieving the individual FTs target to comply with regulatory 
requirements as opposed to a wider quality agenda. This observation will be expanded upon 
within Chapter Seven, the Analysis Chapter. 
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Although reference to quality was a more common finding in the board minute search than 
factors associated with productivity, the most interesting result from the document search 
must be the finding, across all four case studies, that Monitor (the independent regulator of 
NHS FTs) was by far the most commonly observed search result.  On average the regulator 
was mentioned in every board meeting across all four case studies and in those case studies 
which had faced any form of performance issue, or had had a more recent authorisation from 
the regulator, the occurrence was two to three times higher. Case studies AA and BB were 
particularly focused upon the regulator.  
In most of the instances where Monitor is mentioned it is with regard to complying (or 
otherwise) with business plans and regulatory submissions. The focus upon these submissions 
is an indicator of the seriousness with which the relationship with Monitor is taken.  
The degree to which Monitor is able to influence FTs, and possibly guide the productivity 
agenda, was explored in some detail during the interviews, as was Monitor’s encouragement 
of FTs to invest in better financial management reporting in the form of service line reporting 
and management. What is interesting, and to some extent surprising given the prevalence of 
Monitor discussed above, is that SLR (a key interest of Monitor) does not appear to have been 
an area discussed at board meetings to any significant extent. Case studies BB and CC do not 
mention such reporting at all.  
In the search for potential drivers of productivity other than PbR the documents were 
searched for indicators that a quasi-market for healthcare was having an influence on  board 
focus and perhaps driving the productivity and quality agendas of the hospitals. Three terms 
were therefore searched namely competition, patient choice and choice. The concept of 
competition appeared not to be recorded at all in three of the case studies during the period 
covered and in case study CC very occasionally. The terms choice and patient choice also 
appear to have had a limited impact on board discussion although choice was discussed more 
frequently in the case of CC. During this period ‘Choose and Book” (the system by which 
patients were provided with a system to choose a hospital for treatment) was being 
implemented within the NHS. 
Although the analysis of these results will be conducted later in this chapter it should be noted 
at this stage that the document search results indicate a relatively limited occurrence of terms 
which might indicate to the reader that the FT case study boards were focusing on the 
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delivery of efficient healthcare by discussing issues of productivity. This broad conclusion 
is in line with the productivity indicators set out in Chapter Six. 
 
4.5  LIMITATIONS OF DOCUMENT REVIEW 
The research identified the board minutes of the four case studies as a primary source of data 
as to the operational, and strategic, focus of the relevant organisations. In choosing this data 
source the researcher has assumed that the content of board discussions are accurately 
recorded within the FT’s board minutes and that the analysis that has led to the decision has 
been discussed within the formal board meetings. In private sector board meetings (and to 
some extent in the public sector) much of the analysis that leads to decision making by boards 
often occurs in non-documented strategy meetings and more informal settings between 
members of the board. 
In the NHS this limitation is to a large extent countered by the desire of NHS boards to 
demonstrate how and why decisions are made to meet their (often natural) inclination to 
demonstrate public accountability. This tends to result in the production of large detailed 
documents at formal board meetings which bring together much of the behind-the-scenes 
analysis which has had an impact on the decision and the key drivers are then recorded in 
quite full board minutes. This limitation is therefore not thought significant in the context of 
the research. 
The second limitation is the degree to which the document search itself focused upon the 
correct key words and phrases. As previously mentioned the documents have been subjected 
to two sets of searches to ensure that as wide a search selection as possible has been applied. 
As the results section of this chapter demonstrated, the findings from the first series of 
document searches indicated limited focus on productivity by boards. This resulted in the 
application of additional search criteria to ensure that the results were not being prejudiced by 
too narrow a selection of search terms.  
The third key limitation is the degree to which the search of the correct documents has been 
made. By reviewing board minutes the implicit assumption of the research is that the board of 
directors (as the body responsible for the performance and governance of the organisation) 
should be focusing upon the key issues which face an NHS Foundation Trust. In particular, 
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the quality of services provided, long term financial sustainability (which in an 
environment of real terms reducing tariff must indicate the need for improved productivity) 
and regulatory compliance.  
Critics of traditional NHS boards would argue that the real decisions affecting hospital 
behaviour are taken by the Department of Health and that the executive management teams of 
hospitals merely implement those decisions irrespective of their boards. If this was to be the 
case then the content of board minutes might be considered a poor source of data. As the 
research reviews NHS FT board minutes, and FT boards have all been through the rigorous 
basic competency tests applied by Monitor to ensure they are capable of running their 
hospitals independently of the instructions of the DoH, this particular concern as to the 
appropriateness of the documents search is partially allayed.  
The fourth limitation is whether the research focused upon the minutes of the correct 
meetings within the case studies themselves. This limitation falls into two parts; firstly would 
a review of meetings of the operational management team (often referred to as HMT) have 
given a more accurate indication of the focus of the organisation rather than reviewing board 
minutes; and/or should the documentary search have reviewed the minutes of the board of 
directors sub-committees (such as finance and performance, audit or quality and risk) as those 
minutes might have provided a more granular understanding of the issues facing the 
organisations. 
It may be of course that HMT, or the board sub-committees such as finance and performance, 
might have demonstrated more day-to-day focus on productivity and related issues but in 
environments where good corporate governance is practiced (as should be the case in the FT 
sector as a result of the robust FT authorisation process) this should still leave the high level 
discussions about productivity and quality occurring at board level. 
If the research had also included searches of the HMT and board sub-committee minutes this 
may have produced verification (or otherwise) for the results of the review of the board 
minutes. As indicated in Chapter Two, the constraints of access rights to the data, time and 
resources of both the hospitals and the researcher made this unachievable. As previously 
mentioned, the HMT and board of directors sub-committee minutes are not a matter for 
public record therefore the case studies would have had to have been supportive of the 
document disclosure or the provisions of the FoI Act would have had to be used. As the 
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management teams of the four case studies had been very supportive with their time and 
access rights such approaches would have been counter-productive to generating support for 
the interview stage of the research. 
The reader will recall that the documentary review produced the unexpected result that 
significant board focus was concentrated around the relationship and requirements of the 
health sector regulator, Monitor. Although the regulator is mentioned with significant 
regularity in all four case studies, case studies AA and BB recorded three times the number of 
references to the regulator as CC and DD. As noted in the results section, this high degree of 
focus on Monitor by case studies AA and BB is likely to be a consequence of AA having 
recently been through the FT authorisation process and BB facing the threat of regulatory 
intervention due to risks to its financial stability. Caution must therefore be exercised when 
interpreting the significance of Monitor in respect of these two case studies. Although the 
timing of the data collection no doubt had an impact on the research results for these two case 
studies it is still significant to note that case studies CC and DD also record a high level of 
focus on Monitor and therefore the board of directors’ apparent interest in Monitor is not fully 
explained by the timing and circumstances surrounding the document data review. The reader 
will note that in Chapter Five the issue of Monitor’s influence on the case studies is also 
highlighted by the interview data. 
The final limitation is that the research assumes that the presence of key words in the 
documents is a proxy for the focus of board discussion. In certain instances, although 
discussions might not have used one of the key words, it might have been argued that the 
narrative could still be related to the search criteria. To counter this criticism the research 
methodology involved the researcher reading each of the board minutes at the time the 
document review was conducted. Although this approach could be argued to make the 
interpretation of the documents, and the board’s focus, increasingly dependent on the 
researcher’s judgement and therefore more subjective varying from researcher to researcher 
in its interpretation, it could increase the accuracy of the documentary review.   It was 
therefore concluded that in this case the use of defined search terms, combined with the 
researcher reading each of the documents, provided the most robust research methodology. 
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4.6 SUMMARY RESULTS 
4.6.1  Documentary Data 
The objective of the documentary review above was to identify the degree to which the 
boards of directors of the four case studies had focussed upon productivity issues and 
identify any changes in emphasis over time. In addition, the review hoped that an indication 
of possible drivers for NHS productivity would be identified. 
The reader will recall that, as the thesis is addressing the issue of the impact of PbR on 
productivity, PbR was one of the key terms searched in the board documents.  Direct board 
focus upon the term PbR was very low in one case study, CC. In nearly two years of board 
meeting minutes it was only mentioned occasionally (less than one in five meetings) yet this 
hospital remains financially very strong. For the other case studies PbR was mentioned in at 
least every other meeting with FTs AA and BB having the highest rate of occurrence. FT AA 
had only recently received authorisation from Monitor to be an FT and as so much of the 
approval process is based upon financial considerations this could explain the relatively high 
prominence of the subject.  
Case study FT BB had the highest mention of PbR, with most of the emphasis being on the 
structure of the new tariff. It should be noted that the occurrences happened during a period 
when the FT was going through significant financial challenges. 
The documents were also searched for tariff as a substitute for PbR as the phrases are 
interchangeably used. The results reinforced the initial finding that FT AA and FT BB 
received the most positive search results. Most of FT AA’s discussion of tariff focussed 
around the viability of individual services, which is the emphasis of the Monitor application 
process. In the case of FT BB again the focus was on tariff at the time financial pressure was 
most evident. 
There is therefore some evidence to suggest that boards of directors of FT’s focus upon PbR 
and tariff at times of pressure. The pressure that tends to produce that result can be purely 
financial (i.e. a financial deterioration impacting upon the FT’s financial risk rating and the 
regulator (Monitor) therefore requiring corrective action); alternatively, the pressure can be 
explicitly regulatory as a consequence of the application process to be an FT. The two case 
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studies with the lowest referral to either PbR or tariff had, at the time of the research, 
greatest distance from financial pressure and regulatory focus. 
A second group of terms which was searched in the documents related directly to 
productivity. When productivity itself was searched in the minutes in a two-year period the 
boards of all four organisations used the term around once in every four meetings. However, 
it is not only the frequency of the term’s use but the context in which it is used that is 
important. In particular, were the boards using the concept in a context that suggested the 
board was considering productivity as the balancing of inputs, process and outputs or was it 
merely a loose term which the board used to discuss reductions in cost? Certainly in case 
study BB, which was actively engaging clinicians in a financial recovery plan, productivity 
was being used in the context of operating a theatre and clinical pathway review. In the other 
case studies productivity appeared to be used in a more generic sense, often indicating a 
reduction in inputs (i.e.a traditional cost improvement programme). 
As an FT board is required to run its hospital effectively and efficiently a mention of 
productivity in one in four board meetings indicates the concept of productivity was not a 
common concern of senior management and the boards of the four organisations at the time 
of the research. It is very interesting that even at the time of regulatory pressure, close to the 
time of application as an FT or under financial pressure, board discussion was not about 
productivity.  
It could of course have been that, although the phrase productivity was not used, FT boards 
were still addressing the issue but using language that involved the ingredients of 
productivity but not the term itself. As productivity involves the maximising of output for a 
given amount of inputs several other phrases were searched: in particular, cost control, 
reduce costs, cost improvement programme or reference to the organisation’s costs relative to 
other hospitals by reference to the RCI and financial balance. The results showed that FTs 
BB and DD did not mention cost control and CC very occasionally; cost improvement 
programmes were mentioned by case studies AA, BB and DD about once in every four or 
five meetings and CC not at all. None of the boards referred to their RCI in the two year 
period.  
	   73	  
The term efficiency was also searched and was mentioned very little by FT DD and never 
by CC. FT BB mentioned efficiency in two of every three board meetings but that FT was 
under financial pressure. 
The overall lack of frequency of these case study boards focussing on productivity and other 
phrases associated with the delivery of efficient care is a clear indication that neither the 
concept, nor the ingredients of productivity, were the normal language, and therefore 
business, of these case study boards at the time of this research. It could be argued of course 
that these hospitals were just financially too comfortable and therefore they did not need to 
focus upon productivity. Case study BB (which was under the greater financial pressure) 
appears to focus at least twice as often than case study CC on efficiency and a third more 
often on tariff and in the case of DD seven times as often on efficiency and nearly three times 
as often on tariff. This might indicate that a driver is required for board focus on 
productivity. 
An interesting observation from the results is that although PbR or tariff seems to have been 
mentioned on a reasonably regular basis by each of the case study boards those boards do not 
then focus upon productivity and related issues to equal extent. Except in a few cases, boards 
do not appear to be linking PbR tariff to discussions of productivity and there is little 
evidence that tariff is driving discussion around productivity. 
In one of the case studies, FT AA, the results were markedly different. FT AA  mentioned 
cost control in 9 separate board meetings during the period, reduction in costs on average 
nearly every board meeting, cost improvement programme in 10 board meetings and 
efficiency 13 times in 9 separate board meetings.. In the case of FT AA, this language was 
not limited to the time surrounding the application to be an FT so direct regulatory pressure 
cannot be the only explanation, nor was the organisation in financial difficulty.  
It therefore appears that although regulatory/ financial pressure may have a significant impact 
upon the focus by boards on productivity (and related matters), in the case of FT AA 
something else may also have been occurring. An observation by the researcher is that the 
strong, consistent leadership shown by FT AA’s senior management team may have had a 
significant impact upon organisational focus. Senior management capability was not a focus 
of this research, but may have been relevant in the case of FT AA. 
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One of the search terms used in the document review was service line reporting (SLR). As 
explained previously this is the establishment of data and reporting systems in a hospital 
which allows the care and resource use of an individual patient to be tracked so that the 
hospital can record the services consumed by a patient, the average resource use of a 
procedure and ultimately understand how the hospital uses its resources. The traditional use 
of block contracts by purchasers (where a hospital received a guaranteed sum of money for 
delivering specified types of care to the community without limiting output) has traditionally 
not encouraged the dis-aggregation of costs in this way. 
When the term SLR was searched in the board documents two hospitals produced a nil 
return. This was probably to be expected as the use of SLR was not common, and remains 
limited, in hospitals. FT CC mentioned the issue in a couple of instances, but this was simply 
that the chairman of the board had been to a presentation held by Monitor and it was thought 
SLR could be useful for the FT. In the case of FT AA SLR was being given some operational 
importance as it was raised in several board meetings in 2007.  
Reviewing the collective results for FT AA the dynamic which probably occurred is that the 
board had shown a continued interest in its cost base throughout the period of the 
documentary review and the emergence of SLR in the search results is as a consequence of 
the organisation being an early adopter of SLR operationally. It should be noted that SLR 
was brought to the attention of the FT sector by the regulator, Monitor, and was actively 
marketed by Monitor as a way forward for FTs. The research will mention the role and 
influence of Monitor in more detail shortly. 
Although the research is indicating that financial pressure or regulatory influence may be 
having an impact upon the focus of boards on productivity there could be another issue. Is 
the composition and capability of boards critical to the productivity agenda? Boards, their 
chairs and their chief executives are responsible for setting the agenda and business of the 
board. If boards are not focussing upon the business critical elements of the hospital then the 
question must be raised about that board’s competence. Through the approval process of 
becoming an FT the capacity and capability of boards is tested and those clearly not capable 
are invited to rebalance their membership. As FTs approach a time of increasing focus on 
health sector productivity perhaps this potential capability gap will become increasingly 
evident?  
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As FT CC and FT DD did not appear from the board minute review to be focussing upon 
the productivity agenda the research looked for other factors on which the boards of these 
organisations might have been focussed. As hospitals are delivering services then the quality 
of those services would be a key concern of any board, just as any commercial business 
would focus upon the quality of the services and products provided.  
In a period of two years quality was a common focus of all four boards particularly FTs BB 
and CC with FT BB recording quality 33 times in its minutes.  FT AA recorded quality half 
as often as FT BB and CC. As mentioned earlier FT AA had given significant focus upon the 
cost control agenda and it would appear from the documentary results that this might have 
reduced the board’s focus upon quality. When FT AA mentioned quality in its minutes over 
the period about half of those entries referred to data quality as opposed to the actual quality 
of services. Data quality is particularly important with respect to recovering payment for 
activity under PbR. It is surprising that quality is not the dominant over-arching theme within 
the documentary review as Lord Darzi (a leading surgeon and former Minister of Health in 
the Labour government) was in the process of conducting his NHS Next Stage Review. 
Darzi’s final report was laid before Parliament in June 2008 and there was a great deal of 
NHS engagement with the Darzi work during the period of this documentary review . 
FT DD did not show evidence of a strong focus upon the productivity agenda and did not 
appear to have a major focus upon quality either with only [12] references to the quality of 
service in that period and [one third] of those references referred to the regulatory view of 
quality as opposed to inward discussions about the quality of services the hospital provided. 
FT CC showed a greater focus upon the quality agenda with a large majority of the board 
meetings referring to quality and nearly two thirds of these references to quality were 
orientated directly to the quality of services as opposed to the quality of coding or staff 
training. 
An interesting finding from the document review is that the board with the greatest focus 
upon quality, as recorded in the minutes, was FT BB with 33 references to quality mixed 
between quality of patient services, quality of activity coding and managing the need for cost 
control and productivity improvement while maintaining the quality of services provided. It 
would appear from the documentary review that, of all the four boards, FT BB demonstrated 
the ability to drive both the productivity and quality agendas. An interesting question is 
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whether this was because of the simple capability of the constituent members of that board 
(perhaps an opportunity for further research) or the application of outside pressure from the 
regulator driving board performance and focus. 
Subject to the note of caution in 4.5 (Limitations of Document Review) what became clear 
during the course of the research was the impact that the regulator, Monitor, was having on 
the FTs within the study, particularly at board level. As part of the documentary review 
Monitor was therefore recorded as a search term in the minutes producing fascinating results. 
Bearing in mind that the search of quality (a key objective of the NHS) had produced an 
exceptionally high comparative score of 33 for FT BB, Monitor as a search result was 55 for 
FT BB, 44 for FT CC and 27 for FT AA. FT DD only had [11] references but FT DD board 
minute review is scoring low on a series of the key search terms. This issue is discussed later. 
From the documentary review it is very clear that Monitor is consuming significant focus of 
the four FT boards in this study. It may of course be that, as Monitor is the regulator, boards 
are merely being careful in their recording of issues relating to Monitor as a method of 
protecting board members from any accusation of negligence should Monitor ever consider 
using its section 52 powers of intervention in the FT. Although this may partly explain 
Monitor’s prevalence in the board minutes of the FTs, the types of things recorded (such as 
the Chairman had lunch with the head of the regulator or the Chairman attended a conference 
on SLR hosted by Monitor) suggests a more prevailing influence of the regulator with FT 
boards. 
The influence of Monitor on the agenda of FT boards is discussed later when we review and 
analyse the results from the interviews set out in Chapter Five. What is clear from those 
interviews is that Monitor has established clarity in its regulatory framework so that FT 
boards understand the rules under which they must operate and the consequences for boards 
for non-compliance with their terms of authorisation. 
In trying to identify what, if anything, was encouraging boards to focus upon productivity the 
documents were also searched for patient choice, choice and competition. Competition was 
not mentioned at all in three of the four case studies. It is surprising that this was the case 
given that two of the case study trusts were in the London area (which has a large number of 
providers) and that competition between those providers was likely to be more of an issue 
than in more rural areas. The practical application of competition is reflected in-patient 
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choice and choice as a concept. When choice and patient choice were searched the results 
were still very low. The highest prevalence of patient choice was actually for FT CC, which 
was a rural FT with limited competition from local providers. This case study mentioned the 
issue in respect of gearing itself up for choice, in particular information for patients and the 
impact of the choice process on patients themselves. The discussion was not in connection 
with the driving of productivity or quality. At the time of this research, with the choice 
agenda being in its early stages of implementation, there appeared to be no evidence that 
competition or choice was driving board focus or driving the productivity and quality of 
outputs agenda. 
As the above analysis suggests that the boards of directors of the four case studies did not 
appear to be heavily engaged in the productivity agenda it is worth noting what the boards of 
directors of the four case studies did focus their time upon. When the researcher reviewed the 
board minutes of the case studies three key themes emerged. Firstly, a large amount of 
subjects discussed could be described as governance/administrative in nature. This category 
includes the approval of standing orders, risk policies, receiving and approving reports, and 
for FTs, the board of directors’ relationship with (and accountabilities to) the members and 
council of governors of the organisation.  
The second element, on which a significant amount of board focus occurs, is the recording of 
the delivery of operational targets. For instance during the period of the document review the 
NHS was committed to delivering the eighteen week referral to treatment target of ninety 
percent for admitted patients. As politicians considered the delivery of this target to be  
critical for the NHS, significant time was being spent by boards of directors ensuring its 
delivery. The delivery of this, and other access related targets, was to a large extent moving 
organisations away from discussing productivity. Anecdotal evidence suggests large amounts 
of NHS resource were being used to increase speed of access with limited focus on added 
output for that cost.  
The third, and final, area of focus in the case study minutes is around strategy. Focus in the 
minutes covered both developing the strategy itself (FTs are expected to develop medium 
term clinical and financial strategies looking at least five years ahead which are annually 
refreshed) and the board receiving information as to changes in the national and local 
political and commissioning landscape which influence those strategies. 
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The above observations raise the question as to whether boards of directors of FTs are 
focusing sufficient time on the correct issues.  
 
4.7  CONCLUSION 
The results of the analysis of the document search results in 4.6 above are combined with the 
results of the analysis of the interview and productivity data in the form of a case study 
analysis in Chapter 7. 
As previously mentioned the results from the documentary review were used in formulating 
the semi-structured interviews which were conducted with a selection of key staff of all four 
case study sites in the period September to December 2007. The following chapter looks in 
detail at the purpose, methodology and results from those interviews. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INTERVIEWS 
“Death will be a great relief. No more interviews.” 
Katharine Hepburn 
5.1 PURPOSE 
As set out in Chapter Two, the research is using three distinct methods of data collection in 
order to triangulate results. Chapter Four set out the documentary review. In this chapter we 
look at the interview data and in Chapter Six we consider the productivity data. 
The interviews, which were conducted in the latter stages of 2007 and early 2008, aimed to 
produce qualitative data on the determinants of quality, quantity and productivity changes in 
the case study FTs. The interviews tested and built upon the results of the documentary 
review set out in the previous chapter. As the aim of this research is to obtain strong 
triangulation in the research results, reliance purely on documentary data was not appropriate 
and therefore this additional, and potentially rich, method of data collection was required.  
As discussed in Chapter Two in deciding to use interviews as part of the research 
methodology the researcher has been mindful of the challenge that other research methods 
should be eliminated as an option, before interviews are adopted as a method, as most 
researchers believe they have the skills to interview (Bechhofer and Paterson 2000). The 
research objective is not only to identify what has happened, but also how and why it has 
happened and the research is explanatory in nature. The research question is also 
contemporary as most of the key players in delivery of the Plan are still either in post or 
accessible. For these reasons the use of case studies, based upon a small number of quality 
interviews, was an appropriate method of data collection (Yin 2003). 
The objective of the interviews was to produce both descriptive information, concerning 
decision making on such issues as rationalisation of health production processes 
(productivity improvement), and also to provide explanations as to why, or why not, these 
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changes occurred. The interviews also allowed further investigation of the issues which 
emerged from the document review, for example the influence of the regulator.  
 
5.2 METHOD 
5.2.1 Design Issues 
The design of the interview stage of the research needed to address two key issues: reliability 
(i.e. the consistency of the research findings) and validity (did the interviews measure what 
the researcher thought he was measuring (Kerlinger1979). The development of the interview 
guide, the trialling of the interview technique prior to interviewing the respondents and the 
systematic review of the interview transcripts focussed upon maximising validity and 
reliability. 
5.2.2 Interview Respondents 
As noted in the methodology chapter there are no simple academic criteria that can be 
applied for selecting the interview respondents but Bauer and Gaskell (2000) note that an 
individual researcher can probably cope with 15-25 individual interviews. The lower end of 
this range was chosen due to the interview data only forming part of the data collection and 
the seniority of the respondent would by necessity restrict numbers due to limitations on 
access. The time consuming nature of the interview process and transcription supported this 
decision. 
The criterion used to choose respondents was to identify individuals who would provide high 
quality detailed data, effectively intensity sampling and again as Bauer and Gaskell (2000) 
noted  
“The real purpose of qualitative research is not counting opinions or people but rather 
exploring the range of opinions”.  
For this reason the research attempted to identify both key supporters and opponents of 
changes within each of the case studies for interview. In particular, each of the case studies 
were requested to identify a sub-board level respondent for interview who was less 
convinced about the positive consequences of the introduction of PbR. 
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In order that the interviews could provide an effective insight into the drivers of 
productivity improvement in the case study FTs it was necessary to identify the group that 
could provide an effective overview of both internal, external and political factors. As the 
influence of PbR was likely to operate on those at a senior operational or board level in the 
organisation it was concluded that the target group for interview would be board members, 
senior clinicians delivering the service within a financial envelope and senior operational 
managers. 
Since the research was focussing upon the impact of PbR on the alignment of clinical and 
managerial incentives it was necessary to have a combination of professional managers and 
clinicians in the interview cohort. At board level the key operational managers are the chief 
executive, chief operating officer, director of finance, director of nursing and the medical 
director. It was important that the directors chosen had a good understanding of the day-to-
day pressures and forces operating within the relevant FT. 
As noted earlier, the finance director has a pivotal role in ensuring the FT is financially 
viable and operating within the rules of PbR. It was therefore considered appropriate that the 
finance director should be interviewed. In particular, the finance director would be in a 
position to assess the degree to which PbR had an impact upon resource decisions (including 
capital and service developments), contract negotiations, and the need for cost improvement 
programmes. 
It was also essential that a director with an overview of the activities of clinical teams was 
part of the respondent group. Two options existed: the director of nursing and the medical 
director. As the medical profession continue to have an overwhelming influence on clinical 
practice and decision-making it was considered that the medical director would have the 
greatest insight into issues of incentive alignment of clinicians. In addition, the post of 
director of nursing is increasingly adopting general management functions and it can be 
argued with increasing conviction that the nursing director is becoming a general manager 
rather than a clinically orientated nursing specialist. 
The third person the research identified for interview was to be a senior manager with a day-
to-day overview of the operations of the hospital in a key area. As the orthopaedics 
department is often under significant operational pressure, and therefore a focus for process 
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improvement, the general manager for orthopaedics, or a director with significant 
exposure to the dynamics of the orthopaedics department, was interviewed,  
As noted earlier the researcher also considered the possibility of interviewing the chief 
executive of each of the case studies as they would have an over-arching perspective about 
productivity, quality and incentives. It was felt that the possibility of obtaining access to the 
chief executive was at best a remote possibility and so this avenue was not pursued.  
However, in two of the four case studies the chief executives made themselves available for 
interview which provided some useful perspective which the original methodology did not 
envisage.  
In order to obtain an insight into clinical-managerial incentive alignment at an operational 
level access was also requested, and granted, to a leading consultant who was not necessarily 
as supportive of PbR to provide a potential counter view as to incentives, productivity and 
the impact of PbR. This was to assess the extent to which the views of the board were 
consistent with those at a more operational level. Anecdotal evidence also suggested that the 
perceptions of boards and more operational managers and clinicians can vary. 
5.2.3 Access to Respondents 
From the outset of the research the key risk to the project was an inability to secure access to 
the prospective respondents in the chosen case studies. In order to secure access to the FTs 
the Director of Strategy at Monitor was initially approached to elicit support for the project 
and if possible assist in identifying appropriate case studies and obtain direct support for 
access. After the initial meeting between the researcher and the Director of Strategy there 
followed a more detailed discussion with one of Monitor’s two policy directors.  
After the researcher identified the preferred case study sites Monitor’s policy director was 
kind enough to contact the relevant FTs identified and a formal letter followed this initial 
contact from the researcher’s supervisor to the chief executives of the four trusts requesting 
formal access. In two cases the researcher was given access to the cases studies immediately 
and in the remaining two case studies the researcher followed up the letter with a telephone 
call with the chief executives.  
Access was given to all four sites and the chief executive’s office in each case study provided 
contact details for each of the nominated participants. Due to the seniority of the individuals 
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concerned access needed to be planned several months in advance and in many cases it 
was not possible to have several interviews on one day due to diary clashes. Given the 
geographical spread of the case studies travel proved a significant time cost for the project. 
 
5.2.4 Interview Form 
As discussed in Chapter Two several options for interview structure were available. For the 
reader’s convenience a brief summary of the options and decisions made by the researcher 
are set out below but for a fuller analysis please see Chapter Two. 
Four main types of interview were available to the interviewer, structured, semi-structured, 
unstructured and informal interviews. These could be individual or group and the method of 
conducting the interview could be in person, by telephone, video link or web based. 
As the interview questions were exploring underlying motives and behaviour the most 
effective method of interview was thought to be individual and face-to-face, in order fully to 
engage the participants in the project and to develop personal relationships so as to maximise 
the willingness of the respondents to disclose issues around incentives and drivers. If follow-
up questions or clarification were required then it was envisaged that this could be dealt with 
by use of e-mail/telephone. Given the seniority of the individuals involved it was important 
that all issues could be effectively dealt with at the interview; subsequent access was likely to 
be difficult. 
Video conferencing was considered as a method of reducing travel and other costs related to 
the research but due to the very limited access to this within FTs this approach was 
considered an unrealistic option and was therefore discounted. 
With regard to the form of the interview the researcher considered the semi- 
structured/unstructured interview (unlike a structured interview which has defined questions 
with a narrow range of possible responses) which potentially allowed an in-depth 
understanding to be obtained which in the case of identifying consultant and manager 
incentives was important. For this reason the structured interview was discounted because of 
its lack of flexibility and depth. 
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The unstructured interview was considered as this would have potentially allowed a wide 
breadth of perspectives and opinions to be collected from each of the respondents, 
highlighting issues which the researcher might not have considered. The drawback with the 
unstructured approach was that the researcher would not have been able to cover the material 
required in the time permitted as access to each respondent had been limited to one hour. For 
this reason the unstructured interview was discounted. 
The need for the interviews to be efficient yet flexible therefore led to the choice of the semi-
structured interview which enabled the development of an interview guide so that all 
interviews could cover the core areas of investigation yet allow the interviewer to develop the 
questioning as the interview progressed in order to explore issues which emerged during the 
meeting.  
With regard to conducting group or individual interviews the study used individual meetings. 
Although a broader number of respondents could have been potentially captured by use of 
the group interview (potentially using interactive information technology software to capture 
group responses) the objective of obtaining in depth analysis on incentives (and depth of 
understanding) and disclosure would not be enhanced by group interview. In addition, as 
mentioned earlier the respondents were high value individuals with time critical schedules 
and therefore the need to work around individual diaries made group interviews 
impracticable. 
 
5.2.5 Interview Guide 
The interview guide set out in Appendix 5 aimed to ensure that the questions were open 
ended, neutral, sensitive and clear (Patton,2002, as stated in Holloway, 2005). 
Three main factors influenced the content of the questions in the interview guide. Firstly, the 
research question and the key hypotheses provided the main structure (for example the extent 
to which PbR influenced the organisation, clinicians and managers); secondly the results of 
the documentary review indicated areas that should be investigated further (for instance, the 
lack of discussion of quality at board meetings) and finally the practical experience of the 
researcher sitting on NHS boards indicated areas to test (for instance, the impact on board 
focus when going through an FT application. For example question 4 of the interview guide 
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asked in the transition to FT did you perceive any change in focus? For instance, 
patient focus, governance structures, cost control?). 
The central research question (mentioned above), whether the introduction of PbR into the 
NHS aligned clinical and managerial incentives improving output quality, quantity and 
productivity, led to three subsidiary research questions which the researcher used to develop 
the interview guide. 
The first subsidiary research question asked, what is meant by NHS output and how had 
the NHS routinely measured outputs of NHS organisations? Questions 5,6,14,15,23 and 
24 of the interview guide focused on this issue. For example, question 5 asked how does the 
organisation measure its output (quantity and quality)? 
The second research question raised the issue of what was meant by clinical and managerial 
incentives and whether historically there had been a difference between the two groups and 
their incentives. This was addressed by questions 10,12,13,17,18,19 and 21. For instance, 
question 12 asked the respondent how would you summarise the objectives of clinicians in 
this organisation? Has this changed over the last three years? 
 Finally (assuming that the incentives of clinicians and managers were different), questions 
4,7,9,11,16,20 and 25 of the interview guide explored whether the introduction of PbR 
contributed to the alignment of those managerial and clinical incentives. For instance, 
question 25 asked respondents, in which areas did they think productivity had increased 
most within the organisation and what had been the key to this success (if any)? 
The five remaining questions addressed two issues.  Questions 2 and 3 aimed to put the 
respondent at ease and provide a background context to the interview by introducing a very 
open question; for example question 3 asked respondents where would you say the 
organisation had focused its main managerial energy since becoming an FT? For 
instance quality, design, efficiency? 
The final group of questions 8, 22 and 27 provided opportunities for the respondent to 
identify alternative drivers to PbR which had produced productivity improvement in the 
organisation. For instance, question 22 asked whether respondents considered regulators to 
have had any impact on the organisation, and if so, how? This question was included as 
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the document search had identified regulators (particularly Monitor) as a major focus of 
FT boards of directors at their meetings. 
As Hansen (2006) suggests the interview guide was trialled, prior to formal use, on a limited 
number of participants before the main interview programme was commenced. Initially 
trialing the questions on a non-specialist respondent tested the interview guide to remove 
weaknesses in the style and meaning of the questions. Following this initial test the interview 
guide was adapted including introducing question 2 as a non-challenging introductory 
question, which was factually based so as to put the respondent at ease. The type and breadth 
of the questions covered were then tested on a serving NHS finance director at a strategic 
health authority in the south of England.  
As a consequence of the above process the researcher produced the interview guide set out in 
Appendix 5 which was used in all the interviews. 
 
5.2.6 Data Collection and Analysis 
The interviews were conducted on site at the relevant case study FT and were scheduled for 
approximately one hour (the interview guide indicates 69 minutes) but this was adjusted 
according to the respondent’s time availability and the level of engagement with the project 
of the relevant respondent.  
All the respondents appeared to be very open and willing to disclose their personal 
perspective on the research questions on the condition that the data obtained from the 
interviews, and their responses, were anonymised. With the consent of each of the 
respondents the interviews were recorded and the researcher undertook to destroy the 
recordings and transcripts at the end of the research project.  
The interview process went well and most of the interviews completed around the one-hour 
point. In one case the respondent was keen to develop his arguments and therefore this 
interview lasted over the sixty-nine minutes indicated in the interview guide. Due to work 
pressures of another respondent the interview was reduced to 50 minutes, but the material 
was effectively covered. 
In many cases respondents did not need to be asked all the specific questions in the Interview 
Guide as they naturally flowed on to another question area when answering a previous 
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question. This allowed the researcher time to probe in more detail the particularly 
interesting answers provided by respondents. 
At the end of the interview process, in early 2008, the recordings were then transcribed. This 
process turned out to be much more time consuming than the researcher initially 
contemplated. An example of an extract from an anonymised transcribed interview is 
attached at Appendix 3. 
The researcher then systematically reviewed each of the transcribed interviews and a 
summary of the respondents’ views, against each of the questions, was recorded. An example 
of an extract from an anonymised interview response table is set out at Appendix 4, which 
relates to the extract from the anonymised transcript at Appendix 3. The production of the 
interview response table is an attempt to make the results of the interviews as sensitive as 
possible, given the high value nature of the respondents, in line with Kvale (1996).  
Each transcript was subjected to two reviews. Firstly, the responses to each question were 
summarised in the response column next to the relevant question. The transcript was then 
subjected to a second review to identify answers which had strayed from the specific 
question asked but provided information relevant to another area. The responses from all the 
interviews were then grouped into broad themes, which are set out below and summarised in 
the results table, Table 5.1. For ease of reference the questions, and question numbers, in the 
results table are identical to those in the Interview Guide at Appendix 5. 
The outline of the interview responses below are anonymised. The four case studies are 
identified as Case Study AA, BB, CC and DD and relate to the case study coding established 
in Chapter Two and continued in Chapters Four and Six. If relevant, the responses of various 
groups are highlighted and variations between case studies identified. When helpful to 
highlight a result a direct quote from the interviewee is identified 
 
5.3 RESULTS 
The narrative below identifies the key results from the interviews which is followed by a 
high level summary in Table 5.1 below. The narrative and Table 5.1 relate to questions 3 
onwards of the Interview Guide. Responses to questions 1 and 2 have been omitted as they 
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were designed as introductory questions to settle the respondent rather than forming part 
of the data collection. 
The results from question 3, as to where the case studies had focussed their managerial 
energy over the last three years, were in common agreement that the achievement of 
national targets, mostly related to access, and the delivery of their financial plans dominated 
their organisation’s agenda.  
An interesting result was that case study BB, which was financially challenged, used the 
clinical quality agenda to drive a productivity programme. A manager of BB observed “ that 
I think we moved our eye off the ball……… we were very much focussed on the growth and 
expansion of services because the money was coming in” but hospital BB used a review of 
clinical pathways to promote patient quality as the method to ensure that processes were not 
wasteful of resources. A six per cent reduction in inputs was achieved within a twelve month 
period. The FT sector in general is expecting to deliver these levels of cost reduction in 2011-
12 and it will be interesting to see if necessity is the mother of innovation. 
Two other case studies, AA and DD, noted that, having achieved access and finance targets, 
they were then able to focus more on the real clinical quality agenda, rather than the proxy of 
access. One director of DD noting that the system had had a clear set of levers to deliver the 
proxy quality targets (for instance accident and emergency access times) namely “they 
[regulators] basically beat us round the head if we’re missing a target and that’s how it is 
driven”. There is a clear implication that access and finance targets were distractions from 
the quality agendas of the hospitals concerned. 
On the issue of transition to FT status (question 4) respondents from all four case studies 
noted that changes to governance structures, as a consequence of the FT application, had also 
absorbed significant management focus. It was also felt that the FT transition significantly 
reinforced the importance of financial control. The medical director of BB  observed;  
 
“in order to become an FT you have to satisfy a lot of hoops and getting through those hoops 
makes you look really hard at the money and the productivity as a consequence “   
 
A senior clinician at AA commented; 
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“I have seen a change in the management, it is now much more financial orientated – it 
always was to some extent, but the impression I get is that it’s much more money orientated 
now – they’re much more interested in that than perhaps the clinical side – I just sense that”.  
 
It is interesting to note that several high profile governance failures in hospitals within 
England over recent years have put the achievement of access and financial targets as 
contributory factors to those failures; the clinical failures at The Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust are an example (Francis 2009). 
Question 5 focussed upon the issue of measuring clinical quality. All four case studies 
(including respondents from clinical and managerial groups) noted that the organisation 
reviewed clinical data. When discussed in more detail it became evident that all the case 
studies routinely reviewed proxies for quality (for instance access measures) and case study 
DD reviewed quarterly mortality data but none of the case study respondents indicated that 
there was any systematic measurement of value added to patients (for instance SF36 
measures of patient functionality pre- and post- clinical intervention). As a respondent from 
case study DD, noted measuring value added is “ an area where we’re pretty poor in having 
systems to measure outcomes beyond the immediate and also outcomes that are beyond the 
ad hoc audit”. This sentiment was reinforced by a clinician at AA who noted that he was not 
aware of any systemised added value measures for quality but noted that management: 
 
“seem to rely on us to have an overall picture of what the quality is like because there are 
none of my consultants who are particularly poor surgeons or anything like that, [who] I 
have any concerns about – we’d soon get to know”  
 
The recent development of patient reported outcome measures by the DoH may go some way 
to bridging this output measurement gap particularly if the measures are extended to a larger 
number of treatments. 
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On the question of whether the measurement of quality had changed over the past three 
years, all the case studies indicated that there was a movement to collating patient views as 
opposed to the traditional provider centric measurement of quality. For example, one 
respondent from case study BB noted the introduction of a patient quality tracker (which 
focused upon six key questions of patient experience) was intended to put patient views at 
the forefront of decisions of organisational change.  
Question 7, has the introduction of PbR had a material impact on costs, efficiency or 
quality within the organisation, was a key response for the research. There was a clear 
distinction between two respondent groups. Respondents at board level were in agreement 
with the general position outlined by the Finance Director of BB who considered PbR 
provided the backdrop to many of the operational decisions made within the organisation. It 
provided the context for all decision making or as the finance director of AA commented; 
 
“Well, put it another way.  What PbR has done is it has provided a financial context, 
because prior to that price equals cost so there was no real incentive to become more 
efficient.  So because it creates winners and losers it creates a sort of competitive aspect – 
that has driven focus on efficiency and productivity”.  
 
At a more operational level a senior manager at CC considered that PbR’s impact on costs 
etc could be summarised as ‘In terms of reality, no” impact. The Finance Director of AA 
agreed with BB’s Finance Director that whole services could be financially judged due to the 
financial back-drop of PbR but also noted; 
 
“I know that it  [PbR] is intended by the Government to help drive clinical efficiency 
because it should make clear any differentials if you like.  But the classification will not 
deliver that, it doesn’t deliver it and if you’re going to have a genuine debate with your 
clinicians over relative effectiveness then you have to do that at the patient level”.  
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PbR was, in most cases, therefore not impacting upon operational behaviour. Several 
respondents felt that rather than PbR delivering quality and efficiency improvement progress 
was more attributable to national targets. For instance, one manager noted “ I wouldn’t say 
it’s PbR driven I would say it’s general performance driven”. 
In line with the response to question 7, when respondents were asked about whether PbR 
had caused an alignment of incentives between clinical and managerial staff (question 
20) respondents indicated the impact was limited. Apart from certain departmental-specific 
pilot schemes for SLR, respondents considered that clinicians and operational managers had 
not yet been routinely exposed to PbR tariff and costs data and therefore PbR was not really 
having an impact on behaviour. Budgets were often still being allocated upon an historical 
cost basis. Exceptions to this view were in specialties where clinicians and managers wished 
to develop a service (one example being cardiology) and had to prove the specialty’s 
financial viability in order to expand its services. In this case clinicians and managers had 
used PbR to support the case for service development. As a director of DD noted with respect 
to clinical understanding of tariff and costs  “cardiologists would be able to tell you down to 
the penny, the general physicians would not – they wouldn’t know where to begin.” 
This differentiation of views between Board and sub-board respondents as to the impact of 
PbR is reinforced by the responses to question 9 below. 
One of the most interesting (and initially unexpected) results from the research was the 
response to question 8. This question asked what other factors apart from PbR had an 
impact upon costs, efficiency and quality? A common theme in all four case studies was 
the influence of the FT regulator, Monitor. As a director of DD noted with regard to 
Monitor’s impact “The setting [ by Monitor] of criteria for your financial risk rating has had 
a profound impact on our budget strategy “ and goes on to note that the delivery of surpluses 
by the Trust has probably been higher because of Monitor’s financial rating system. One of 
the chief executives noted “the financial matrix that they’ve [Monitor] brought in and the 
clarity of thinking around that I think has assisted the Board” 
Also of interest was that the impact of Monitor was noted by respondents at an operational 
level within the case studies. A respondent at CC noted that the regulator “created pressure 
for improvement”. While an observation from a senior operational manager at BB who was 
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involved in the hospital’s financial recovery observed with regard to the delivery of the 
programme:  
 
“ was that Monitor or was it because we had to do it?  I’d argue that we had to do it - 
Monitor was the kind of bully boys to make sure it was delivered” 
 
Question 22 specifically asked the question as to whether regulators had an impact on the 
organisations. At board level the responses indicated that Monitor had a significant impact 
on board focus. As one chief executive noted  “the benefit of Monitor is clarity of 
focus….reducing the fudge within the NHS, I think”. Respondents below board level were 
conscious of the over-arching influence of Monitor on the organisation but it had a less direct 
impact upon them. 
Linked to the influence of Monitor is the introduction of service line reporting (SLR) which 
combines income, cost and potentially quality reporting within one system. The adoption of 
this management approach has been actively pressed by Monitor by means of ‘seed funding’ 
of ten pilot sites, publicity and adoption of SLR now being a key requirement for any FT 
which finds itself in breach of its terms of authorisation as an FT. A director of BB noted that 
organisations needed to introduce SLR to procedure level as “ it’s only at procedure level 
you start to unravel good and bad clinical practice” thus allowing clinical teams to drive the 
productivity agenda.  The potential of SLR to drive productivity improvement was 
mentioned by respondents in all the case studies. At the time of the research the practical role 
out of SLR to operational level was very restricted with one respondent noting; 
 
“What we’re only just beginning to get our heads around is managing income and 
expenditure in a way that’s slightly more ‘real world ”. 
 
Question 9, which asked what was the level of clinical understanding, and engagement, 
with PbR, produced a very negative result as to PbR’s direct influence on clinicians. The 
respondents of all the case studies, both clinical and managerial, were in agreement and as 
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the medical director of DD noted “ most clinicians have a very hazy idea” of PbR and the 
medical director of BB observed that; 
 
“anaesthetists will have no understanding at all because it doesn’t impact on 
them…………….they are a cost, an essential cost, they are our largest consultant group they 
are also quite hard to drive in terms productivity”.  
 
An operational manager at CC noted “ it doesn’t hit their [clinical] radar really”. and a 
manager at AA observed “ a very broad spectrum of them would say, no idea, no idea what 
that HRG [tariff under PbR] is”. It was interesting that a leading clinician at BB observed; 
 
“the more we get to know about PbR the more you realise there’s a very strange Alice in 
Wonderland aspect to it that makes it [PbR] lose credibility”.  
 
The latter point probably relates to the unpredictable changes in tariff from one year to 
another. Or, as the chief executive of one of the case studies noted with respect to PbR; 
 
“I think [what] people in general find quite hard is the variability of the tariff  year-to-year 
and quite what to make of that in relation to the costs to the organisation”.  
 
The responses to this question strongly indicates that PbR may not be having an impact on 
agendas and therefore managerial and clinical incentives to drive productivity. 
Although question 9 had indicated a low engagement with PbR by clinicians, Question 11 
attempted to identify any characteristics which tended to pre-dispose a clinician to an 
interest in the concept, be it age, gender or specialism. The only thread that appeared to 
have any common theme was that those that have an interest do so ‘because they want to 
change something…..there is a general interest in formulating their business strategies and 
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developing their services’ . But at the time of the research this had only resulted in 
sporadic engagement by clinicians with PbR. 
In order for clinicians to be focussed on PbR, and therefore allow PbR to  stimulate 
engagement and alignment of incentives between managers and clinicians, a driver for 
clinicians to be interested in PbR is required. A traditional management model in hospitals is 
for clinical directorates to be managed on a tripartite basis between a lead nurse, clinical 
director and a general manager as envisaged in the Grey Book in 1972. Question 10 was 
therefore aimed at identifying the extent to which clinicians took effective responsibility for 
delivering their services within a prescribed budget. Question 10 asked, do clinicians have 
responsibility for delivering their service to a budget within this organisation. Has this 
changed over time? 
All the case studies indicated that there was a difference between theoretical clinical 
accountability for budgets and the reality. In all the case studies it appeared that the general 
managers and the clinical directors agreed the budget (and in some cases clinical directors 
formally signed-off that budget) and in theory worked to operating within the budget. The 
finance director of AA being quite clear that; 
 
“we [the executive directors] would expect it to be a partnership between the clinical 
director and the general manager and they’re held accountable in the monthly budgetary 
control meeting”. 
 
But in practice the accountability for operating within a budget appeared to rest with the 
general managers with the clinical director’s accountability being theoretical rather than 
actual. One general manager was very clear that ultimately the clinical director could step 
down from the role in management and still have a respected professional career as a 
clinician; general managers on the other hand are dependent on good performance for their 
next role and are therefore subject to effective performance levers and therefore accountable. 
With respect to whether there was a variation in the objectives of clinicians and managers 
there was a common view across all the sites that clinicians had a patient care focus as would 
be expected. But, within this, respondents commented that their clinical reputation amongst 
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their peers was a key factor as was the promotion and development of their own 
specialism within the hospital. The medical director of CC noted; 
 
“most people [referring to consultants] are driven and put in a very high level of work and 
what drives the majority – and I would say well over 90% - is a desire to improve their 
department and to improve their service, they genuinely want to do that”.  
 
Another  medical director noted that there was “nowhere to go” in terms of career 
progression for consultants, which was unlike the position for the junior managers with 
which they worked. 
With respect to managers there was a belief by clinicians and managers themselves that to do 
the demanding role there had to be an underlying altruistic motivation to provide good 
quality health services. However, both groups then saw one of the major motivations of 
managers as being to deliver the operational targets, both to ensure career progression and by 
implication some degree of financial reward. The chief executive of DD noted about 
managers;   
 
“I think there’s something about keeping your head above water which isn’t there to the 
same extent with the clinicians, and that’s the level of the process of attrition that some of the 
management have, either been through or are going through which distinguishes them”.  
 
The contrast in motivations might reflect itself in a tendency for clinicians to be internally 
focussed on their specific clinical areas, perhaps promoting the interests of their specialism, 
whilst managers might naturally have a more corporate performance and systems orientation.  
When asked about what issues do clinicians and managers engage most upon. Has this 
changed in the last three years (question 21)? The most common response was where 
service developments were under consideration or on issues such as infection control. A 
director of DD noting that managerial and clinical co-operation “ works brilliantly [on] 
service development, and we can move the service forward, and it can be fantastic”. This 
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response appears to indicate that collaboration is mostly possible on the areas which 
clinicians value, rather than on the performance agenda which appears to be a key focus of 
management. 
Questions 14,15,16, 17 and 19 dealt with the issue of quality within the case studies. 
Definitions of what quality of care meant varied widely between respondents. Many of the 
responses focussed upon safety and compliance with core process standards such as access 
times. In a few instances, quality was considered from a patient’s perspective, but this 
appeared to be theoretical rather than the hospital systematically measuring patient reported 
outcome measures. As the medical director of one case study noted “meeting targets has 
become a surrogate for quality of care” and a senior manager of case study DD responded; 
 
“It’s an area where we’re pretty poor in having systems to measure outcomes beyond the 
immediate and also outcomes that are beyond the ad hoc audit”. 
 
With the exception of one chief executive who noted “I would say most clinicians would say 
the quality of care here has improved since we became an FT” respondents across 
organisations generally considered that quality had not materially risen in recent years. Some 
respondents thought quality of services had declined while a respondent in the same 
organisation as the chief executive above reflected “I think it (quality) has stayed about the 
same”. Respondents did not generally equate service quality with speed of access. There was 
general consensus that the whole board was responsible for the quality of services, although 
unsurprisingly, the medical directors and the directors of nursing were initially highlighted. 
Managers were considered by all the respondents to be engaged with the quality agenda, but, 
when pressed, respondents seemed to indicate, as the previous medical director suggested, 
that quality was synonomous with targets and that reliable quality data, such as re-admission 
rates within thirty days, was difficult to obtain in some cases. A senior doctor at BB noting; 
 
“And that’s the trouble with the information you’re presented with, it’s so crude it just 
means that you need to look into it deeper to get the information that you really want and the 
quality of information that we can get is extremely poor – we really struggle with it”. 
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Questions 18,23,24 and 25 explored respondents understanding of the productivity agenda in 
the case studies. Given the current focus of the NHS on productivity improvement the results 
are of particular interest. All the respondents were clear as to what productivity meant to 
them and the common theme was that it involved close scrutiny of inputs and improvement 
in the process of care to maximise output. But a doctor from BB noted that if you asked most 
other people in the organisation what they understand by productivity they would probably 
respond “what are you on about?”  
When asked whether their organisations were focussed on productivity the responses were 
mixed. Case study BB, which had been under financial pressure, had addressed the 
productivity in a systematic way, a doctor noting; 
 
“The idea was to make changes that would be embedded into the organisation, that would be 
sustainable, rather than making short-term cuts that couldn’t be sustained for another year.  
The idea was to try and make efficiency gains”.  
 
Many respondents in the other case studies indicated that some work on pathway re-design 
had occurred in some specialities but the approach was not systemised and most of the focus 
was on traditional annual cost improvement programmes instead of dealing with more radical 
pathway re-design.  
There was no clear theme when respondents were asked to identify the department that they 
thought had showed most improvement in productivity except that departments that were 
perceived as making progress tended to be those who had faced a financial need to address 
costs due to sustainability issues or needed to produce a business case to support expansion. 
Departments varied from orthopaedics and cardiology to specialisms such as sexual health. 
In contrast, in case study BB, which, as the outlier case study, was required to take radical 
action to remedy an underlying financial problem, a leading clinician noted; 
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“we made an awful lot of really good quality gains in length of stay by taking out all kinds 
of inefficiencies and improving process”.  
 
In that particular instance the hospital had introduced a clinically led transformation 
programme which had addressed some of the core business processes of the hospital and 
delivered significant productivity improvement. This is reflected in the productivity data in 
Chapter Six. 
The above results are summarised in Table 5.1 below. The numbers in the left hand column 
of the Table correspond to the question numbers in the Interview Guide. As indicated, the 
numbering commences at question 3 as the introductory questions have been omitted. 
 
Table 5.1  
Interview Results Table 
No Main Questions Summary of Results 
3. Where would you say the 
organisation has focused its main 
managerial energy since 
becoming an FT? For instance 
quality, design, efficiency? 
Respondents considered hospitals to be 
target focused (financial and Health Care 
Commission). The financially challenged 
FT focused on financial balance using 
clinical pathway reviews to link the finance 
and quality agendas. The more established 
FTs were starting to focus more on real 
clinical quality rather than achieving 
access targets as a proxy for quality. 
 
4. In the transition to FT did you 
perceive any change in focus? 
For instance, patient focus, 
governance structures, cost 
A general view that the financial focus of 
organisations was further emphasised. 
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control? 
5.  How does the organisation 
measure its output (quantity and 
quality)?  
Output measures generally viewed as 
national access targets and Monitor 
financial reporting. No real evidence that 
value added clinical data was measured. 
Limited evidence that Boards reviewed 
actual clinical outcome data. 
6. In your experience, do you think 
there has been any change in 
how outputs are measured in the 
last three years, and if so, how 
and why? 
General focus was considered to be  on 
access targets. But more established FTs 
starting to consider patient satisfaction 
data. 
7. In your opinion has the 
introduction of PbR had a 
material impact on costs, 
efficiency or quality within this 
organisation? 
General view that PbR had not had a direct 
impact within the organisations, but 
respondents with a whole systems view 
considered PbR created a context in which 
development and other decisions now 
operated. One respondent, from an early 
FT applicant, considered that most 
strategic decisions now operated within the 
context of PbR and that tariff actually 
distorted some decision-making e.g 
hospitals being paid less for patients 
staying less time discouraged some 
projects that could reduce length of stay. 
8. What other main factors do you 
think have had an impact on 
costs, efficiency and quality 
within this period and how 
important where they relative to 
There was a common view that the 
regulatory framework (especially 
Monitor’s financial orientation) and 
national access targets forced Trusts to 
look at costs and process. 
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PbR? 
9. What is the level of clinical 
understanding and engagement 
with PbR? 
 
 
General view was that clinical 
understanding of PbR was limited but with 
exceptions. Organisations that have had to 
deal with financial challenges appeared to 
have greater understanding and there was a 
general view that surgeons with private 
practice (familiar with operating in fee for 
service environment) were more familiar 
with PbR than specialties such as 
medicine. 
10. Do clinicians have responsibility 
for delivering their service to a 
budget within this organisation? 
Has this changed over time? 
Clinical ownership of budgets at specialty 
level seemed limited. Some indications that 
clinical directors had responsibility for 
delivery of service within budget but in 
final analysis general managers were 
responsible for delivery. Even in the most 
established FT there was no evidence that 
clinicians or managers understood the cost 
of delivering individual services. Many 
respondents indicated the trialing of 
Service Line Reporting (which was being 
undertaken in several FTs ) provided an 
opportunity to move financial and 
productivity issues down to clinician level. 
11. Which kinds of personalities are 
most engaged with PbR within 
the organisation? 
No real gender or age profile indicated. 
Most common view was that clinicians 
with private practice or clinicians with a 
specialty that faced a financial challenge 
(i.e. operating above tariff) and wanted to 
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expand were most engaged. 
12. How would you characterise the 
objectives of clinicians in this 
organisation? Has this changed 
over the last three years? 
Clinical reputation amongst peers, 
minimisation of risk and patient care were 
the most common themes. 
13. What are the objectives of 
managers in this organisation. 
Has this changed over the last 
three years? 
Themes identified were: career progression 
(which meant delivery of financial and 
other targets); a degree of public service 
altruism and financial motivation. 
14. What do you understand by 
quality of service? 
No standardized view. Mixture of safety, 
compliance with minimum process 
standards (e.g. access) and some 
respondents mentioned adding value to 
patients. No evidence that measures existed 
on the latter point. 
15. What has happened to clinical 
quality in the organisation in the 
last three years? 
Mixed responses. No respondent suggested 
material improvement organisation wide. 
Mixture of views around slight 
deterioration (because of financial 
pressure) to static. 
16. If a change in quality has 
occurred what do you think have 
been the drivers of that change?  
HCC targets and benchmarking commonly 
mentioned as drivers for improvement. 
Improvement in internal clinical 
governance also indicated in some cases. 
17. Who is responsible for the 
quality of care in this 
organisation? Has this changed 
over the last five years? 
Initial response commonly the Director of 
Nursing supported by the Medical Director 
on key areas. This was often followed by 
the Board as a whole. No real changes over 
time were identified. 
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18. Who is responsible for the 
efficient delivery of care in this 
organisation? Has this always 
been the case? If not what has 
changed? 
Common response was that it was a 
common corporate responsibility. Within 
that general position it appeared that 
management effectively owned the 
efficiency agenda as opposed to clinicians. 
19. How engaged are managers in 
the agenda around quality of 
care in this organization? Has 
this changed over the last five 
years? If yes, what is the driver 
of this change? 
General response was that managers were 
engaged in the clinical quality agenda. 
When pressed clinical quality appeared 
synonymous with delivery of targets and 
their appeared to be limited quality data 
widely available. Some respondents 
indicated that acquiring reliable quality 
data was problematic. For instance, basic 
data around re-admission rates within 30 
days of treatment sometimes not available. 
20. Has the introduction of PbR had 
any impact upon 
clinical/managerial behaviour for 
instance cost, planning, and 
quality focus? 
Respondents indicated  that PbR had had 
limited impact within the FTs themselves 
as clinicians, and managers had not been 
subjected to reliable data concerning tariff 
and costs. Most budgets were still allocated 
on an historical basis. Impact of PbR 
appeared to have been limited to specific 
specialties that had had to engage with PbR 
to ensure delivery of sustainable service as 
clearly out of line with tariff or had been 
part of a pilot scheme. 
21. On what issues do clinicians and 
managers engage most upon? 
Has this changed in the last three 
years? 
Respondents noted infection control 
indicators and service development, as the  
most common areas. 
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22. Do you consider regulators to 
have had any impact on the 
organisation and if so how? 
 
 
General view was that Monitor has had 
material impact on the organisations. In 
particular, reviewing governance systems 
and ensuring more rigorous financial 
control. The robust compliance regime 
forced two of the FTs to impose tough cost 
reduction/productivity programmes. 
23. What does the organisation 
understand by productivity and 
does your view differ in any 
respect? 
Respondents often viewed productivity as 
controlling inputs and improving hospital 
processes to maximise output. It was often 
thought that those in the organisation saw 
productivity more as a cost cutting process 
to stay solvent. 
24. To what extent is productivity a 
focus of the organisation? For 
instance, within the board, 
divisions and clinical teams. 
 
Mixed response. Very clear that the word 
productivity used but within the 
organisations several respondents 
considered that the real care pathway re-
design work (which was required to 
improve productivity) did not occur. 
Practical implementation was therefore a 
traditional cost reduction programme. 
25. In which areas do you think 
productivity has increased most 
within the organisation and what 
has been the key to this success 
(if any)? 
No common thread. Most common 
examples tended to be surgical specialties 
(e.g. orthopaedics) or an area which had 
been under financial pressure and had 
therefore completed a review of its 
business through necessity. 
26. Is there anything we have not 
discussed which has driven 
productivity in this organisation? 
Responses nil or emphasis of a point 
already mentioned. 
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5.4 LIMITATIONS OF METHODOLOGY 
This section sets out some of the key limitations of the interview methods applied in the 
research. 
 
5.4.1 Reliability and Validity 
A key risk with any interview is the reliability of the research technique. In particular the 
researcher has conducted all the interviews, listened to all the tapes and compiled all the 
transcription and data analysis. In a larger, formally funded, research project a selection of 
the tapes and data analysis could have been checked by another researcher to ensure 
reliability. Resources did not allow that in this case.  
The researcher has attempted to minimise reliability concerns by development of a robust 
interview guide (Appendix 5), interview response and data review sheets (Appendix 4) and 
implementation of trial interviews prior to commencing the research (5.2.5 above). The 
trialling of the interviews also assisted in checking validity of the interview guide. 
As indicated in 5.2.2 above the respondent group included the medical director and a second 
medically qualified respondent, to reflect the clinical perspective on PbR and incentive 
alignment. Although the reasons for using medically qualified staff as a proxy for the clinical 
perspective remain valid, a larger piece of research without tight resource constraints might 
include other clinical staff in the respondent group. For instance, access to a senior matron in 
each case study to obtain the nursing perspective and the ability to interview a larger number 
of respondents would contribute to improved research validity. 
Internal political bias is a potential problem for the interview element of the research. Senior 
management teams within the NHS work in a very political environment and there can be a 
tendency to ensure that a consistent, politically acceptable, message is presented. It is hoped 
that the confidential nature of the interviews has, to a large extent, minimised that risk. The 
apparent willingness of respondents fully to engage with the research suggests this limitation 
is minimal 
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5.4.2 Generalisability 
As the interview element of the research was only based upon sixteen interviews in four case 
study sites the research cannot claim statistical generalisability. The respondents to the 
interviews were not chosen at random and no probability coefficients reflecting statistical 
confidence levels could be applied. This limit with regard to statistical generalisability does 
not restrict the findings with regard to analytical generalisability. It is quite legitimate to 
make a reasoned judgement based upon the findings in this research as to what might be the 
case in similar organisations (Kvale 1996). This analytical generalisability will be developed 
in Chapter Seven. 
5.4.3 Data Recording 
The richness of the data acquired from the respondents might have been improved if the non-
verbal responses to the questions could have been accurately recorded and reflected upon in 
the analytical stage of the research; for instance, a video recording of the interviews. In 
particular, this might have given some extra data when issues of motivation where discussed 
with the respondents. On balance, as much of the data collection was of a factual nature, this 
limitation is not considered material and the resource implications of video recording would 
have been prohibitive. 
5.5 SUMMARY RESULTS 
5.5.1  Interview Data 
In this section the interview results are analysed and in Chapter Seven those summary results 
are considered along with the productivity and documentary summary results in the form of a 
case study analysis 
In response to the question as to where the case studies had focussed their managerial energy 
over the last three years respondents were in common agreement that the achievement of 
national targets, mostly related to access, and the delivery of their financial plans dominated 
their organisations’ agendas. It is worth noting that the financial plans of FTs are created by 
the FT boards themselves and therefore it is unlikely an FT would set objectives (be they 
quality or productivity) which are too stretching; non-delivery of an FT’s plan can lead to 
difficulties with the regulator, Monitor. 
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An interesting result was that case study FT BB, which was financially challenged, used 
the clinical quality agenda to drive a productivity programme. FT BB used a review of 
clinical pathways to promote patient quality as the method to ensure that processes were not 
wasteful of resources. A significant reduction in input costs was achieved within a twelve-
month period. As noted earlier, the RCI did partially rebound after the initial reduction. 
Two other case studies, FT AA and FT DD, noted that, having got access and finance under 
control, they were now able to focus more on the real clinical quality agenda rather than the 
proxy of access.  
On the issue of transition to FT status respondents from all four case studies noted that 
changes to governance structures, as a consequence of the FT application, had also absorbed 
significant management focus. It was also felt that the FT transition significantly reinforced 
the importance of financial control. 
The reader will recall from the interview data that there was a general respect for the clarity 
of the message that Monitor is delivering to FTs. The process which Monitor requires FTs to 
go through to attain FT status appears to be changing the mindset of organisations requiring 
effective board level governance and financial discipline. This raises the question of whether 
this approach could be extended to promote change and improvement of quality and 
productivity. Perhaps more detailed conditions could be added to the licence requiring 
productivity and quality improvement to be demonstrated. 
In terms of measuring clinical quality all four case studies (including respondents from 
clinical and managerial groups) noted that the organisation reviewed clinical data. When 
discussed in more detail it became evident that all the case studies routinely reviewed proxies 
for quality (for instance access measures) and case study FT DD reviewed quarterly mortality 
data. None of the case study respondents indicated that there was systematic measurement of 
value added to patients (for instance SF36 measures of patient functionality pre and post 
clinical intervention). It is interesting to note that neither the regulator, nor the DoH, required 
hospitals to understand the value added by the treatment they delivered and there appeared to 
be no aspiration by the respondents to do so.  
On the question of whether the measurement of quality had changed over the past three years 
all the case studies indicated that there was a movement to collating patient views as opposed 
to the traditional provider-centric measurement of quality. For example, one respondent from 
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case study BB noted the introduction of a patient quality tracker (which focused upon six 
key questions of patient experience) and was intended to put patient views at the forefront of 
decisions about organisational change.  
With regard to the key question as to whether the introduction of PbR had a material impact 
on costs, efficiency or quality within the organisation, there was a clear distinction between 
two respondent groups. Respondents at board level were in agreement with the general 
position that PbR set the context in which the FTs operated and therefore impacted 
significantly upon decision-making around costs, quality and efficiency. At a more 
operational level PbR was considered to be something that did not touch day-to-day 
decisions.  
The theme that PbR did not appear to touch those in the operational roles within the 
organisation, including clinicians and many operational managers, was replicated when 
respondents were asked about the degree of clinical understanding and engagement with 
PbR, The general consensus was that PbR was not really understood or engaged with by 
many clinicians. In such circumstances, it is questionable as to whether it could act as a lever 
for change at operational level.  If PbR is not engaged with by those who have the power to 
transform clinical pathways, or who are spending the clinical resources used on patients on a 
daily basis, then changes in packages of care are unlikely to occur despite any inefficiency 
identified by management. A key question arises as to why PbR and costs data was not 
focussed upon at an operational level. Was this reluctance related to a lack of confidence by 
senior management in the data, a lack of IT packages to make the data accessible to 
operational leaders or a lack of engagement at an operational level with the information? The 
answer is probably all three. A recent Kings Fund report on service line reporting indicates 
that clinical engagement at operational level with SLR/SLM (and by implication PbR which 
underpins SLR) is best achieved when clinicians are involved in both developing the 
reporting system and encouraged to dispute and engage with the data at an early stage (Foot, 
Sonola, Maybin and Naylor 2012). 
With regard to a very open question as to what other factors, apart from PbR, may have had 
an impact upon costs, efficiency and quality, a common theme (in all four case studies) was 
the influence of the FT regulator, Monitor. The general view was that the way Monitor 
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regulated, with clarity and robustness, making the rules clear and demonstrating its 
willingness to intervene when necessary, made the regulator very influential. 
Also of interest was that the impact of Monitor was noted by respondents at an operational, 
as well as board level, within the case studies, being characterised as a force for 
improvement. An interesting question arises as to why this pressure for improvement is felt 
so much when the boards of the organisations themselves should be generating 
organisational stretch. A key assumption of a decentralized NHS is that FT boards will have 
the capability to operate without standards and objectives being set by the DoH. 
Linked to the influence of Monitor is the introduction of service line reporting (SLR)/ 
management. The adoption of this management approach has been actively pressed by 
Monitor by means of “seed funding” of several pilot sites and a large amount of promotion 
and publicity within the FT sector.  The potential of SLR to drive productivity improvement 
was mentioned by respondents in all the case studies. 
5.5.2   Emerging Issues 
The interview data produced several interesting themes, which although they may not 
directly contribute to this research, are of interest and may require further investigation. 
Firstly although clinicians and managers were both considered to show altruistic behaviour 
towards patients - wishing to maximise the quality of patient care (possibly even knightly 
behaviour as the commitment was often perceived as going far beyond contractual 
requirements (Le Grand 2003)) - key objectives of clinicians also included promotion of their 
own clinical reputation and development of their own specialties within the hospital. This 
supports the proposition at 1.3 that if PbR was to be engaged with by clinicians then the 
knavish (Le Grand 2003) desire to promote their own specialty within the hospital, and their 
personal reputation within it, should be supported. Of wider interest though is how the NHS 
might incentivise its clinicians to be more productive in terms of reward schemes. For 
instance, rather than trying to use financial incentives to promote excellence (for instance 
merit awards for consultants) should the NHS be supporting high performing clinicians to 
secure peer recognition by academic publication, articles in journals and other profile based 
support? This might be more effective in supporting clinicians’ desire for peer recognition. 
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The second point of interest is in respect of indicators for measuring the quality of care. 
Over recent years there has been significant focus upon the introduction of quality measures 
that look at the value added to patients from clinical interventions. Devlin and Appleby 
(2010) noted that patient reported outcome measures (PROMS) have been routinely available 
in the NHS since 2009 and that there is an intention to expand those measures to diseases 
other than hip and knee surgery, hernia repair, varicose veins and cataract to mental health, 
cancer care and long term conditions such as stroke and heart failure. It was therefore very 
interesting to note that none of the case studies were using either national PROMS data or 
locally developed PROMS information to assess the quality of the services the FTs were 
providing. In addition, no desire was expressed to pursue this kind of reporting either by 
clinicians or managers. In times of financial constraint in the public sector it is increasingly 
important that public funds are spent in a way that adds most value to patients and if PROMS 
are to be used by the NHS to ensure services maximise value then clinicians and managers 
will need to engage with the data effectively. Further research might look at why clinicians 
and managers appear not to be engaging with the concept of PROMS and what NHS leaders 
might need to do to support further engagement with the concept of PROMS and the use of 
that data in reviewing quality within hospitals. 
The third area of interest was that although clinicians at clinical director level (i.e. the 
clinician responsible for running a particular service alongside the general manager) were 
notionally jointly responsible with the manager for the performance of the service, both 
clinicians and managers were of the view that should the service they manage fail to perform 
clinicians could always return to clinical practice, but the manager could not. As a 
consequence, the manager was often the individual who was effectively held accountable for 
performance. If this dynamic is correct then it would be interesting to understand what 
impact this has on the ability of senior leaders effectively to manage clinical services 
particularly when clinical engagement is required concerning decisions around clinical 
practice and service change. Perhaps a topic for further research. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
The results from the interviews indicate that the delivery of financial and other targets 
dominated the agendas of each of the case studies with suggestions that only when delivery 
of the basic targets was achieved could hospitals focus on the quality of care agenda 
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(although one hospital did appear to use the clinical quality agenda to actually deliver 
financial and other targets). The results also indicate that the process of becoming an FT had 
the effect of focussing the organisations on financial delivery which, everything else being 
equal, might suggest less focus upon other issues. 
With respect to clinical quality there was a general acceptance that the case studies did not 
systematically measure clinical outcomes, such as patient reported outcome measures, and 
that most of the time the hospitals were performance managing proxy quality measures such 
as access times to treatment. 
With respect to whether PbR had an impact upon quality, output and productivity the results 
indicate that from day-to-day PbR did not drive operational decisions but PbR did provide 
the context in which boards, in each of the case studies, made strategic decisions. For 
instance, services tended to be expanded in situations when PbR tariff was above the costs of 
delivering the service. There was little evidence, though, that clinicians were focussing on 
productivity and efficiency issues as a result of their awareness of PbR tariffs and the 
financial viability of their services. This is an interesting result, given that unconfirmed 
indications suggest that the NHS Operating Framework for 2012-13 may permit 
commissioners and providers to move away from PbR based contracts, allowing them to 
revert to ‘block’ contracts. In their simplest form, block contracts allow commissioners to 
pay a provider a fixed fee for the delivery of all specified clinical services to a given 
population. As one of the key elements of PbR is to allow price (tariff) to drive productivity 
improvement in service providers it may be that the perceived failure of PbR to change 
clinical behaviour and drive productivity improvement is having a significant impact on 
national policy decision making.  
A key, but unexpected result, from the interviews was the observation by respondents, 
particularly at board level, that Monitor had a significant impact on organisations as it 
established clarity on issues such as performance and created a pressure for improvement. In 
addition, Monitor’s role in promoting SLR, which was seen as potentially promoting 
engagement of clinicians in the productivity agenda , indicates the regulator’s influence; 
although at the time the interviews were conducted SLR was only just being introduced and 
respondents indicated that, at an operational level, it had only had an impact on clinical and 
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managerial behaviour in limited areas. These and other results are discussed further in 
Chapter Seven. 
The next chapter introduces the proxy productivity data and identifies two proxy measures 
for productivity in the four cases studies and provides a high level overview of relative 
productivity in each hospital. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PRODUCTIVITY DATA 
 
‘When everything seems to be going against you, remember 
that the airplane takes off against the wind, not with it” 
      Henry Ford 1863-1947 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters have set out the results from the review of documentary and 
interview data respectively. This, the final data section, considers six indicators of 
productivity for each of the four case studies. This chapter is then followed by an analysis 
chapter, which brings together the documentary, interview and productivity data results. 
The productivity data is based upon two information sets. Both sets of information are 
produced by the Department of Health (DoH). Within the limitations discussed below, the 
data has been subject to standardised collection and analysis. The first index which the 
research uses is the relative cost index (RCI) for NHS acute trusts. This data set is compiled 
annually and is the basis on which tariff, under PbR, has been historically set.  
The second information set was produced by the Institute of Innovation and Improvement 
and was based upon NHS wide data on hospital length of stay, surgery day case rates and 
pre-operative bed days. The intention being to demonstrate to NHS providers that by 
reducing variation in clinical care pathways significant cash releasing productivity 
improvements could be achieved by NHS providers. 
 
6.2 RCI DATA SET 
6.2.1  Construction 
The RCI effectively represents the average cost of producing different elements of clinical 
care for a hospital which is translated into a number showing whether that hospital’s costs for 
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different types of care are above the national average, therefore making a loss, or are 
below the average therefore making a profit. The data for calculating the RCI is submitted by 
each NHS organisation for each HRG (i.e bundles of care consuming similar resources) to the 
DoH using established protocols set out in the NHS Costing Manual and Guidance. The data 
is then compiled into a National Schedule of Reference Costs for each trust in England by 
HRG, and, from this data set, the weighted average of all HRG costs in a trust, relative to the 
national average, is then compiled; this being the RCI. In addition, the average cost of 
producing each HRG across all English hospitals forms the basis of the tariff (payment) under 
PbR for each clinical treatment falling within a particular HRG. It is interesting to note that, 
as Dawson and Street (1998) observed, the policy assumption in collecting the RCI data in the 
first place was that trusts would view their relative position within the RCI index and this 
would create “incentives to change the way they use resources” i.e. promote productivity. 
A trust’s RCI therefore shows the average cost of delivering a basket of procedures and 
treatments in that trust relative to the average of all English NHS trusts. For instance, a trust 
with an RCI of 100 would be delivering its services at the average cost of delivering the 
basket of services within England. Consequently, as 100 represents the average cost of 
delivery an RCI of less than 100 would therefore indicate relatively efficient provision and 
those with an RCI of over 100 relatively inefficient services. Care should be taken with these 
conclusions, as set out in the limitations section below. 
The RCI index is sub-divided for acute providers into several categories. In particular, the 
costs of delivering elective, non-elective inpatient, critical care etc are given their own RCI 
score. The trust-wide RCI is also recorded with, and without, a market forces factor (MFF) 
taken into account.  
The MFF adjusts for the unavoidable cost differential of delivering the relevant services, 
under each HRG, in different parts of the country. For example, higher costs of maintaining 
the labour force, such as the provision of London weightings for staff in the capital, and 
additional costs associated with higher labour mobility in some parts of the country. As the 
case studies in this research are geographically spread across the South West and South East 
of England the MFF adjusted RCI figures are presented as the costs of labour and other 
inputs vary significantly across the regions.  
In addition to the hospital’s organization-wide RCI, the table also records the elective and 
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critical care RCI’s. In the case of elective work the care pathway is capable of being 
standardised and therefore would lend itself to productivity improvement. Critical care is a 
relatively small department and should lend itself to service redesign should it be an area of 
high cost within the trust. These areas are therefore much more likely to be areas to achieve 
productivity improvement, as opposed to non-elective inpatient (in particular general 
medicine), where the co-morbidities of patients and reliance on other agencies for discharge 
(for example social services) complicate care pathway redesign. 
In determining whether the RCI data for each FT is indicating an improvement in 
productivity it is the trend over the three-year period, which is relevant. This is especially the 
case given the limitations of this data discussed below.  It should be noted that during the 
period of the data being reviewed there has been a 2.5% productivity assumption in the 
funding of the NHS. Under such conditions a majority of trusts should be improving their 
productivity. As the RCI is a relative index, an FT must be outperforming the average trust in 
productivity improvement in order to improve its RCI. Conversely a deteriorating RCI may 
not indicate productivity falls but may simply indicate productivity improvements below that 
of the average NHS trust.  
Subject to the limitations set out in 6.2.3 below the advantages of using the RCI are that 
established protocols for the collection and submission of data exist (as described above), the 
index applies to all acute trusts in the NHS (therefore includes the four FT case studies in this 
research), and the data collection methodology has been subject to rigorous review by the 
Audit Commission, and consequently the DoH, adding to its accuracy.  
 
6.2.2  RCI Data Results 
The four tables below set out the RCI data for the four cases studies for the three financial 
years 2005-6, 2006-7 and 2007-8 followed by a brief description. The analysis of the results 
is dealt with in the following chapter. 
Table 6.1-FT AA  
Year Organisation 
(MFF Adjusted) 
Elective RCI Critical Care RCI 
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RCI 
2005-6 97 93 97 
2006-7 98 108 96 
2007-8 92 108 92 
 
It would appear that FT AA (using the RCI measure) has improved productivity across the 
organisation as a whole, seeing the RCI fall from 97 in 2005-6 to 92 in 2007-8, although it 
increased very slightly in 2006-7.  Similar improvements in the RCI have been achieved in 
Critical Care with a steady fall from 97 to 92 in the same three-year period. 
Less positive is the increase in the hospital’s RCI for elective work, which has risen 
substantially from an RCI of 93 in 2005-6 to 108 in 2006-7 and remained at this high level in 
2007-8. Everything else being equal this suggests a significant deterioration in relative 
productivity in the FT’s elective work. 
 
Table 6.2 FT BB  
Year Organisation 
(MFF Adjusted) 
RCI 
Elective RCI Critical Care 
RCI 
2005-6 98 122 98 
2006-7 88 90 82 
2007-8 97 93 93 
 
The trend in FT BB’s RCI is consistent on all three indicators. Between 2005-6 and 2006-7, 
when the FT imposed significant efficiency targets on the organisation, the hospital-wide 
RCI dropped from 98 to 88. This was reflected in an astonishing Elective RCI change of 122 
to 90 and a large reduction in the Critical Care RCI of 98 to 82. But from 2006-7 to 2007-8 a 
material proportion of the reduction in RCI has been reversed. The organization-wide RCI 
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has reverted to 97, only 1 below its starting point in 2005-6, and the Critical Care RCI 
has risen to 93, although remaining significantly below its 2005-6 level of 98. Progress on 
Elective care appears to be more sustained with only a slight increase in the RCI to 93: still 
29 points lower than it was in 2005-6. Overall FT BB appears to have delivered some relative 
productivity improvement. 
 
Table 6.3 CC  
Year Organisation 
(MFF Adjusted) 
RCI 
Elective RCI Critical Care 
RCI 
2005-6 93 85 104 
2006-7 90 98 101 
2007-8 97 86 125 
 
FT CC provides very mixed results with respect to its RCI. Between 2005-6 and 2006-7 
small declines in its RCI, and therefore improvements in productivity relative to other 
providers, were recorded for the organisation as a whole and Critical Care. In contrast, the 
Elective RCI rose significantly from 85 to 98 in the same period. In 2007-8 the FT recorded 
rises in its RCI across the organisation as a whole from 90 to 97 and in Critical Care from 
101 to 125. Conversely, the Elective RCI reverted back to just above its 2005-6 level at 86.  
If we look at the period 2005-2008 as a whole all three RCIs of the FT have increased 
indicating deterioration in relative productivity for the FT. 
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Table 6.4  DD  
Year Organisation 
(MFF Adjusted) 
RCI 
Elective RCI Critical 
Care RCI 
2005-6 89 93 75 
2006-7 82  87 71 
2007-8 87 99 126 
 
FT DD reduced its RCI for all three RCI indicators between 2005-6 and 2006-7. The 
organisation wide RCI declined from 89 to 82, the Elective RCI from 93 to 87 and the 
Critical Care RCI from an extremely low 75 to 71. All three indicators then witnessed 
significant increases in the year 2007-8 with the organization-wide RCI increasing to 87, the 
Elective RCI a substantial increase of 12 points to 99 and the Critical Care RCI from 71 to 
126 representing a 55 unit increase. Although analysis of the results will be dealt with in the 
next chapter it should be noted that the increase in the RCI for Critical Care is thought to 
reflect an investment by the FT in an area of the Trust which had seen limited investment 
over previous years. 
On the basis of the RCI data FT DD would appear not to have delivered improvement in 
relative productivity during the period as a whole. 
 
6.2.3  RCI Data Set Limitations 
Limitations as to data accuracy have been raised by the Audit Commission. In the 
Commission’s review of £73 million worth of activity across all trusts in England they 
identified a coding error rate of 9.3 %. Most of these errors were attributable to poor 
documentation, lack of coding resource and low clinical engagement (Audit Commission 
2008).  
Data accuracy issues were also forecast by Dawson and Street (1998) due to what they 
perceived as a lack of automated data collection within trusts. For instance, no automated 
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systems for collection of resource use (such as diagnostics) which would lead to 
inaccuracy in counting units of activity, deficiencies in case mix measurement and variations 
in individual trust interpretation of the NHS Costing Manual and Guidelines.  This is a 
position that has not materially improved.  
The statistical significance of various forms of the RCI is discussed by Street (2000) who 
notes that if this efficiency score on its own is to be used as determining true differences in 
performance between hospitals then confidence intervals must be applied to the data. As one 
would expect, with the data collection issues raised above, when Street applied 95 percent 
confidence intervals to the data then variation between individual trusts in a given year was 
not statistically significant. Dawson, Goddard and Street (2001) confirm this view but note 
that the use of the index does offer useful insights into changes in performance of hospitals 
over time. For this reason the research does not make judgments about the relative efficiency 
of an FT case study compared to another organisation. The research uses the productivity 
metrics (discussed below) along with trends in the RCI of each of the FT case studies over 
time to determine whether, in each case study, any evidence existed of changes in relative 
productivity. 
Care must also be taken in interpreting changes in the RCI index. For instance, an increase in 
the RCI may not indicate falling productivity. Efficiency from an NHS-wide perspective may 
be to move hospital-based activity from inpatient care to an outpatient community settings. 
The impact of this will be to reduce the number of units of activity (Spells) within the 
hospital and require the fixed costs associated with that activity, such as buildings and 
minimum clinical staffing, to be spread over a smaller number. The consequence for that 
hospital would be increased costs per unit of output and therefore reduced productivity. 
However, for the NHS as a whole, improved care (in an appropriate setting) at reduced cost 
may have been achieved. 
 
6.3 PRODUCTIVITY METRICS 
6.3.1  Construction 
In identifying a second data set to indicate the degree of productivity improvement within the 
case studies the research required a more disaggregated data set than the RCI, which could 
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show, at a more operational level, whether productivity improvement was being 
achieved. 
As productivity is a case of achieving optimum output by adjustment of inputs (for example 
bed usage) and care processes (for example, use of evidence based care bundles) good 
indicators to use would be data on the use of bed or labour inputs and an efficient care 
pathway while in hospital.  
In September 2004 the Modernisation Agency launched the idea of The Ten High Impact 
Changes which it believed could improve the experience of patients by more appropriate care 
pathways, improve clinical outcomes and avoid unnecessary waste of resources. In short, the 
programme was aimed at improving NHS productivity. The impact of this campaign by the 
Modernisation Agency (part of the DoH) was that NHS management started to monitor key 
productivity variables. In particular, day surgery rates, length of stay and to a lesser extent 
patient admission prior to treatment. 
Although productivity was not the NHS’s political focus in the period 2005-8 (the quality 
agenda often dominating management time) the Institute of Innovation and Improvement 
(Institute) (the successor of the Modernisation Agency) continued to collect NHS-wide data 
on length of stay, surgery day case rates and pre-operative bed days. The Institute tried to 
demonstrate that achievable improvements in a specific variable could be translated into 
cash, releasing savings for individual NHS organisations amounting to several million 
pounds each.   
Therefore the second data set used to identify improvements (or otherwise) in productivity 
comprised three indicators identified above as used by the Institute. The Institute started to 
record the metrics in the first quarter of 2006 and these are produced on a quarterly basis for 
each NHS trust. The methodology is therefore consistent and applied to all trusts in England, 
including the four FT case studies in this research. 
It should be noted that the Institute also produces other metrics in addition to length of stay, 
day case surgery and pre-operative bed days such as do-not-attend appointments rates 
(DNA). Although these metrics could add to the richness of the productivity data they would 
be considered to be of a secondary nature and they were not part of the Institute’s original 
battery of data collection. They have not therefore been included in the data set for this 
research, as for much of the period in question (financial years 2006-8) comparative data 
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would not have been available.  
In order to illustrate a limitation of the productivity metrics selected the following tables also 
include re-admission rates (within 14 days) as proxies for quality as collected by the Institute. 
Because of the proxy nature of the metric, and the data availability only being from quarter 
one 2007/8, the data is only being used to illustrate a limitation of the analysis and is 
discussed further at 6.3.3. 
The length of stay metric identifies the percentage of the hospitals bed days that could have 
been saved if the FT had reduced the excess bed days, above the average for England for the 
relevant HRG, by twenty five percent. Assuming there was no material variation in case mix 
across the case studies, in the case of FT AA by reducing its excess bed days by 25% it could 
reduce bed usage by 13.3% without any impact on output. Improved productivity would be 
indicated by this percentage falling over time. 
The day case metric is very straight forward. The day case rate is the percentage of the 25 
procedures identified in the Audit Commission’s basket of day case procedures actually 
performed as day cases (Audit Commission 2001). Examples of day case procedures in the 
basket are extraction of cataract with/without implant and laparoscopy. Improved 
productivity would be indicated by increasing day case rates over time. In the case of FT AA 
day case rates increasing from the very low starting point of 63% of the basket of procedures. 
The final metric is the percentage of all bed days in the hospital used for patients undergoing 
a procedure between date of admission and date of operation. For example, if a patient is 
admitted for an elective operation are they admitted the day before the operation (thus being 
a pre-operative bed day which might not be clinically necessary but administratively easier) 
or on the day of the treatment thus being more efficient. In the case of FT AA, everything 
else being equal, productivity would be improving if the 24.4% recorded in quarter one of 
2006/7 declined over time. 
6.3.2  Productivity Metrics Results 
The trends in productivity, for each of the for the four case studies, are set out in the tables 
below. Below each table a narrative highlights the key results for each FT. Please note the 
national position of each trust is a score out of 176 NHS trusts in England. 
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Table 6.5 FT AA 
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 1 2006/7 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   139 	   139	   94	  
Indicator Score 	   13.4%	   63.0%	   24.4%	  
Change Last 
Period	   0.0%	   0.0%	   0.0%	  
NOT	  	  COLLLECTED	  
	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 2 2006/7 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   139 	   146	   70	  
Indicator Score 	   13.2%	   59.4%	   23.5%	  
Change Last 
Period	   -­‐0.2%	   -­‐3.6%	   -­‐0.9%	  
NOT	  	  COLLLECTED	  
	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
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Quarter 3 2006/7 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   139 	   137	   109	  
Indicator Score 	   13.1%	   63.1%	   24.5%	  
Change Last 
Period	   -­‐0.1%	   +3.7%	   +1.0%	  
NOT	  	  COLLLECTED	  
	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 4 2006/7 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   119 	   138	   55	  
Indicator Score 	   13.4%	   63.4%	   22.2%	  
Change Last 
Period	   +0.2%	   +0.2%	   -­‐2.3%	  
NOT	  	  COLLLECTED	  
	  	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 1 2007/8 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   119 	   141	   62	   29	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Indicator Score 	   13.3%	   65.4%	   22.5%	   3.5%	  
Change Last 
Period	   0.0%	   +2.1%	   +0.3%	   0.0%	  	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 2 2007/8 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   141 	   142	   60	   70	  
Indicator Score 	   13.7%	   64.4%	   22.5%	   4.5%	  
Change Last 
Period	   +0.4%	   -­‐1.0%	   0.0%	   +1.0%	  	  	  	  	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 3 2007/8 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 157 157	   121	   102	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Indicator Score 	   14.5%	   57.1%	   25.5%	   4.8%	  
Change Last 
Period	   +0.9%	   -­‐7.3%	   +3.0%	   +0.4%	  	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 4 2007/8 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   148 	   156	   98	   73	  
Indicator Score 	   14.0%	   63.0%	   23.7%	   4.4%	  
Change Last 
Period	   -­‐0.5%	   +5.9%	   -­‐1.8%	   -­‐0.4%	  
 
The results of the productivity metrics for FT AA show that, with regard to length of stay, the 
percentage of bed days that could have been saved if the FT had reduced its excess bed days 
to the average (having corrected for age, sex and social deprivation) has actually increased 
from 13.4% in quarter one 2006/7 to 14.5 % in the third quarter of 2007/8, reducing to 14.0 
% in the final quarter.  
With regard to day case rates at FT AA these fell from 63.0% in the first quarter of 2006/7 to 
an extremely low rate of  57.1% in the third quarter of 2007/8 although this rate recovered to 
the starting value of 63.0% in the final quarter of that year. 
FT AA did make some progress in terms of the percentage of beds used in pre-operative bed 
days starting the period with 24.4% of beds days being pre-operative and finishing quarter 
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four of 2007/8 at 23.7%. In quarter four of 2006/7 the hospital had achieved a level of 
22.4% but this was not maintained.  
The productivity metrics therefore indicate that overall FT AA has not made material 
progress in improving use of bed stock or maximising the efficiency of its care processes for 
elective work (as indicated by use of day case surgery). This supports the results in the RCI 
data at 6.2.2, which suggest elective care had not seen improvements in productivity but 
actual declines. This would be supported by declining use of day surgery and a deteriorating 
position on the length of stay indicator. 
Table 6.6 FT BB 
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 1 2006/7 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   173	   101	   13	  
Indicator Score 	   15.9%	   69.3%	   17.1%	  
Change Last 
Period	   0.0%	   0.0%	   0.0%	  
NOT	  	  COLLLECTED	  
	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 2 2006/7 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   N/A 	   N/A	   N/A	   NOT	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Indicator Score 	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	  
Change Last 
Period	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	  
COLLLECTED	  
	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 3 2006/7 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   169 	   88	   74	  
Indicator Score 	   15.0%	   71.1%	   22.8%	  
Change Last 
Period	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	  
NOT	  	  COLLLECTED	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 4 2006/7 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   160 	   88	   35	   NOT	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Indicator Score 	   15.7%	   72.0%	   20.9%	  
Change Last 
Period	   +0.8%	   +0.8%	   -­‐1.9%	  
COLLLECTED	  
	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 1 2007/8 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   164 	   109	   23	   36	  
Indicator Score 	   15.5%	   70.0%	   18.7%	   3.6%	  
Change Last 
Period	   -­‐0.3%	   -­‐1.9%	   -­‐2.2%	   0.0%	  	  	  	  	  	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 2 2007/8 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 155 145	   40	   55	  
	   128	  	   	  
Indicator Score 	   14.2%	   62.4%	   21.0%	   4.3%	  
Change Last 
Period	   -­‐1.3%	   -­‐7.6%	   +2.3%	   +0.7%	  	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 3 2007/8 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   158 	   110	   16	   22	  
Indicator Score 	   14.6%	   69.6%	   18.3%	   3.7%	  
Change Last 
Period	   +0.4%	   +7.2%	   -­‐2.7%	   -­‐0.6%	  	  	  	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 4 2007/8 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 135 134	   43	   41	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Indicator Score 	   13.8%	   67.7%	   21.6%	   3.9%	  
Change Last 
Period	   -­‐0.8%	   -­‐1.9%	   +3.3%	   +0.2%	  
 
Note 
Accurate data was not available for FT BB in quarter two 2006/7. 
The results for length of stay for FT BB, with regard to the percentage of bed days that could 
have been saved if the FT had reduced its excess bed days, show an improvement from 
15.9% in quarter one 2006/7 (and one of the highest rates of NHS trusts being positioned 173 
out of 176) to 13.8 % in the fourth quarter of 2007/8 (with an improved position of 135 out 
of 176). 
With regard to the day case rate this declined over the period from 69.3% in quarter one 
2006/7 to 67.7% in the final quarter of 2007/8. It should be noted that in several quarters FT 
BB achieved 70% or higher on this indicator but did not achieve sustained improvement. 
In respect of the indicator for pre-operative bed days FT BB did not make improvements in 
productivity in this area. In the first quarter of 2006/7 its rate was a very low 17.1%  (which 
reflected upper quartile performance compared with other NHS trusts) and therefore 
improvement was going to be a challenge. Apart from one quarter it remained a top quartile 
performer on this indicator throughout the two-year period. 
The productivity metrics for FT BB indicate some progress but, apart from the length of stay 
indicator, the FT has not managed to sustain improved performance. In many ways this 
reflects the conclusion of the RCI analysis earlier where the FT registered significant 
reductions in its RCI only to be partially reversed the following year. 
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Table 6.7 FT CC 
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 1 2006/7 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   15	   86	   105	  
Indicator Score 	   10.6%	   71.0%	   24.8%	  
Change Last 
Period	   0.0%	   0.0%	   0.0%	  
NOT	  	  COLLLECTED	  
	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 2 2006/7 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   10 	   107	   102	  
Indicator Score 	   10.4%	   67.5%	   24.7%	  
Change Last 
Period	   -­‐0.2%	   -­‐3.5%	   0.0%	  
NOT	  	  COLLLECTED	  
	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
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Quarter 3 2006/7 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   14 	   110	   68	  
Indicator Score 	   10.7%	   67.3%	   22.6%	  
Change Last 
Period	   +0.3%	   -­‐0.3%	   -­‐2.1%	  
NOT	  	  COLLLECTED	  
	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 4 2006/7 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   9 	   121	   82	  
Indicator Score 	   10.6%	   67.0%	   23.1%	  
Change Last 
Period	   -­‐0.1%	   -­‐0.3%	   +0.5%	  
NOT	  	  COLLLECTED	  
	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 1 2007/8 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   8 	   128	   71	   11	  
Indicator Score 10.3%	   68.1%	   22.9%	   2.5%	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Change Last 
Period	   -­‐0.2%	   +1.2%	   -­‐0.2%	   0.0%	  	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 2 2007/8 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   11 	   78	   62	   17	  
Indicator Score 	   10.4%	   73.0%	   22.6%	   3.2%	  
Change Last 
Period	   0.0%	   +4.9%	   -­‐0.3%	   +0.8%	  	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 3 2007/8 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   6 	   81	   76	   15	  
Indicator Score 	   9.7%	   73.7%	   23.6%	   3.2%	  
Change Last -­‐0.7%	   +0.7%	   +1.0%	   0.0%	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Period	  	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 4 2007/8 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   13 	   128	   67	   18	  
Indicator Score 	   11.1%	   68.7%	   22.5%	   3.1%	  
Change Last 
Period	   +1.3%	   -­‐5.0%	   -­‐1.1%	   0.0%	  
 
FT CC started quarter one 2006/7 with a strong position with respect to other NHS trusts on 
the length of stay indicator ranking 15 out of 176 at 10.6%. This suggested that improvement 
would be challenging. In quarter three of 2007/8 it had improved this to 9.7%. 
The FT also made progress on the pre-operative bed days indicator moving from 24.8% in 
quarter one 2006/7 to 22.5% in quarter four 2007/8 with each quarter being less than the first 
quarter. 
On the day case indicator the FT was less consistent, starting quarter one 2006/7 with a day 
case rate of 71.0% against the basket, but this was not achieved again until quarter two 
2007/8. FT CC finished the final quarter of 2007/8 at 68.7% a significant deterioration 
placing the FT at third quartile ranking compared with its peers. 
It is worth noting that the day case rate was above 68% in all the quarters of 2007/8 and in 
two quarters over 73%. This, combined with strong performance on the other indicators 
(detailed above) may have contributed to the improvement in the Elective RCI in 2007/8. 
 
	   134	  
Table 6.8 FT DD 
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 1 2006/7 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   145	   31	   174	  
Indicator Score 	   13.6%	   78.5%	   32.0%	  
Change Last 
Period	   0.0%	   0.0%	   0.0%	  
NOT	  	  COLLLECTED	  
	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 2 2006/7 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   154 	   18	   166	  
Indicator Score 	   13.6%	   77.9%	   30.8%	  
Change Last 
Period	   0.0%	   -­‐0.6%	   -­‐1.3%	  
NOT	  	  COLLLECTED	  
	  	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
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Bed days days 
Quarter 3 2006/7 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   137 	   19	   171	  
Indicator Score 	   13.1%	   78.7%	   30.5%	  
Change Last 
Period	   -­‐0.5%	   +0.8%	   -­‐0.3%	  
NOT	  	  COLLLECTED	  
	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 4 2006/7 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   120 	   43	   164	  
Indicator Score 	   13.4%	   77.2%	   28.8%	  
Change Last 
Period	   +0.3%	   -­‐1.6%	   -­‐1.7%	  
NOT	  	  COLLLECTED	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
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Bed days days 
Quarter 1 2007/8 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   158 	   56	   137	   77	  
Indicator Score 	   14.8%	   76.5%	   26.4%	   4.1%	  
Change Last 
Period	   +1.5%	   -­‐0.7%	   -­‐2.4%	   0.0%	  	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 2 2007/8 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   149 	   14	   142	   104	  
Indicator Score 	   14.0%	   81.5%	   26.0%	   4.9%	  
Change Last 
Period	   -­‐0.8%	   +5.0%	   -­‐0.5%	   +0.8%	  	  	  	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
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Bed days days 
Quarter 3 2007/8 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   141 	   39	   125	   104	  
Indicator Score 	   13.8%	   78.8%	   25.8%	   4.9%	  
Change Last 
Period	   -­‐0.2%	   -­‐2.7%	   -­‐0.2%	   0.0%	  	  
Indicator/Quarter Reduction in 
Length of Stay 
Increase 
in day 
case rate 
Reduction 
in Pre-
operative 
Bed days 
Emergency 
Re-admission 
within 14 
days 
Quarter 4 2007/8 	   	   	   	   	  
National Position 	   166 	   14	   123	   108	  
Indicator Score 	   14.8%	   83.3%	   24.9%	   4.7%	  
Change Last 
Period	   +1.0%	   +4.5%	   -­‐0.9%	   -­‐0.2%	  
 
 
FT DD showed improvement in the productivity metrics in the case of day case rates and 
pre-operative bed days, but showed deterioration with respect to the length of stay metric. 
In respect of pre-operative bed days the percentage of bed days consumed between admission 
and operation accounted for 32.0% of bed usage in the first quartile of 2006/7, the highest of 
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our four case studies and making FT DD 174 out of 176 NHS trusts on this metric. The 
FT showed a steady and sustained improvement over each quarter resulting in a rate of 
24.9% in the final quarter of 2007-8. 
The day case rate recorded in quarter one of 2006/7 was a respectable 78.5% placing the trust 
as a top quartile performer and attaining 83.3% in the fourth quartile of 2007/8. Progress on 
this indicator of productivity improvement was less uniform with three of the eight quartiles 
showing deterioration in day case surgery to a low of 76.5% in the first quarter of 2007/8. 
In respect of length of stay this metric showed improvement in 2006/7 but deterioration in 
2007/8 indicating a lack of consistency. FT DD remained a lower quartile performer on this 
metric throughout the two year period ending quarter four 2007/8 with 14.8% of bed days 
that could have been saved if the FT had reduced its excess bed day usage. 
It is likely that the deterioration in the length of stay metric and variation in the day surgery 
rate may be partial explanations for the deterioration in the FT’s hospital wide and Elective 
RCI between 2006/7 and 2007/8. 
6.3.3  Productivity Metrics Limitations 
As with the RCI data set the limitations identified by the Audit Commission (2008) and 
Dawson and Street (1998) (as set out at 6.2.3 above) apply to the productivity metrics as 
much as they do to the RCI data set. 
In addition, the productivity metrics used in this research have not taken into consideration 
improvements, or deterioration, in the quality of outcomes or care to patients as an indicator 
of changes in productivity.  
The lack of real standardised quality indicators, such as post operative functionality tests (for 
example SF 36) or patient reported outcome measures (PROMs) currently being produced by 
the DoH for clinical procedures such as hip and knee replacements (Devlin and Appleby 
2010) restricts the ability of the research to effectively take into account improvements in the 
quality of care. This is a clear limitation of this data set. As indicated earlier at 6.3.1, the 
above tables include re-admission rates (within 14 days) as proxies for quality as collected by 
the Institute. Because of the proxy nature of the metric, and the data availability only being 
from quarter one 2007/8, the data is only being used to illustrate the point. 
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On review of the re-admission rate for each of the FTs it will be noted that the 
emergency re-admission rates from quarter one 2007/8 to quarter four have increased in each 
case. For instance, FT CC records an increase in the rate of re-admission from 2.5% to 3.1% 
over the period: this might represent a 25% deterioration in quality. As any real conclusion as 
to improvement or deterioration in relative productivity must consider the quality of the 
outputs produced (in this instance the degree to which clinical procedures are being carried 
out fault free and therefore not requiring patient re-admission to correct clinical error) any 
data (such as that provided in this research) must be considered with some caution when 
concluding the degree to which productivity has varied in each of the case studies. 
 
6.4 SUMMARY RESULTS 
6.4.1   Productivity Data 
The above results indicate a very mixed picture on productivity in the four case studies.  The 
results from the review of changes in the organisation wide relative cost index (RCI) for the 
four FTs indicated that three of the four case studies saw a reduction in their RCI between 
2005-6 and 2006-7 but in 2007-8 the RCIs of the three hospitals reverted to, or exceeded, 
their 2005-6 RCI.  For instance, FT BB saw its RCI drop from 98 to 88 and then rebound to 
97. A similar story occurred with FT DD.  FT CC actually witnessed its RCI drop from 93 to 
90 and then rise to 97 putting this FT in a worse average cost position relative to other 
hospitals than at the beginning of the study.  
The exception to the above picture was FT AA which initially saw its RCI rise between 
2005-6 and 2006-7 from 97 to 98 and then fall to 92. Even in this case the data did not 
indicate a consistent organisation-wide year on year improvement in relative productivity. 
This inconsistent picture on productivity improvement was replicated when we considered 
the RCI of each case study with regard to its elective work. It should be noted that hospitals 
have the potential to have significantly more control over elective activity therefore 
permitting them to plan activity relative to capacity, standardise their care pathways to 
maximise patient safety, efficiency and ensure clinical effectiveness. This kind of 
environment would suggest easier wins with regard to productivity improvement as opposed 
to unplanned emergency care where demand can be much more variable.  
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The data for the Elective RCI for the four case studies indicated that FT AA saw a 
significant and sustained increase in this measure between 2005-6 and 2006-7 increasing 
from 93 to 108. This increase in its relative costs was then maintained in 2007-8. Two of the 
case studies saw their elective RCIs decrease between 2005-6 and 2006-7. FT BB witnessing 
its RCI drop significantly from 122 to 93 and FT DD from 93 to 87.  
FT BB’s change in elective RCI was probably a consequence of a cost improvement 
programme, which was implemented over a relatively short period. In both case studies the 
reduction in the Elective RCI bounced back. In the case of FT BB it reverted to 93 (still 
significantly below its starting point of 122) but FT DD witnessed its RCI rebound to 99 
(above its starting point of 93). The final case study FT CC saw its Elective RCI rise from 85 
to 98 between 2005-6 and 2006-7 but then fall again to 86; only marginally above its starting 
point and still not indicating an overall improvement or consistent trend in productivity. 
The final RCI the research considered was the Critical Care RCI. Critical care usually 
represents a small part of the overall bed stock of a hospital (involving high dependency beds 
and intensive care facilities). These facilities are therefore expensive in resource and because 
of size (perhaps twenty or so beds in an average size district general hospital) should lend 
themselves to effective management; maximising quality and efficiency of care.  
Three of the case studies witnessed initial decreases in their Critical Care RCI between 2005-
6 and 2006-7, the most significant reduction being from 98 to 82 in FT BB. But in each of 
these cases a significant increase in each Critical Care RCI occurred between 2006-7 and 
2007-8. FT BB witnessed a significant amount of its improvement being reversed, jumping 
back to 93, and the other two case studies seeing very large rises, FT CC rising from 101 to 
125 and FT DD rising from 71 to 126.  In contrast FT AA witnessed a decline in its Critical 
Care RCI year on year seeing it fall from 97 to 96 and finally to 92 in 2007-8. 
It is clear from the RCI data, on all three measures, that none of the case studies had a 
sustained improvement in productivity in all three areas. On the basis of the RCI data the best 
record was shown by FT AA where two out of three measures showed improvement at the 
end of the period but even in that case study the Elective RCI witnessed a significant and 
sustained rise. 
The research does not set out to explain the variations in the RCI over time but large 
variations in an RCI of up to 77 percent within a year (as in the case of FT DD in Critical 
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Care) need to be addressed for the integrity of the remaining data to be maintained. 
Investment in services, particularly critical care, usually involves significant investment in 
both facilities (causing a significant rise in depreciation costs for those services) and usually 
an increase in staffing. Both these investments can add significantly to the input costs of 
delivering a service and cause wide variation in a specialty’s RCI. In the case of FT DD, a 
significant investment in critical care occurred but without proportionate throughput of 
activity, thus significantly increasing the Critical Care RCI. This investment in a service, 
everything else being equal, will indicate deterioration in productivity. Clearly this does not 
take into account any improvement in quality leading to increased patient survival and 
prognosis. 
As mentioned above the results from the RCI data were supplemented by the productivity 
metrics produced by the Institute of Innovation, namely length of stay, day case rates and 
potential for the reduction in pre-operative bed days. There was also a review of emergency 
re-admission rates. 
The productivity metrics results reinforce the conclusions from the RCI data. FT AA saw its 
excess bed days deteriorate from 13.4% in quarter 1 2006-7 to 14.5 % in the third quarter of 
2007-8 and day case surgery rates also deteriorated from 63.0% in the first quarter 2006-7 to 
a low of 57.1% in the third quarter of 2007-8 only recovering to 63.0% by the final quarter of 
2007-8. Limited improvement on the percentage of pre-operative bed days from 24.4% to 
23.7% was achieved between the first quarter of 2006 and the final quarter of 2008. These 
productivity metrics do not indicate a trust making sustained headway on improving 
productivity within the organisation. 
The productivity metrics results for FT BB also show an organisation not achieving sustained 
progress on productivity. In this case the results indicated a decline in the day case rate from 
69.3% to 67.7% between quarter one of 2006-7 and the final quarter of 2007-8 (although 
several quarters showed higher performance) and the pre-operative bed days indicator 
deteriorated from a very competitive 17.1% to 21.6% in the final quarter of 2007-8. Although 
it could be argued that this indicator was unlikely to show a significant improvement due to 
FT DD already being a top quartile performer, in fact the metric deteriorated markedly over 
time. FT BB did show some improvement in the excess bed days indicator, moving from 
15.9% in quarter one 2006-7 to 13.8% in the final quarter of 2007-8. This was an easy win 
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area for productivity improvement given its poor relative position. At the end of the two-
year period it still remained a lower quartile performer on this measure. 
FT CC and FT DD’s productivity metrics showed a better productivity performance but still 
presented a mixed story. In the case of FT DD it exhibited an improvement in its day case 
rates and its pre-operative bed days. Pre-operative bed days showed a marked improvement 
dropping from 32.0% in the first quarter of 2006-7 to 24.9% in the final quarter of 2007-8. 
FT DD’s day case rate also showed good improvement rising from 78.5% in the first quarter 
of 2006-7 to 83.3% in the final quarter of 2007-8. Unfortunately, FT DD’s length of stay did 
not indicate the same success. This metric improved in 2006-7 from 13.6% to 13.4% in the 
final quarter of that year but throughout 2007-8 saw its performance significantly deteriorate 
ending the final quarter of 2007-8 at 14.8% 
In respect of FT CC this case study also showed improvement in two productivity metrics. 
The length of stay indicator improved from a very good 10.6% in quarter one 2006-7 to 9.7% 
in quarter four of 2007-8. The hospital also showed consistent improvement over the two 
year period in its pre-operative bed days moving from 24.8% in quarter one 2006-7 to 22.5% 
in the final quarter of 2007-8. FT CC did not maintain its 71.0%  day case rate achieved in 
quarter one 2006-7 and ended the final quarter of 2007-8 at 68.7%. Between this period it 
achieved a high of 73.7% and a low of 67%. 
What does the research therefore conclude from a combination of the results from the RCI 
and productivity metrics with regard to productivity in the four case studies? All four case 
studies showed short-term variations in relative productivity but no sustained record of 
productivity improvement. There is some evidence to suggest that the hospitals tend to be 
able to make short-term changes in their relative cost base (for instance, FT BB saw its RCI 
drop from 98 to 88 on the back of a cost improvement programme) but then there is a 
tendency for organisations to revert to their traditional relative productivity position. For 
instance, BB’s organisation wide RCI of 88 for 2006-7 rebounded to 97 within one year of 
the cost improvement programme being completed. The productivity metrics showed the 
same position with FTs showing short-term improvement in productivity metrics (for 
instance FT CC’s day case rate showed significant variation over a two year period varying 
from 73.7% to as low as 67%). This does not suggest a reliable trend in productivity 
improvement. As discussed later this could be because action on productivity improvement 
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remains focussed on short term actions to reduce costs (which are not backed up by a 
fundamental review of operating processes), a failure by boards to address at a strategic level 
the issue of productivity and the way that the boards conduct their business (which could be 
an issue of board competence). A third explanation could be the non-engagement of 
clinicians in the productivity agenda thus not addressing the fundamental issue of reviewing 
and standardising care pathways to ensure quality of care and efficiency of care processes.  
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has set out the productivity data, identified the main trends and then conducted 
an analysis of the results for the four FT case studies. The next chapter brings together the 
findings and analysis from the documentary review, the interviews and the productivity data 
in a case study analysis. The case study analysis section is then followed by the final chapter 
which brings together the main conclusions of the research and considers the wider policy 
implications. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ANALYSIS  OF RESULTS 
 
“It requires a very unusual mind to undertake the analysis of the obvious” 
Alfred North Whitehead 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the themes of the documentary, interview and productivity data analysis in 
chapters four, five and six respectively are brought together and discussed in the context of 
the four case studies from which the data originated. The chapter will identify which issues 
were common across the case studies, and where variation occurs, why this might be the 
case. These results are then linked to the central and subsidiary research questions and the 
main conclusions from the results are explored. This section is then followed by the final 
chapter of the thesis, which considers the implications of the results firstly, in terms of 
implications for the management of hospitals in respect of delivering productivity and 
improving quality and quantity of output. Secondly, the wider implications the results might 
have for the Coalition Government’s Health and Social Care Act 2012. The final chapter also 
explores opportunities for further research in the field. 
 
7.2 CASE STUDIES 
The four case studies were introduced in chapter two as case studies AA, CC and DD with an 
outlier case study BB. Key characteristics of the four case studies are set out below. 
 Table 7.1 Case Study AA 
Geography/urbanisation South East England, city location 
Population Serves a diverse socio-economic urban 
population of approximately 470,000 with a 
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wider catchment for its specialist services 
Provider Choice Competing acute (general and specialist) 
providers within 5 mile radius 
Authorisation Authorised as a foundation trust in 2006 
Financial Risk Rating Financial Risk Rating of 4 out of 4 being the 
strongest risk rating for financial 
sustainability 
Leadership Long serving chief executive and stable 
executive management team 
Clinical Engagement No evidence of significant issues with 
clinical engagement within the organisation 
Services Combination of general acute services 
(including accident and emergency) for local 
population with some specialist services for 
example burns, HIV and paediatric and 
neonatal surgery 
 
Table 7.2 Case Study BB 
Geography/urbanisation South East England, city location 
Population Serves a diverse ethnic minority urban 
population of approximately 250,000 a 
quarter of which is under 20 years of age with 
significant deprivation within the community. 
Provider Choice Competing acute (general and specialist) 
providers within 5 mile radius 
Authorisation Authorised as a foundation trust in 2004 
Financial Risk Rating Financial Risk Rating of 2 out of 4 being the 
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strongest risk rating for financial 
sustainability and 1 being the weakest 
Leadership Long serving chief executive and stable 
executive management team 
Clinical Engagement Generally good clinical engagement, one of 
key factors indicated in contributing to 
delivery of a large cost improvement 
programme 
Services Combination of general acute and community 
services (including accident and emergency) 
for local population with some specialist 
services for example HIV  
 
 
Table 7.3 Case Study CC 
Geography/urbanisation South West England, city location but 
covering a large rural population 
Population Serves a mainly white population of 
approximately 400,000 over a large sparsely 
populated rural area 
Provider Choice Nearest competing acute (general and 
specialist) provider 45 miles  
away therefore limited competition 
Authorisation Authorised as a foundation trust in 2004 
Financial Risk Rating Financial Risk Rating of 4 being the strongest 
risk rating for financial sustainability  
Leadership Long serving chief executive and stable 
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executive management team 
Clinical Engagement Generally good clinical engagement  
Services Provides general acute services (including 
accident and emergency) together with some 
specialist services. For example, orthopaedic 
surgery, renal, plastic and thoracic services.  
 
Table 7.4 Case Study DD 
Geography/urbanisation South East England urban/coastal location 
(not city) 
Population Serves a mainly urban population of 
approximately 550,000 but rises during 
summer months due to tourism. 
Provider Choice Competing acute provider within 10 mile 
radius 
Authorisation Authorised as a foundation trust in 2005 
Financial Risk Rating Financial Risk Rating of 4 out of 4 being the 
strongest risk rating for financial 
sustainability 
Leadership Long serving chief executive and stable 
executive management team 
Clinical Engagement No evidence of significant issues with 
clinical engagement within the organisation 
Services Combination of general acute services 
(including accident and emergency) for local 
population with some specialist services for 
example burns, HIV and paediatric and 
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neonatal surgery 
 
7.2.1  Common Factors Across Case Studies 
As discussed in Chapter Two, and as indicated in the tables above, all four case studies had 
been authorised as FTs in the earlier waves of the transition from NHS Trusts to FTs between 
2004-6. Due to the FT application process requiring boards of directors of applicants to 
demonstrate their organisation is managed in an ‘effective, efficient and economic manner’ 
all four case studies had been able to illustrate to the regulator high standards of performance 
and governance and that the organisations were effectively managed. The four case studies 
were therefore considered to be high performing organisations in the NHS context. As each of 
the case studies had been through this process in the last three years they had been subject to 
an external governance review led by Monitor and supported by leading firms of accountants 
(for example KPMG). This would mean that the hospitals had demonstrated that they had 
financial and management systems and processes which were fit for purpose and could 
manage the hospital effectively under the PbR regime. For the purposes of this research all 
four case studies would have the basic systems from which they could take advantage of any 
benefits accruing from PbR be they financial or operational. 
The second common factor was that all the case studies were subject to the same 
accountability structures. As mentioned in Chapter Two, by ensuring all the hospitals were 
FTs the research removed the variation that might have been caused by the four case study 
hospitals being in different StHAs as the performance cultures across those StHAs could have 
varied significantly. As discussed in earlier chapters, as FTs  all four case studies were subject 
to the same regulatory structure led by Monitor and therefore subject to the same performance 
and incentive regime. All four hospitals were also subject to the same internal accountability 
structures with respect to reporting to their governors for the performance of the hospital and 
delivery of each case study’s strategy as set out in 3.5.1. The impact of working in the same 
regulatory and performance management environment is that all four case studies will have 
been subject to the same requirements and development opportunities (for instance 
encouragement by Monitor to implement SLR) when operating under the PbR regime. They 
would also have had the same potential to access support and information as to how best to 
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implement management and other systems which would allow the hospitals to maximise 
their effectiveness under the PbR . 
The third common factor illustrated in the tables above is that all four FTs had stable and long 
serving management teams and no specific problems evident with respect to clinical 
enagagement. Chris Ham notes in the King’s Fund’s recent paper on reforming the NHS from 
within that one of the critical factors in successful delivery of change programmes is 
leadership continuity (Ham 2014). He cites Salford Royal Foundation Trust as an example of 
continuity of leadership leading to high performance and this is supported by the experience 
of hospitals such as Virginia Mason in Seattle, USA that has successfully introduced Lean 
methodology and has been supported by stable leadership over a fifteen year period. As all 
four case studies have continuity of leadership (combined with being high performing 
organisations) and no evidence of concerns with clinical engagement they should all have 
been well placed to take advantage of any opportunities that PbR provided to align 
managerial and clinical incentives and deliver improved output, quality, quantity and 
productivity. 
The fourth common factor in all the case studies was the basic portfolio of services provided 
by each hospital. All four case studies delivered general acute services to their populations 
(including accident and emergency) and provided some specialist services. None of the 
hospitals had designations as regional trauma centres neither were they specialist hospitals. 
The only slight difference in services provided was that case study BB delivered some 
community based services (including nursing home facilities) but these were relatively small 
compared to its acute services. From the point of view of the research this means that all four 
case studies were of similar size (i.e. medium sized district general hospitals) and complexity 
of services. This indicates that in terms of implementing management systems to support the 
organisation in operating under the PbR regime, and developing managers and clinicians to 
operate within in it, senior management in each case study faced similar challenges in terms 
of size and complexity of organisation. 
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7.2.2  Differences Across Case Studies 
There are two key areas were the case studies are subject to variation. Firstly, the geography 
and the populations of the case studies lead to an impact as to choice of provider for patients. 
Secondly, case study BB was chosen because it had a different financial status compared to 
the remaining three hospitals. These two differences are discussed below. 
With respect to the population, geography and provider choice case studies AA and BB are 
in city locations serving concentrated populations and in both cases the hospitals are close in 
proximity to alternative providers. In both instances these alternative providers deliver the 
general and specialist services provided by each of the case studies and therefore patients 
have an effective choice of provider and consequently each of the case studies face potential 
competition. From the point of view of the research there is therefore potential for individual 
specialities within case studies AA and BB to be subject to competition for patients and 
therefore one might expect potential for clinicians and managers to engage with PbR in order 
to understand the sustainability of their services and maximise their efficiency. In addition, it 
might be expected that the board of directors of the case studies might consider competition a 
potential risk and this might have been highlighted in the documentary data. 
With regard to case study DD, which although in an urban/coastal area also faces potential 
competition from a provider within five miles the same as case studies AA and BB we might 
expect similar responses. A slight difference in this case is that the competing provider to DD 
does not compete with FT DD’s more specialist services and it does not therefore face the 
prospect of local competition across all its provision. 
With respect to case study CC which has a mainly rural, very dispersed and ageing 
population where the nearest provider, for all its services, is 45 miles away competition is 
significantly restricted. In FT CC’s case, it is likely that clinicians and managers will not 
perceive competition to be a threat to their speciality and therefore PbR, and the financial 
viability of their services might be considered less of a concern. This might also impact on 
the board of directors focus on PbR . 
The second issue of variability was the financial status of the four case studies. As discussed 
in Chapter Two (and set out in Tables 7.1-7.4 above) FTs AA, CC and DD all had financial 
risk ratings of three or four and were therefore not of financial concern to Monitor at the time 
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of the research. FT BB, which had a risk rating of two was subject to regulatory review 
and therefore the sustainability of the hospital, and individual specialties within it, would 
have been the focus of general management and clinical leaders. Under such circumstances, 
particularly, where alternative providers existed to deliver the services (please see discussion 
above), it might be that PbR would be more likely to contribute to the alignment of 
managerial and clinical incentives and deliver improved output, quality, quantity and 
productivity. 
7.2.3  Analysis Across Case Studies 
The detailed analysis of the results was carried out in Chapters Four, Five and Six 
respectively. This section brings together the themes in that analysis by reviewing those 
themes across the case studies and then explaining any variation. 
A consistent theme across all the case studies was that none of the hospitals had delivered 
sustained improvement in productivity, as indicated by the RCI or productivity metrics on a 
wide range of indicators, during the period of the study. In terms of organisation wide 
productivity improvement the two best performers were FT AA and FT BB. FT AA finished 
2007-8 with an organisation wide RCI of 92 compared to 97 in 2005-6 and FT BB managed 
to reduce its RCI from 98 to 88 in 2006-7 (but this subsequently rebounded in 2007-8). 
In explaining why FT AA and BB performed marginally better on the overall productivity 
metrics the data provides some possible explanations. In respect of FT AA it will be noted 
that it had recently completed the FT application process in 2006. The board minutes suggest 
that, as part of that process, the board of directors took a keen interest in understanding 
productivity related issues, particularly around tariff and the viability of individual services, 
which is the emphasis of the Monitor application process. FT AA was also a pilot site for 
SLR implementation which may have also contributed. This organisational focus might well 
have led to some improvement in overall productivity.  
In the case of FT BB, although its productivity improvement was short lived, the change was 
the largest reduction of all the case studies over the period. As the reader will recall FT BB 
was the outlier case study that had a Monitor financial risk rating of 2. The impact of this was 
that the hospital was subject to close regulatory monitoring and this was reflected within the 
documentary and interview results. For instance, FT BB’s board minutes recorded the 
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highest focus on PbR (particularly with respect to changes in tariff for its main services) 
of all the case studies. In addition, the interview data illustrated that FT BB was 
implementing a clinically driven improvement programme focussing on efficiency rather 
than a traditional cost improvement programme driven from the top down. 
A common theme for all the case studies from the interview data and documentary review 
has been the significance of Monitor as an influencer of each of the hospitals. In all the case 
studies Monitor recorded the highest incidence of all the terms in the documentary review 
and Monitor’s influence was highlighted by interview respondents across all the case studies 
both at board and operational level. Although all the case studies noted the influence of 
Monitor it was particularly pronounced in the cases of FTs AA and BB. This is probably due 
to FT AA having been through the FT application process during the period of the 
documentary review and FT BB being the subject of regulatory scrutiny due to its poor 
financial position. 
In terms of the significance of PbR all the case studies produced a very similar response. At 
board level it was thought that PbR set the commercial rules in which the FTs operated. In 
that respect it impacted significantly upon decision-making around costs, quality and 
efficiency of services. At an operational level PbR was considered to be something that did 
not affect day-to-day decisions. With respect to clinical understanding and engagement with 
PbR the consensus was that PbR was not really understood, or engaged with, by many 
clinicians. It is not clear from the data whether PbR data has not been effectively shared with 
clinicians because management lacked confidence in the data, because of a lack of IT 
packages to make the data accessible to operational leaders or because of a lack of 
engagement at an operational level with the information by clinicians and managers. 
Conversations around clinical quality occurred at the board meetings of all the case studies to 
varying degrees, and as we noted earlier FT BB recorded the highest incidence of PbR, 
efficiency and quality. This congruence is probably explained by the clinical transformation 
programme that was being followed at the time of the review. In terms of measuring clinical 
quality, all four case studies (including respondents from clinical and managerial groups) 
noted that the organisation reviewed clinical data. What is evident is that all the case studies 
routinely reviewed proxies for quality (for instance access measures) and FT DD reviewed 
quarterly mortality data. None of the case studies had significant programmes for the 
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measurement of value added to patients (for instance SF36 measures of patient 
functionality pre and post clinical intervention). It is interesting that regulators do not require 
hospitals to understand the value added to patients by the treatment they deliver and (as 
mentioned in Chapter Five) there appears to be no aspiration by the respondents to do so.  
A very interesting result is that competition was not mentioned at all in three of the four case 
studies; this is especially interesting as FTs AA and BB are in city locations with potential 
competition within five miles (please see Tables 7.1 and 7.2 above). When the documentary 
search was widened to patient choice the incidence increased but remained relatively low. 
The interview data also failed to highlight competition as a major driver of focus on PbR or 
productivity improvement. Given that FTs AA, BB and DD were all in close proximity to 
other providers this is an interesting outcome. There is nothing in the results to explain the 
relatively low significance of competition as a focus of the four case studies. It may be that, 
when hospitals are attracting greater demand for their services than the capacity they have to 
deliver it, losing a few patients to competing providers might be rather helpful. 
            7.3 CENTRAL AND SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
7.3.1  Questions 
The central research question of the thesis is whether the introduction of Payment By Results 
into the National Health Service has aligned clinical and managerial incentives and improved 
output, quality, quantity and productivity.  
In order to fully answer this central question several subsidiary research questions needed to 
be addressed. Three of these subsidiary research questions were answered in the literature 
review. In particular: 
7.3.1.1 what is traditionally meant by productivity and how has the NHS  routinely measured 
inputs and outputs; 
7.3.1.2  will future methods of measuring productivity (as considered by Atkinson et al and 
the Office of National Statistics) produce radically different methodologies for measuring 
public sector productivity; and  
7.3.1.3  what has happened to NHS wide productivity since 2000 to the present time? 
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7 3.1.4  This left the following questions to be addressed by the data collection element 
of the research: 
7.3.1.4.1 what has happened to productivity in the four case studies between 2005 and 
2008; 
7.3.1.4.2 has the introduction of PbR led to greater management and board focus upon 
understanding costs of individual procedures within FTs; 
7.3.1.4.3 has the introduction of PbR resulted in FTs developing and implementing 
action plans to align health care costs to the relevant HRG under PbR; 
7.3.1.4.4 do concerns about an FT’s long term financial viability produce greater 
organisational focus on PbR and productivity 
7.3.1.4.5 has the introduction of PbR acted as a catalyst for clinicians understanding 
of, and taking responsibility for, not only the outputs of clinical care but also the costs 
of inputs; and 
7.3.1.4.6 has PbR produced a greater alignment between the fundamental interests of 
clinicians and managers? If so, how and why? 
 
7.3.2  Analysis 
This section will address each of these subsidiary research questions in turn and then bring 
together the analysis in a final review of the central research question and a conclusion. 
From the productivity data (both RCI and productivity metrics) the answer to the first 
subsidiary research question, as to what had happened to productivity in the four case studies 
between 2005-8, is that each of the case studies had seen variations in productivity on 
various measures over the period, but there had not been sustained progress on productivity 
in any of the FTs. 
The conclusion that there had not been any sustained improvement in productivity, in the 
case studies is in line with Appleby, Crawford and Emmerson (2009)’s findings that at best 
productivity in the NHS has been flat over recent years. 
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With regard to the second question - has the introduction of PbR led to greater 
management focus upon understanding costs of individual procedures within FTs - the 
results of the documentary search indicate that at board level PbR/tariff has been mentioned 
in the case study minutes on a regular basis but does not appear to have caused a link to a 
discussion of productivity, merely to a discussion of income. As an explicit driver PbR does 
not appear to have driven the focus of boards on to the costs of individual procedures. 
However as one of the Finance Directors  noted “PbR has set the context in which all 
decisions are made”. There is no evidence that  the context has caused a focus on 
productivity. 
In addition, from the search of the documents, there is no evidence that boards have 
increasingly focussed upon the costs of delivering individual services. In fact over the two 
year review of board documents two of the boards paid very limited attention to the 
discussion of costs with regard to individual services although one, FT BB, paid more 
attention to these issues during a short period of financial pressure. 
This finding raises the issue as to whether it is actually external pressure which forces 
management teams to focus upon the key elements of running a business and therefore is it is 
important to use regulatory, or financial, pressure on NHS management teams to ensure that 
they focus upon productivity. This is, in part, the position of those who have promoted the 
target culture of the NHS in order to promote progress on access, and latterly, quality. 
Productivity targets have, to date, not been applied.  
It should be noted that several of the respondents commented that at an operational level 
there was an increasing movement to understanding costs of individual procedures. The 
mechanism for promoting this interest in the costs of individual services appears to be the 
introduction of SLR. The momentum for trialling this approach to understanding the costs of 
individual procedures has been heavily promoted by the regulator, Monitor. A group of FTs 
benefitted from seed funding to implement SLR. 
FT AA had been one of the FTs to trial SLR in one of their specialities and the results from 
the board minutes indicate that, of all the case studies, FT AA was seeing SLR as a method 
of promoting the efficiency agenda within the organisation via understanding the costs of 
individual procedures. 
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Interviews with those connected with the SLR project of FT AA, and board members 
supporting the project, saw opportunities not only for understanding and driving the 
efficiency agenda but also by linking quality indicators into SLR promoting quality of care 
within the hospital. Although FT AA evidenced board and operational level support for SLR 
as a driver of productivity improvement there was a general acceptance by those interviewed, 
across all the FTs, that SLR was a key element in the promotion of productivity improvement 
in the organisation as it provided the data and understanding necessary for productivity issues 
to be addressed. 
The above discussion surrounding SLR links neatly into answering the third question: has the 
introduction of PbR resulted in FTs developing and implementing action plans to align health 
care costs to the relevant HRG under PbR? 
At the time of the research none of the case studies were in a position to say that SLR had 
been fully rolled out to all parts of their hospitals. In the most advanced cases it appeared that 
SLR was only being trialled in discrete specialties as management teams were cautious about 
some of the unexpected consequences that might arise from the information that SLR 
produced. For instance, one concern noted was that if a specialty was producing a surplus 
then clinicians would probably argue for that surplus to be re-invested in the services of that 
specialty. This clearly conflicts with the concept that surpluses are retained centrally and 
allocated by central management. 
As the research results have indicated that PbR has acted as a backdrop to decision making 
by the case studies, it might be expected that hospital management would have implemented 
a strategy to align hospital costs with the relevant HRG under PbR. Evidence from the 
interviews suggests that, when organisations believe that the tariff could undermine the 
financial stability of the hospital, then action is taken by the management teams to reduce the 
costs of the organisation. However there was very limited evidence to suggest that 
management teams had sufficient cost information to accurately align the costs of an 
individual treatment to the relevant HRG across multiple procedures.  
The reasons for this inability to align procedure costs to the relevant HRG were probably 
threefold. Firstly, as previously mentioned, hospitals do not fully understand the costs of 
delivering the individual services they provide. SLR, if implemented and supported by data 
collection systems which are accurate will probably be the first time NHS hospitals will have 
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had a management model which permits them to understand the costs of delivering 
individual treatments. At the time of the research SLR was only in its initial stages of rollout. 
Secondly, as will be discussed later, clinical engagement with understanding the costs and 
related revenue associated with various treatments was generally low; any review of care 
pathways to align procedure costs to HRG requires clinical engagement. Finally, at the time 
the interviews were conducted, none of the FTs were facing current financial pressure and 
the central debate in the NHS had moved to a quality agenda. Under such conditions it was 
probably more difficult to have a discussion about efficiency; the pressure for productivity 
improvement had been weakened by the DoH stimulated discourse on quality. 
 The issue concerning pressure brings us to the fourth subsidiary research question: do 
concerns about an FT’s long term financial viability produce greater organisational focus on 
PbR and productivity? 
The research results, and the intuitive conclusion to this question, are aligned. Firstly, the 
productivity improvement for FT BB during its period of financial pressure clearly showed 
that its relative costs compared to other providers in England decreased significantly. 
Secondly, the document review showed focus upon efficiency, length of stay and tariff by the 
board during the hospitals period of financial stress. Finally, interviews with the management 
and clinicians confirmed the financial focus of the organisation when under that financial and 
therefore regulatory pressure. 
The final two subsidiary research questions to be addressed fall into two areas. The first 
question focuses upon clinical engagement with financial control and the process of care and 
the final question addresses the alignment of managerial and clinical agendas. 
First, the question as to whether the introduction of PbR acted as a catalyst for clinicians 
understanding of, and taking responsibility for, not only the outputs of clinical care but also 
the costs of inputs?  
In order for there to be a real probability of PbR acting as a catalyst for clinicians 
understanding and taking responsibility for the costs of care, PbR would probably have had 
to have had an operational influence throughout the organisation. As indicated by the review 
of the board minutes, PbR has not been a particular focus of the boards of hospitals and 
results from the interviews indicate that generally clinicians, at operational level, are not 
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aware of the costs of the procedures they deliver, nor the payment the hospital receives 
for the service they provide.  
In instances where SLR was in the process of being introduced in a speciality, then the 
interview data suggests that some clinicians become increasingly engaged with 
understanding the costs of delivering (and payments the hospital receives) from the service. 
A critical hurdle in SLR promoting that engagement is that clinicians must have belief and 
confidence in the accuracy of the data on which SLR relies. The accuracy of that data rests 
on the completeness of the activity coding system within the hospital which, as the Audit 
Commission (2008) notes, is often of questionable accuracy. 
PbR is therefore only setting the background for promoting clinical engagement with the 
costs of delivering services; it appears that it is SLR that provides the potential vehicle for 
engaging clinicians. SLR, if used well, may be a key vehicle for promoting clinical 
engagement and as a consequence productivity improvement. 
The final question the research aimed to answer was, has PbR produced a greater alignment 
between the fundamental interests of clinicians and managers? If so, how and why? 
The key variation that the interviews identified in respect of the differences in the 
fundamental interests of clinicians and managers was that although both groups were 
perceived as driven by public service, career progression and domestic financial stability the 
professional interests of clinicians tended to be connected with the furtherance of their 
speciality, their specialist skills and peer recognition within their specialty. Professional 
success for a manager depended upon the achievement of the corporate objective of the 
hospital; or achievement of the manager’s contribution to that objective.  
As the research results have indicated that PbR has had such a low profile within the 
hospitals operationally, it is no surprise to find that there was no evidence that PbR had 
resulted in a greater alignment of clinical and managerial objectives. For alignment to occur 
there probably needs to be some bridge created where the interests of the hospital at large are 
considered to be synonymous with the furtherance of the interests of individual specialties 
and the clinicians that work within them. 
It is possible that a combination of a tougher financial climate, forcing the NHS to tackle 
cultural issues, continued robust regulation by Monitor (ensuring continued delivery of 
	   159	  
financial objectives by FTs) combined with the proliferation of SLR might create an 
environment where the pursuit of productivity improvement is recognised as both desirable 
and achievable by clinicians and managers alike. 
 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has applied the research results to the subsidiary research questions and this 
section takes those answers and concludes on the central research question of the thesis 
namely: 
Whether the introduction of PbR in FTs (in the acute sector of the NHS) led to a greater 
management focus on, and improvements in, productivity and if so, why?  
The research has provided little evidence that the case study FTs have delivered a steady 
record of productivity improvement; although there has been some productivity improvement 
achieved in specific areas by all the FTs over relatively short periods. These improvements 
have often been reversed in the medium term. 
The results also indicate that PbR has had a relatively low profile as a concept, and as an 
express driver of productivity, both at board and operational level within the FTs. This is 
probably because, at the time of the research, FTs did not have the data and management 
systems in place to allow PbR to drive the productivity agenda. This largely remains the case 
in 2012. 
The research did produce some interesting results with regard to three other drivers: 
regulatory influence; focus upon productivity when organisations are under financial 
pressure and the potential for SLR to promote clinical engagement in the costs of delivering 
healthcare.  
The dominance of Monitor (the primary FT regulator) on board focus is  an unexpected but 
very interesting result. Monitor is considered a clear and robust regulator and possibly 
because of its strong powers of intervention has significant influence on the focus of FTs and 
their boards of directors. This influence, combined with the evidence from this research that 
the case study FTs have not particularly focussed upon or delivered productivity 
improvement of their own volition, raises two key questions. Firstly, is NHS management 
culturally orientated to central command and control and in order perform requires the 
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previous central direction provided by the DoH to be replaced in some form? Secondly, 
if this is the case, is there an opportunity for Monitor to take over this ‘direction’ function by 
changes in its regulatory framework? These issues are discussed further in Chapter Eight. 
The result that the greatest short term productivity improvement and focus by the board of 
directors upon PbR (tariff)/cost improvement occurred at the FT facing the most challenging 
financial environment indicates that pressure for change, be it financial and/or regulatory, 
might be a pre-condition for productivity focus and improvement by FTs. If this is the case 
then the anticipated poor financial conditions for the NHS in 2011-14 may provide a catalyst 
for productivity improvement. 
The perceived significance of SLR, as a medium for engaging clinicians with productivity 
improvement, is also of interest. Monitor has been consistent in its support for SLR but its 
operational rollout, within the case studies, was limited. Should the effective use of SLR be a 
pre-condition for successful clinical engagement with cost control and productivity then this 
could be a key area on which FT boards should focus. 
Finally, the research results indicated some FT boards neither focussed heavily on quality or 
productivity during the period of this research. There is therefore the interesting question of 
how these boards are adding value to their hospitals? 
The final chapter explores the policy implications of these findings both from the point of 
view of operating the NHS in its current structure and in terms of the Liberal-Conservative 
Coalition Government’s future plans for the NHS. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OPTIONS 
 
“We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when 
we created them “ 
Albert Einstein 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous four chapters have presented and analysed the research results. This chapter 
builds upon the analysis and considers potential policy implications with regard to the NHS 
productivity agenda, the role of Monitor and the future of decentralised NHS hospitals 
operating within a quasi market. This chapter then moves on to identify some of the key 
limitations of this research, given the resource constraints any PhD research must face, 
including limitations of the data collection and the generalisability of the results. The chapter 
concludes by considering what other research could be conducted which could build upon 
this work or issues the research has identified which, although not directly aligned to PbR, 
might be of interest to others. 
 
8.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS CURRENT OPERATIONS 
8.2.1  Research Key Conclusions 
The research results and analysis in Chapter Seven lead to three broad conclusions: 
• PbR has not resulted in an alignment of clinical and managerial incentives and has 
therefore not promoted productivity and wider performance of the case studies; 
• Limited evidence existed of board engagement with productivity; and 
• The case studies appear to respond to central direction and control. 
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The policy implications fall into two distinct categories. Firstly, what are the 
implications for policy in terms of operating hospitals in the NHS under current conditions 
and in particular delivering the productivity improvement currently being demanded by NHS 
leaders? Secondly, what policy implications might there be for wider healthcare strategy in 
England, particularly in respect of the Liberal –Conservative Coalition Government’s Health 
and Social Care Act 2012. The discussion starts with operating hospitals under current 
conditions. 
 
8.2.2  Productivity 
In the current financial climate, particularly in circumstances of ‘tepid’ funding requiring 
NHS productivity improvements of between 3.4 to 7.4 per cent per year between 2011-17 
(Kings Fund 2009), the DoH is using the level and calculation of tariff under PbR as an 
explicit lever for driving productivity improvement.  
It is highly likely that the use of the PbR/tariff lever will result in a  continued reduction in 
tariff paid for services; for instance the 2010-11 NHS Operating Framework introduced 30 
per cent marginal cost pricing for emergency admissions above those levels recorded in 
2008-9. In addition, the 2011-12 NHS Operating Framework has implemented a reduction in 
tariff of minus 1.5% for 2011-12 and indications are that that level of reduction may continue 
for several years. 
The analysis of the research results in Chapter Seven indicates that this policy may not work. 
The majority of FTs in this study did not appear particularly engaged with productivity 
improvement or cost control or in the relationship between these factors and tariff under PbR. 
This is reflected in the fact that a majority of the case studies failed to produce a sustainable 
and consistent improvement in productivity during the period of the research. This seems to 
have been because the boards of directors of the case studies did not appear to focus on 
productivity related issues and the use of SLR data, to allow clinicians and managers of 
hospitals to drive productivity improvement, was not widely available at operational level. 
The 2012 Kings Fund SLR report (based on seven different case studies) suggests that SLR 
use within the NHS continues to be highly variable (Foot et al 2012).  
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If the above remains the case it is unlikely that within the timeframes necessary (funding 
to be severely constrained financial year 2011-12 onwards) NHS organisations will be able to 
produce a sophisticated and targeted review of the clinical care pathways they provide to 
target productivity improvement at areas where there is real opportunity for efficiency 
improvement.  
This kind of structured, evidence based review of clinical care and processes requires not 
only the development of skills and capacity within an organisation (which takes time and 
resource) but, as we shall discuss later, requires engagement of clinicians stimulated by 
effective credible data. This is not something which can be delivered overnight. A more 
likely response is to require across the board service cost reductions irrespective of the 
efficiency of individual services: the traditional approach of the NHS. 
In the absence of a greater understanding of productivity within FTs, and the continuation of 
across the board cost improvement programmes, the  implications of the traditional approach 
to tough financial conditions are likely to be a combination of the erosion of quality, as 
already efficient departments are pressed further to achieve across the board cost 
improvement targets, while the potential gains from improving relatively inefficient service 
delivery (and a reduction in inappropriate clinical care variation) are not realised in other 
services. 
If informed, yet robust, productivity improvement is not achieved by FTs then the likely 
reaction of FT boards will be to attempt to exit those services which are significantly above 
tariff. In areas which do not have multiple providers (for example rural areas) this may lead 
to a deterioration in service coverage. A condition of every FT’s Monitor licence is the 
delivery of the Mandatory Services. A clear policy implication therefore is that Monitor may 
need to force FTs to continue to provide those Mandatory Services to ensure service 
coverage. 
 
8.2.3  Central Control 
A general theme of Government policy since the early 1990’s (with the introduction of 
“autonomous” NHS trusts, in the early 1990’s, and creation of FTs in 2003-4) has been a 
shift to more decentralised management of acute services with hospitals being accountable to 
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their local populations for the services they provide and development of a quasi market 
in healthcare. The policy implications with respect to FT management and the quasi market 
will be dealt with in the next section. 
The research results raise the issue of what boards of directors of FTs focus their attention 
upon. The results indicate that at the time of the research the four case studies were not 
heavily focussed upon productivity issues or the quality of the services they provided. For 
instance, the concept of productivity was only recorded in the minutes about one in every 4 
meetings and quality of services, although noted more often than productivity, was recorded 
less than once in every meeting. 
In contrast the research has noted the strong (and unexpected) dominance of Monitor, the FT 
regulator, in influencing the activity and focus of boards. As discussed in the analysis 
chapter, Chapter Seven, the most common reference in the board minutes of all the case 
studies was to ‘Monitor’. In addition, the interviews chapter, Chapter Five, and the analysis 
chapter, Chapter Seven, highlighted the significance respondents attached to the influence of 
Monitor on the case studies. What does this indicate about the behaviours of the management 
of FTs and the non-executive directors which serve on those boards? 
The NHS, since its creation in 1948, has been subject to central direction and control. The 
creation of NHS Trusts from 1991 onwards and then Foundation Trusts from 2003 to the 
present day heralded a movement from central control to local accountability. But the results 
indicate that, without central direction, prioritisation and focus of appropriate organisational 
effort FTs do not focus on productivity and quality issues. Is NHS management culturally 
conditioned to central direction from Whitehall? 
The results from the Board minutes review illustrate that the most prominent influence on 
Board agendas and focus was Monitor and the interview responses support this proposition. 
Monitor’s influence can be interpreted in two ways. First, that Monitor has used a regulatory 
framework which has been clear and robust encouraging boards to respect the advice and 
position of Monitor on regulatory matters. Monitor has then used that authority well, 
encouraging the roll-out of SLR and that this, with greater board competency as a 
consequence of the FT authorisation process, will lead to improvement in productivity as 
boards have the tools and information effectively to manage their businesses. 
	   165	  
The less positive interpretation is that, as FTs have been removed from the operational 
control of the DoH (FTs beng directly accountable to Parliament and their members), rather 
than releasing these organisations to become innovative and driving forces for the 
improvement in quality of service and productivity they have instead looked to Monitor  (as 
the main regulator of FTs ) to replace the traditional function of the DoH.  Under this 
interpretation, FTs now look to Monitor for direction as NHS organisations are more 
comfortable with central direction and control as opposed to localised decision making. 
In this context it is interesting to reflect upon the dynamics which were at play between 
Monitor and the DoH immediately prior to the May 2010 General Election. It appeared that 
Monitor was trying to justify its position of being an independent regulator by arguing that its 
method of regulation had led to financial savings and improved quality by the FTs it 
regulates. A recent report commissioned by Monitor, Measuring Monitor’s Impact (Monitor 
and Frontier 2009), argued that the process of FT application has directly led to savings of 
£271-389 million and also that the Monitor approval process also leads to reductions in 
MRSA rates and faster access to elective services by FT applicants. What is interesting is 
that the report notes that there is no evidence to suggest that, once through the selection 
process, FTs go on to outperform non-FTs in either financial or non-financial performance. 
To some extent this would fit with the notion that NHS organisations, whether we call them 
FTs, Primary Care Trusts or NHS Trusts, are run by executive management teams that have 
been developed in a culture of central direction and control and that they perform best when 
being pressed directly from the centre. The Monitor authorisation process is an intense 
detailed review of the organisation which sets clear hurdles for organisations to jump through 
in order to achieve FT status. This setting of hurdles and objectives is similar to the kind of 
control traditionally exercised by the DoH. 
The reduced access times of maximum of 18 weeks from referral to treatment, reduced 
Accident and Emergency waiting times to maximum four hours and improved cancer 
survival rates over the period of the Plan certainly indicate that targets can drive progress and 
many of those targets were set because of the control the DoH exercised over the NHS.  
If NHS management, and the organisations they lead, do respond more effectively to central 
direction and control then it may be that, as the NHS enters one of the most financially 
challenged periods of its history, a management model of central command and control and 
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targets might be a more effective approach of achieving financial stability than relying 
upon autonomous boards to deliver innovation and performance. 
It is probably worth noting that the lack of focus of boards on productivity could be partly 
due to the cash rich environment the NHS has been working in since the introduction of the 
Plan. With real growth in resources being as high as 7.5 per cent per annum (NHS Plan 2000)  
boards have not really faced the opportunity cost of investment decisions and therefore the 
difficult task of driving productivity improvement has not been necessary. If NHS 
management does react better under conditions of pressure and direction then, as long as 
regulatory performance standards are maintained, the need to deliver services within a no-
real-growth environment may result in the creation of incentives, and resultant productivity 
improvements that did not appear to exist at the time of the research. 
Financial pressure in itself may not of course produce the desired productivity improvement. 
The ‘burning platform’ effect of financial pressure could be easily quenched by allowing 
performance in the NHS to deteriorate. For instance, if Monitor (as the FT regulator) was to 
be less aggressive in enforcing the eighteen week maximum waiting time from referral to 
treatment (RTT Target) then, everything else being equal, the required amount of activity 
within the system would fall reducing the need to make more radical productivity 
improvements. Could this effect actually be occurring? In December 2010 7.8 % of admitted 
patients waited longer than the RTT Target, by December 2011 this had risen to 8.4%: a 
deterioration of some eight percentage points in twelve months (DoH 2012). But evidence 
suggest, that as of May 2012, Monitor is not changing its robust regulatory approach with 18 
FTs being deemed by Monitor to be in significant breach of the terms of their  authorisation 
and their boards being required to take corrective action to remedy their poor performance 
(Monitor May 2012). 
8.2.4  Monitor 
As the research indicated that Monitor was having significant influence in its regulatory role 
there is of course an opportunity for Monitor to extend its current light touch approach to 
regulation (subject to an FT’s compliance with its terms of authorisation) and be more 
directional in its regulatory regime with regard to quality and productivity issues. This could 
act as a key driver in promoting the productivity agenda.  
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There is some evidence that Monitor is increasingly willing to consider the delivery of 
quality targets a key focus of its regulatory role. The failures identified in the quality of 
services at Mid Staffordshire FT by the Healthcare Commission (Francis 2009) led to a 
review by Monitor of its regulatory mechanisms. In particular, Monitor’s May 2009 Board 
Minutes (Monitor 2009b) identify the systems it uses to assess clinical governance quality 
are to be reviewed. With the proposed extension of Monitor’s powers as an economic 
regulator for all NHS funded providers (DoH 2010) it will be interesting to see if Monitor 
releases the area of quality to the Care Quality Commission. 
If the research is correct, and Monitor is in a strong position positively to influence FTs due 
to its regulatory reputation and clarity, then Monitor might be able to use arms’ length 
productivity indicators to promote improvement. For instance, Monitor’s regulatory 
framework reviews FT plans but does not specify minimum performance criteria. It might be 
that a regulatory expectation of FT business plans to deliver minimum earning levels on 
turnover (i.e. a minimum EBITDA) or minimum returns on assets employed) would 
encourage FTs to make their hospitals more efficient. This in turn could lead to a review of 
clinical pathways and processes and therefore drive productivity. 
Although the above technique would be similar to the current approach of setting national 
performance targets (e.g RTT Targets), as the performance criteria would be strategic high 
level objectives, it would allow FTs to decide how the objective(s) were to be achieved rather 
than the more operational micro-management targets that the DoH has traditionally 
employed. The latter approach has, according to some academics, led to negative 
consequences with regard to the quality of clinical care (Bevan et al 2006) and with NHS 
management paralysis (Blackler 2006). 
Monitor could also extend its willingness to set standards for FTs by exerting influence over 
the board membership of their boards of directors For instance, it could influence the 
appointment process of directors to ensure they had sufficient understanding of the business 
of hospitals (especially with regard to non-executive appointments) and requiring operational 
directors to demonstrate commercial capacity. This approach is analogous to the powers of 
the Financial Services Authority when approving the appointment of directors to the boards 
of Banks; a point highlighted by Turner in his report on failures in the banking sector (Turner 
2010). 
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The policy implication of the above may suggest that, due to the NHS’s cultural history 
and its comfort with central control, then autonomous decision making at local levels within 
the NHS is not appropriate. The extension of Monitor’s role as a driver of productivity and 
quality improvement may be a realistic policy option, given its reputation and clarity as a 
regulator. 
 
8.2.5  Clinical Engagement 
The research results also indicated that the alignment of clinical and managerial incentives 
had not occurred with the introduction of PbR . What might this indicate about the 
productivity agenda over coming years? In particular, to what extent clinicians are likely to 
be engaged with the need for identifying productivity improvement during the period 2011-
14?  
There is currently much discussion within the NHS about clinical leadership, change 
management and productivity techniques such as Lean. David Nicholson, the Chief 
Executive of the NHS, is on record as saying (Pathiraja and Drysdale 2010) that his 
aspiration is that every NHS chief executive post advertised should receive an application 
from a clinician, as opposed to candidates being drawn purely from the traditional general 
managers created by the Griffiths review of 1988. For this transformation of NHS leadership, 
clinical engagement with the management agenda will be critical and the alignment of 
incentives between management and clinicians probably a pre-condition for change.  
If, as the research suggests, there has not been a significant alignment of those incentives (be 
it from the introduction of PbR or other drivers) then there is significant doubt that the 
adoption of the leadership agenda by clinicians is likely to occur in any material way. The 
Nicholson vision therefore appears to be a hollow policy aspiration.  
The productivity agenda is also heavily reliant upon the active leadership of clinicians in re-
modelling the delivery of clinical services both within organisations and across 
organisational boundaries. Experience of change management in USA healthcare, as 
exemplified by the introduction of Lean techniques in US hospitals such as Virginia Mason, 
Seattle and the improvements in medical service quality delivered by the Department of 
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Veterans Affairs, both identified significant clinical leadership and alignment of 
incentives as critical for success.  
In the case of Virginia Mason the pre-condition for the success in introducing and acquiring 
the efficiency and quality benefits from Lean was a ‘Compact’ between management and 
clinical teams. The Compact was effectively the alignment of the clinical and managerial 
objectives where both groups developed a patient first, defect free, no waste culture to drive 
efficiency improvement. 
Much of the process, procurement and behaviour changes required to deal with the 
productivity agenda in healthcare can not be addressed without clinicians acting as promoters 
and drivers of change. In particular, clinical practice and changes in clinical care need to be 
owned, and to a large extent driven, by clinicians with general NHS managers providing the 
technical and practical support to implement the changes in care pathways. If this level of 
clinical engagement does not exist with the productivity agenda then those changes will not 
occur and the large productivity gains (both quality and efficiency) from clinical care 
pathway review and development will not be delivered.  
In a “cold’ to ‘tepid’ funding environment this lack of clinical/managerial alignment could 
significantly contribute to the risk of financial failure within the NHS. It is therefore critical 
that leaders, both managers and clinicians, acknowledge the lack of alignment and identify 
levers (such as engagement with meaningful data via SLR) which will promote clinical 
engagement with the productivity agenda. 
In order to develop meaningful clinical engagement it may be time to move away from 
notions of controlling professionals and follow Nantha’s view set out in Chapter Three that 
we need to develop the intrinsic motivation of doctors and move away from the controlling 
approach adopted by the NHS and other health systems (Nantha 2013). If this was combined 
with the findings of Humphrey and Russell (2004) (please see 3.5.1) where NHS general 
management create opportunities and conditions for clinicians to proactively influence the 
strategy of the service they deliver and provide opportunities for them to innovate and be 
respected and valued then clinicians may not work wish to work in the private sector ( as 
identified by Humphrey and Russell) but make a greater contribution to public services. 
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8.2.6  Service Line Reporting 
An interesting observation from the interviews conducted was that the introduction of SLR 
appears to be viewed by many managers and clinicians as a key information tool required for 
productivity issues to be effectively addressed in an organisation. At the time of the research 
there was little evidence that SLR was being used at board level; although FT AA appeared 
to be considering issues around implementing SLR reporting. From a policy perspective this 
support for the potential benefits of SLR should reinforce Monitor’s willingness to champion 
the introduction of SLR and perhaps even formalise a commitment from FTs to commit to 
SLR within its authorisation or compliance frameworks.  
Should the effective introduction of SLR be a critical tool for clinical engagement with the 
productivity agenda then one of the key barriers to effective implementation of SLR must be 
addressed: that of data quality. The data used in SLR is based upon the activity coding within 
the hospital. The Audit Commission’s data quality report for 2008 noted that this was of 
questionable quality although more recent reports have suggested steady but slow 
improvement. The promotion of data quality may therefore be a key priority for FT boards 
and regulators to allow the benefits of SLR to be realised. 
Catherine Foot and colleagues have identified that SLR has led to tangible service changes in 
some organisations, but for SLR to be effective boards of directors have to be willing to 
devolve responsibility. Foot et al note that for SLR to work boards have to stop performance 
managing and become capability builders and clinicians need to be involved in developing 
the reporting system rather than it being done for them (Foot et al 2012 p8). 
8.3 STRATEGIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
So far the discussion has focussed upon policy implications in terms of the day-to-day 
operations of the NHS as it is currently structured. The discussion now explores possible 
implications for the quasi market for healthcare in England and then looks in detail at seven 
policy options available. 
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8.3.1  English Quasi Market in Health 
As discussed in 2.3 above, since 1990 English health policy has shown a general movement 
to decentralised NHS providers competing with a small, but increasingly significant, group 
of private sector providers delivering publicly funded health care. The market element has 
been encouraged by the supported entry to the market of private acute providers who are 
offered enhanced tariff payments to support the costs of capital development and to 
overcome the barriers to market entry. 
An assumption of this policy has been that acute FTs, directed by competent boards of 
directors, will compete with private providers within the quasi market to encourage 
improvement in quality and a reduction in the costs of services provided. The Liberal -
Conservative government has committed itself in its White Paper on NHS reform (DoH 
2010) and the subsequent Health and Social Care Act 2012 to further promote this model of 
quasi competition by allowing local general practitioners, acting as agents for their patients, 
to directly commission services from acute providers via the creation of clinical 
commissioning groups. A similar policy that was introduced in 1991 in the form of GP 
Fundholding, was reviewed by Le Grand et al (1998). 
For the quasi-market to be a positive force for the development of more efficient NHS 
services the boards of directors of FTs need to have the capability to rise to the challenge of 
the quasi-market. If the boards of FTs are not capable of dealing with productivity and 
quality challenges then it is possible that the private sector will take advantage of this relative 
weakness in leadership capability, identify low complexity homogenous treatments which the 
private sector can produce efficient profitable pathways for, and potentially eliminate FT 
competition in these areas. Private providers such as Circle Holdings Plc appear to believe 
that their partnership model with clinicians is effective at aligning corporate and clinical 
incentives to produce such a comparative advantage in the market. As Ali Parsa (Chief 
Executive of Circle) recently noted Circle has: 
 
“a passion for reengineering healthcare delivery to make it simpler, better and smarter value 
for the patients. Circle arrives not with a top-down plan to impose change, but with a proven 
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methodology of unleashing NHS professionals' talent through clinical leadership and 
devolved decision-making (Parsa 2011)." 
 
If the private sector was successful at targeting homogenous treatments and standardising 
pathways as discussed above this could leave FTs, and the state acute sector in general, with 
complex, co-morbidity patients which require much greater resource usage. This could leave 
many NHS organisations with the problem of trying to deliver complex patient care, at an 
unreasonably low tariff price, thus presenting a significant threat to quality. 
So does the research indicate that the implicit policy belief, that innovative FT boards are 
able to deal with the challenges of productivity and quality and can compete with private 
sector providers, is flawed? Certainly, as discussed earlier, the research indicates that quality 
and productivity agendas have not been the main focus of the four FT case study boards and 
that productivity improvement has not been sustained in any of the four FTs. 
The research results raise the question of the capability of those FT boards to deal with the 
big issues. In a successful quasi- market model the non-performance of those FTs would lead 
to changes in management as stakeholders of FTs (i.e the governors representing 
commissioners, public and staff whose role it is to hold the board of directors to account for 
the performance of the organisation) demanded changes in the performance of the acute 
providers and improvements in quality and productivity.  
However, recent evidence from the Mid Staffordshire review (an acute FT which failed to 
provide effective safety and leadership of clinical services) indicates the stakeholders of the 
FT were not aware of the deterioration in service quality or financial standing, and were 
therefore incapable of demanding improvements or replace the board of directors (Francis 
2009).   
The regulator of FTs, Monitor, has recently emphasised the need for FTs to show greater 
accountability to the membership to overcome these constraints but it is questionable the 
extent to which unpaid and diverse memberships, often under-resourced and trained by the 
boards they should hold to account, can effectively execute that role.  The Francis Report 
into Mid Staffordshire noted that quality issues were known about within the community 
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served by the hospital and the Governors of the trust had failed to take action to hold the 
board to account for the quality failings. 
If the research is correct, and the FT boards are not focussing upon quality and productivity 
issues, and Monitor’s concerns about the ability of governors to hold those boards to account 
for performance is justified, then Monitor will be increasingly required to act as guardian of 
FT performance and use its intervention powers. Since Monitor’s creation in 2004 it has had 
to use its formal intervention powers on twelve occasions. Ten of those interventions have 
occurred in the 15 months leading to July 2010 suggesting a capability gap is emerging. 
Monitor may well be increasingly required to take regulatory action within the sector. 
However, for those who argue for the pro-choice quasi-market, the potential policy 
conclusion that the NHS performs best when subject to central direction would be a 
regressive step - even if it is Monitor that exercises that control. An alternative policy 
prescription might therefore be that FT boards capacity and capability needs to be further 
developed so that innovation, productivity and quality can be driven by local organisations 
competing within the quasi market for health.  
The May 2011 Kings Fund Commission review of NHS Leadership  emphasised the need for 
individual organisations to take responsibility for leadership and management development. 
The Commission particularly noted the importance of the development of governor 
capability within FTs (Kings Fund, 2011). This will be of particular importance should 
Monitor adopt a more distant role as economic regulator with less powers of direct 
intervention. 
A lever that might encourage this improvement could be the ability of the stakeholders of 
poorly performing FTs to have the right to sell the business and assets of the hospital to a 
competing private provider. Clearly, this approach would require the introduction of 
significant safeguards as hospital governors would effectively be selling public assets as well 
as potentially impacting on the distribution of health services in the area. 
An alternative option might be greater support for the entry of private sector management 
teams into the NHS by the use of franchising agreements such as that implemented by the 
Hinchingbrooke Health Care Trust. Hinchingbrooke has recently appointed Circle (a private 
sector provider of clinical services) to operate the management franchise of the Trust for ten 
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years from the 1st June 2011(Hinchingbrooke 2010). These and other policy options are 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
8.3.2  Seven Policy Options 
If the research is correct that NHS de-centralisation, as currently structured, may not produce 
the high quality, productive and responsive services required then what are the possible ways 
forward? The discussion now explores seven main options which are:  
A.  The roll back of the FT movement with a halt being called to future authorisations 
and either a wholesale reversion of the FT movement to the traditional form of NHS trusts or 
even an abolition of the purchaser/provider split; 
B  Reversion to the pre-1990 structure of direct command and control of all hospitals and 
organisations from regional offices of the NHS. Alternatively, a freeze on the creation of FTs 
but with hospitals being permitted to continue with their FT status as long as they fully 
comply with their Monitor terms of authorisation. Significant breach of that authorisation 
automatically causing a reversion to non-FT status; 
C The third option would be to argue that the de-centralisation of the NHS in the last 
decade has not been sufficiently radical as all the NHS has done by the creation of FT’s is to 
change the title on the management offices of those organisations without creating cultural 
change within them. This analysis argues that the managers running these organisations prior 
to FT status are broadly the same people who were managing the organisations under 
conditions of central management and control; the key difference being that they now receive 
higher salaries to reflect supposed increased autonomy. In this case the policy option would 
involve the compulsory tendering of FT management to private sector management teams.  
D Option four would be to adopt the view that FT management teams can deliver on the 
productivity agenda as long as the correct conditions are met to promote performance of the 
hospitals. This option might consider what outside conditions would be required to promote 
improved management performance, for instance the form and effectiveness of stakeholder 
pressure being applied to the FT, particularly the effectiveness of governors of FTs in 
holding the boards of directors of those organisations to account for performance. 
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E Option five is the position the private market lobby might argue, that the above 
options are merely tinkering with a broken system and that the productivity and efficiency 
agenda in the NHS (as with other public services) will not be delivered because the critical 
market disciplines are not present in a public or even a quasi-market context. For instance, 
the inability of a private company to provide stakeholder value and good products to 
customers will lead to the insolvency and market exit of such providers. For this group the 
selling-off of FT assets to private providers would promote real competition between 
deliverers of care with the NHS acting as funder of care (perhaps through the medium of 
larger integrated care commissioners similar to Kaiser in the USA).  
F  Option six, which would probably work alongside all of the previous possibilities, but 
could not fully replace current structures, could be the development of social enterprises or 
mutuals where stakeholders such as clinicians, activists and members establish social 
enterprises for the delivery of services . This kind of structure would allow operating 
surpluses to be re-invested in the quality of services to patients. The assumption of this 
model is that the best people to run and deliver a service are those who actually use and 
operate it on a daily basis. 
G  Finally, a policy option might be one of wait and see. The central premise of the thesis 
is that involvement of clinicians in the productivity agenda is the key requirement for 
productivity to be delivered. It may merely be an issue of the passage of time, allowing the 
effective roll-out of service line management so that clinicians are touched by PbR and the 
commercial reality as to the financial sustainability (or not) of their services is allowed to 
have an impact on behaviours. Supporters of this option might point to the “burning 
platform” of NHS financial crisis as being the agent for progress as services and clinicians 
are forced to address the efficiency of the clinical pathways of care. 
These policy options will be explored in a little more detail with a focus being placed upon 
what advantages each option may deliver in the context of driving productivity improvement 
while also setting out some key limitations of each option.  Let us first consider the option of 
de-registration. 
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8.3.2.1 De-registration 
As previously discussed, the creation of independent NHS trusts in the 1990s, and then the 
further development of the concept of organisational autonomy for hospitals by FT status, 
was predicated on the concept that if the “shackles of central management and control” could 
be removed from publicly owned organisations then the drive of managers and clinicians 
would lead to advances in quality, innovation, efficiency and productivity improvement 
producing a more dynamic, responsive service to patients. If the research is correct and NHS 
management respond better to direction and control (as opposed to being generators of 
innovation and quality) then the de-authorisation of FTs and reversion to central control 
could be a realistic policy option. 
At present, Section 15 of the Health Act 2009 (the Act) allows de-authorisation of FTs in 
circumstances where Monitor considers the FT is “seriously” failing to comply with its terms 
of authorisation (or requirement imposed by any enactment) and the seriousness of that 
contravention or failure is sufficient to justify the Secretary of State making an order to de-
authorise (Section 52B of the Act).  The Secretary of State can also request Monitor to 
consider de-authorisation and Monitor must then respond within fourteen days as to whether 
it will formally request the Secretary of State to use his Section 52D powers to de-authorise 
the FT. On de-authorisation the FT would revert to the status of an NHS trust and would be 
subject to the directions of the Secretary of State and thus the command and control functions 
exerted by the Department of Health and their agents the Strategic Health Authorities. 
Monitor’s March 2010 consultation paper on the way it plans to exercise its powers of 
recommending de-authorisation is clear in that it will be  an “act of last resort” and will only 
do so when it has “fully exhausted its regulatory powers” and the use of those powers will 
still be likely to leave the FT in an unsustainable position (Monitor 2010). Given the wide 
powers and influence that Monitor has over the leadership of organisations within the FT 
sector, it is probably unlikely that it will exhaust its extensive  regulatory powers and so  de-
authorisation through this method is only likely to happen in exceptional circumstances if at 
all. 
The Secretary of State’s powers to request Monitor to consider de-authorisation still leaves 
the decision making process within the control of the regulator and, in the light of the above 
discussion, Monitor is unlikely easily to concede such a request.  However, the recent change 
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in leadership of the regulator (both Chief Executive and Chairman) may lead to a change 
in regulatory position with respect to political influence over the medium term. 
In terms of future authorisations of FTs, the economic environment, coupled with a majority 
of the financially stronger organisations already having been authorised, might have created a 
natural restriction on the number of future authorisation of FTs. For instance, in 2007-8 30 
FTs were authorised, and in 2008-9, 26. In 2009-10 this dropped to 14 and in 2010-11 this 
reduced to 8 (Monitor 2011b). The much more difficult funding environment of 2011-12 
onwards is very likely to lead to the tap of FT authorisations dwindling to a trickle unless 
Monitor drops the bar for the financial sustainability tests for authorisations – an act unlikely 
to be supported by proponents of the FT movement. 
The third de-authorisation option is that a political decision is taken to pass primary 
legislation to de-authorise all FTs. If the political will existed to remove the independence of 
FTs reverting them to NHS trust status, removing their ability to borrow and making them 
subject to the directions of the Secretary of State then this would be a relatively simple legal 
process.  
This is a very unlikely in the short term with the election of the Liberal–Conservative 
government and Andrew Lansley as Secretary of State for Health. Lansley appears 
fundamentally opposed to a policy of de-authorisation. In the Conservative pre-election 
publication Renewal-Plan for a better NHS the party was explicitly supportive of a policy of 
provider pluralism pressing for an extension of FT status and allowing private providers, 
social enterprises and FTs to compete for the right to provide services to the NHS.  The new 
government’s commitment to the continuation of the FT sector has been further 
demonstrated in its July 2010 White Paper “Equity and Excellence-Liberating the NHS” in 
which it emphasises all NHS Trusts will either become FTs or will become part of existing 
FTs.  As at February 2012, as the resultant Health and Social Care Bill passes the House of 
Lords, the commitment for all NHS providers to become  FTs or other independent body 
remains. Strategic Health Authorities are robustly pressing non-FT NHS provider boards to 
become either FTs, a social enterprise or merge by 2014. 
In circumstances where the Liberal-Conservative coalition fails, Andy Burman, the former 
Secretary of State for Health, certainly showed himself willing to question and curtail the 
autonomy of the FT sector by his statements as to a review of the effectiveness of 
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governance arrangements of FTs (ie the ability of the membership to effectively hold the 
management of the FTs to account) and his public conflict with Monitor over his desire to 
make provision for political influence over the decision to de-authorise FTs. Whether any 
future Labour administration would be willing to roll back the whole policy of 
decentralisation is less clear.  
The policy option of the de-authorisation of FTs is of course predicated on the assumption 
that the reversion of FTs to central command and control would allow the Secretary of State 
to use his powers to drive productivity improvement. Given that the NHS has significantly 
improved access times, as a consequence of central direction and targets, there is an 
argument that the use of strategic targets (as discussed earlier) to drive productivity 
improvement could be effective. 
 
8.3.2.2 Franchising 
The third option to address the issue of NHS management responding more effectively to 
command and control is to further develop the franchising of the management of FTs to 
private or third sector providers. This could be either a mandatory requirement for all FT 
management teams to be subject to a tendering process at regular intervals, or a more 
selective approach requiring only non-performing FTs to be subject to a management 
tendering process. 
The willingness of the NHS to consider the franchising of management is indicated by the 
decision by the East of England Strategic Health Authority to franchise the management of 
Hinchingbrooke hospital. Also, in 2002, the NHS built in the concept of management 
franchising in its response to failing NHS trusts who had dropped to a zero star rating in the 
annual assessments. Good Hope Hospital was one such trust which dropped from a previous 
rating of three stars to zero stars in the 2002-3 annual assessment.  
The Good Hope hospital board signed up a private firm, Tribal Secta, in August 2003 for 
£1.3 million. Tribal Secta provided one of its employees as Chief Executive of the trust and 
delivered other support facilities. Tribal’s three year franchise contract was prematurely 
terminated in December 2005, by mutual consent, after being in place for approximately two 
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years. From December 2005, Good Hope received management support from the Heart 
of England NHS Foundation Trust which finally led to a merger in April 2007. 
A report from the European Services Strategy Unit points out that the aims of the franchise to 
transform Good Hope within three years with the object of building internal sustainable 
management capacity and handing management back to the hospital was clearly not 
achieved. According to the report a financial review by PwC in 2005 indicated a forecast 
financial deficit of £7.1million in 2005-6. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Tribal was not 
fully aware of the complexity of the financial situation facing the Trust when it signed-up to 
the franchise and that freedom to operate the franchise was severely constrained by political 
factors. On that basis it might be argued that this was not a representative attempt to 
introduce a private sector management franchise. Irrespective of this, the European Services 
Strategy Unit report certainly indicates that the franchising of hospital management may not 
be a preferred solution in all cases. 
Other management franchises put in place were at Dartford and Gravesham, Ashford and St 
Peters, Portsmouth Hospitals and Barnet and Chase. In the case of Good Hope, and these 
four examples, the common factor was that the franchise Chief Executives had all had 
established NHS track records; this was a pre-condition for any franchise team being 
admitted to the approved register. To that extent the issue of NHS management culture 
change was not being addressed, except perhaps in the case of Good Hope and Tribal Secta, 
which was bringing non-NHS resource and capability as support into the contract as opposed 
to franchising agreements which merely provided former NHS managers to run the 
organisation. 
The question is to what extent franchising would amount to a sufficient policy option to 
create robust drivers within the system to promote productivity growth? Incentives could be 
built into the fixed term appointment contract which link performance on productivity 
improvement to payments under the contract and re-appointment at the end of the fixed term. 
If the indicators were sufficiently sophisticated the productivity agenda could be widened to 
include the quality ingredients of productivity such as improvement in clinical outcomes and 
patient satisfaction. The problem is, of course, that although leadership from the top assists 
the focus of the organisation, delivery of the productivity agenda requires the engagement of 
operational managers and clinicians with the productivity agenda. It is therefore unlikely that 
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“top table” management change (as reflected in a franchise agreement) would materially 
impact on the cultural issues of an organisation in the short term.  The short term nature of 
franchise agreements pose a threat to the cultural change required in any organisation.  
Anecdotal evidence from the successful introduction of Lean  at Virginia Mason in the USA 
(a successful healthcare provider in Washington State) suggests that stable senior leadership 
is a key condition for long term progress on productivity. 
On the basis of UK experience to date, management franchising has not demonstrated that it 
could address the cultural issues around productivity improvement in the NHS. It will be 
interesting to see the success, or otherwise, of the current East of England project at 
Hinchingbrooke and the ten year appointment of Circle. 
 
8.3.2.3 Strengthening Governance-stakeholder Influence  
A fundamental policy objective of the FT movement was that local hospitals should be 
accountable to the populations they serve. One of the key elements of this accountability 
structure is that every FT has a group of elected members who serve as governors of the 
organisation. They include staff and key stakeholder groups (such as commissioners and 
local authority representatives) and members of the public constituencies (i.e elected 
members of the general public who use the hospital). 
In conditions where this accountability function is effective then this key stakeholder group 
should appraise the performance of the directors and hold the board of directors to account 
for the performance of the organisation by means of exercising its powers (i.e. remove and 
appoint non-executive directors of the FT (including the Chairman of the FT).  
Performance of the organisation for these purposes should include the running of the hospital 
in an ‘effective, efficient and economic manner’ (Condition 2 of an FT’s Terms of 
Authorisation (Monitor 2004)). This could and should include the hospital delivering 
efficient services i.e. maximizing productivity within the organisation. 
At present there is increasing disquiet about the ability of the governors of FTs to hold the 
board of directors to account. The recent Francis Report on the failures at Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust indicated that patient concerns with respect to the quality of services 
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did not effectively influence the board. Governors were to a large extent unaware of the 
concerns and did not therefore hold the board of directors to account. 
The key elements that appear to be blocking the ability of governors, a key stakeholder 
group, to hold the boards of FTs to account for performance seem to be as follows. Firstly 
there is a fundamental balance of power problem faced by a voluntary (non-professional) 
group of governors being able to hold a professional board of directors to account. The 
power imbalance probably rests on factors such as technical knowledge of the underlying 
operations of the business, effective access to the correct form of information and the clear 
time constraints affecting voluntary groups.  
If this group of stakeholders is to be as effective as institutional shareholders of UK public 
companies in ensuring the boards of directors continue to perform and deliver measures such 
as increasing productivity then this group must be given greater resources and time to 
develop their professionalism. Alternatively, the accountability structure needs to be changed 
so that professional governors are appointed, or the level of support for amateur governors is 
fundamentally improved.  
At present many groups of FT governors struggle with the very basic understanding around 
the regulatory framework of the Care Quality Commission and Monitor. In a vast majority of 
cases they are a long way off being able to challenge boards as to the level of productivity 
stretch within the organisation, the extent to which the annual business plan targets for 
EBITDA and the return on assets employed are sufficiently stretching to maximize 
stakeholder value or the extent to which such targets, if stretching, are in line with the 
delivery of the quality of care to patients. 
The above conclusions are supported by Allen and Keen et al (2012), Dixon and Storey et al 
(2010) and Lewis and Hinton (2008). All this research supports the conclusion that governors 
are struggling with their role of holding the board of directors to account for the performance 
of their hospitals. One of the key limits to their effectiveness being lack of clarity as to the 
governors’ role both from the point of view of the board of directors of the FT and the 
governors themselves. Please see 3.5.1 for further details of the research. 
It is unlikely that in the short term the capacity and capability of governors will be able to be 
developed to act as a major driver of organisational performance and culture change within 
FTs. Stakeholder power to promote FT performance should be seen as a secondary 
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improvement to promote productivity as it is unlikely to address the issues in the shorter 
term. 
 
8.3.2.4  Social Enterprises 
A topical policy option, as it forms part of the Liberal-Conservative Government’s NHS 
White Paper, is the concept of a social enterprise. An extension of the co-operative/mutual 
concept (where organisations are operated for the benefit of their members (usually the 
customers or employees of the business) social enterprises are managed by the 
community/employees of the service with any operating surplus being re-invested in the 
service itself rather than being redistributed to members. This concept has recently acquired 
some political traction. 
The political appeal of this policy option has resulted in all three main English political 
parties signing-up to the concept of supporting and extending social enterprises as promoted 
by the Social Enterprise Coalition. An interesting question arises as to the extent to which 
social enterprises could be potentially used to promote the cultural change and productivity 
of FTs. 
A good example of a health related social enterprise is the Sandwell Community Caring 
Trust (SCCT). This is a social care service originally delivered by Sandwell Borough 
Council that required the achievement of significant efficiency savings for the service to be 
sustainable. Success would depend on the extent to which enpowerment of staff could deliver 
a cultural change in the organisation delivering improved quality and efficiency. 
SCCT was created in 1997 and by 2008 the percentage of turnover spent on front line 
services had increased from 62% to 82% and the cost of adult residential care had declined 
from an average of £657 to £328 per week while at the same time improving quality. The 
quality improvement was driven by maintaining a stable workforce (with staff turnover of 
less than 4% per year) and absenteeism dropping from 22 days per year in 1997 to 0.3 days 
in 2008 (Collaborative Communities 2012). Clearly, if the organisation of FTs into social 
enterprises could achieve a similar 50% reduction in average costs with material 
improvement in service quality this would be a significant productivity success. 
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Critics might argue that social enterprises are only effective with relatively small 
organisations like SCCT and that the large scale nature of an acute FT would not be capable 
of being operated in this way. The counter to this argument would be the commercial success 
of the John Lewis Partnership (a commercial retailer owned and run for the benefit of its 
employees) in recent years. Although John Lewis is not directly comparable with a social 
enterprise, John Lewis had a turnover of 7.4bn in 2009-10, 70,000 employees and operated 
from over 250 sites (John Lewis 2010, p1-4). Size does not therefore appear a limitation to 
the success of mutualism, in the widest sense, so operation of an FT by its staff based upon a 
turnover of £250-300 million and 4000-5000 staff seems achievable. 
It may be that the complexity of an acute FT could preclude it being structured on the basis 
of a social enterprise. In particular, the complexity of running and organising a hospital with 
a very heterogenous product line, and a heavy regulatory burden, may provide significant 
barriers to non-professional established NHS management being able to operate an FT. This 
might be the case if for instance a group of clinicians wished to operate the FT without 
previous management experience.  
There are of course new models of healthcare delivery that could, in time, provide the 
management expertise that would allow clinicians to be part owners of organisations like 
acute FTs. At present market players such as Circle (majority owned by institutional 
investors but which permits clinicians to have a minority stake in the business by regularly 
allowing them to subscribe for shares) provides the capital to develop hospitals and the 
management expertise to run them while allowing clinicians to be ‘partners’ in the business. 
At present this model has been limited to a relatively small spectrum of services but it could 
provide an interesting model for the future management of FTs. 
In reality there is nothing to preclude professional managers from continuing to operate an 
FT as a social enterprise, supporting the employees in their desire to transform service 
delivery without the same degree of centralist direction and control experienced under the 
traditional NHS trust model. The drawback of this approach would of course be that the 
hospital would still be being managed by the same group of managers, just a different legal 
form. This could just be a re-branding and a change in the structure of the organisation rather 
than promoting any real cultural change. 
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It is probable that staff engagement with the concept of a social enterprise would be most 
effective at a speciality or service level where the diversity of the product line is less 
extensive and the staff/community can more easily identify with a particular service. It is also 
more probable that the clinicians within the service could actually be able to manage and 
operate such a social enterprise (due to its relative size compared to a complete hospital) thus 
creating the change in management culture. Social enterprises could well make a contribution 
to driving productivity at service level as the proximity of the business and patients to both 
clinicians and managers respectively could be an effective driver for aligning managerial and 
clinical incentives. It is probably not the model for operating a complex heterogenous 
product line seen in an FT. 
As noted above, it is important that change in legal structure is not seen as the solution to 
issues of staff engagement. As Addicott (2011) notes, staff engagement is about effective 
power in decision-making not having notional ownership either directly (via a share) or 
indirectly (via some form of trust (for example, John Lewis).  Addicott believes it is the staff 
engagement that allows social enterprises to innovate, not being a social enterprise. 
 
8.3.2.5  Privatisation 
The next policy option to consider is the idea of transferring assets of the FT to the private 
sector. If NHS culture is restricting productivity improvement then a transfer of FTs to 
private sector hands may well drive up performance of the organisations. The UK certainly 
has a track record of privatising public assets having sold assets such as British Gas, Britoil 
and British Rail to the private sector. In the case of British Gas this has resulted in 
commercial success for the organisation, although British Rail is less of a success story with 
part of the privatised business, the track infrastructure, being re-nationalised in October 2002 
when Network Rail Limited purchased Railtrack Plc from the rail administrator (specific 
insolvency administration for railways under the Insolvency Act 1986), taking the rail 
network back into public ownership. 
Transfer to the private sector would certainly allow the introduction of private sector 
management practices into FTs and the organisations could be driven to deliver private sector 
returns on the assets employed and operating margins. It is highly probable that privatisation 
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would drive cultural change, although recent strike activity on British Airways (formally 
a nationalised industry) over changes in working practices suggests that change can 
sometimes be difficult even when assets are transferred to the private sector. 
There would of course be significant political risks to this approach. Firstly, many hospitals 
are probably unsustainable as businesses (many are relatively small - e.g Yeovil FT turnover 
of circa £70 million) and will in the current downturn face significant financial risks. In 
private sector hands it is highly likely that some FTs would become insolvent and cease 
trading. This could significantly impact on access to services, particularly in rural locations. 
Secondly, because of the relative complexity of FT services it is highly unlikely that the 
private sector would be interested in providing the full menu of services in the first place. 
Their ability to generate the levels of returns required for private capital investment are 
unlikely to be achieved in the low volume high cost procedures. This is supported by the 
experience of private sector treatment centres where, in the first wave of agreements, the 
DoH had to enter into contracts with private sector providers which guaranteed high levels of 
activity, and at a price above national tariff (i.e. a higher price than was paid to NHS 
hospitals), in order to encourage them to enter the English health market. Although some 
commentators argue that this arrangement merely corrected an NHS cost advantage resulting 
from NHS access to public funded capital,  Dixon, Harrison and Mundle recently noted that 
“The revised [Health and Social Care] Bill makes it clear that promotional tariffs cannot be 
introduced in future to support the entry of a particular type of provider” (Dixon, Harrison 
and Mundle 2011, p26}. In addition, private sector providers concentrate on the delivery of 
non-complex, standardised procedures such as hip replacements. FTs are required to deliver 
high risk, complex procedures over extensive product lines. 
Given the prospect of hospitals facing closure under private sector insolvency rules, and the 
financial unattractiveness of some product lines of FTs, the privatisation option is possible 
but unlikely to be adopted on a large scale. The policy may be an option for those NHS 
Trusts that are not likely to achieve FT status due to structural financial constraints (for 
instance serving small populations or possessing poor buildings and infrastructure). In these 
circumstances a combination of transferring services to existing FTs and allowing the private 
sector purchase of residual assets may be an option the Coalition Government might 
consider. 
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8.3.2.6  Wait and See 
It is of course possible that the more radical policy options discussed above are not actually 
required. If the productivity agenda has not been delivered because service line management 
has not yet brought PbR into contact with clinicians and managers at operational level, then it 
may just be a matter of time before the large scale introduction of service line management 
becomes established in FTs and alignment of managerial and clinical incentives occurs and 
the productivity agenda is delivered. The economic downturn might actually act as a catalyst 
for a faster introduction of service line management into hospitals. The risk of course is that, 
under pressure, senior NHS management teams will revert to traditional command-and-
control techniques and actually slow down the roll-out of service-line management. In these 
circumstances, the NHS will have to seriously consider some of the more radical policy 
options outlined in this chapter. 
 
8.4  RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
This research has produced interesting and unexpected results but remains subject to some 
key limitations. 
The first limitation is the generalisability of the results.  The accepted wisdom is that case 
study research cannot be generalisable. Yin (2003) argues that multiple case studies (as in 
this research) allow theoretical generalisations but not statistical generalisations. Crosthwaite, 
MacLeod and Malcolm (1997) illustrate this idea further by explaining case studies as 
distinct experiments which allow the researcher to theoretically generalise what might 
happen in other situations under similar conditions. The use of multiple case studies, as in the 
case of multiple experiments in the science laboratory, provides greater rigour to the 
analytical generalisations through replication. 
The research is clearly not able to extrapolate the results from the four case studies to 
statistically predict the behaviour of FTs in general, nor the behaviour of clinicians or 
managers within those FTs. Although this is a limitation, the use of case studies remains an 
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accepted method of social research and of creating theoretical generalisations, a 
methodology followed here One must remember that there has never been a double-blind of 
the effectiveness of parachutes when jumping out of aircraft at 10,000 feet compared to 
jumping without such parachutes, but theory still persuades us to take the parachute option as 
opposed to the alternative. 
The productivity data, both the RCI and the productivity metrics, although compiled by third 
party organisations with the benefit of robust quality assurance systems are still subject to 
data collection errors. The key limitations to the data rests within the quality of the data 
submissions from the NHS hospitals themselves. For instance, the most recent Audit 
Commission Data Assurance Framework Report (2009) concludes 12 per cent of activity is 
still coded incorrectly (down from 16.5 per cent in its 2008 report). 
As noted in Chapter Six any conclusions about the extent to which productivity has changed 
in each of the Case Studies will be subject to the limitation that output measures are ignoring 
changes in quality. The research briefly highlighted the indicator of emergency re-admissions 
as an example of a blunt indicator for changes in quality but the introduction of common 
added value indicators for quality in the NHS are currently not routine. Until quality changes 
are routinely observed, and recorded by FTs, this is an unavoidable limitation. The 
introduction of PROMS quality indicators into the NHS and the commitment in the July 
2010 NHS White Paper to develop outcome measures are welcome steps forward. 
In addition to the quality of data submissions previously discussed the productivity analysis 
is subject to a further weakness in that when a Trust invests in improved environments for 
care (for example capital developments to replace outdated buildings) this can result in a 
much higher depreciation charge which would indicate a higher input cost with no 
measurable improvement in output.   
As significant capital investment has occurred in the NHS over the period of this research 
then this is a limitation of the conclusions on productivity. It may therefore be that the 
research underestimates the degree of productivity improvement as the RCI data does not 
take into account the quality improvements arising from improved environments but does 
reflect increased depreciation costs within the RCI. 
 
	   188	  
8.5 FUTURE RESEARCH  
The research has identified three main areas which need to be further investigated. 
Firstly, the results indicate that PbR across the four case studies has not generally aligned the 
incentives of clinicians and managers in the productivity agenda. The fundamental question 
that then arises is whether this is because the concept and detail of PbR has not been 
effectively communicated to clinicians, so that they cannot effectively engage in the 
productivity debate thus not permitting alignment with managerial incentives, or whether 
there is a fundamental barrier in terms of incentive alignment which PbR has failed, and will 
continue to fail, to bridge. 
The results from the interviews indicate that clinicians have not been practically touched by 
PbR rather than PbR not engaging clinicians but further research is required on this aspect. 
A key area for investigation may be the degree to which the introduction of SLR, at an 
operational level, leads to clinical interest in PbR and the productivity agenda. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that when clinicians become engaged with the underlying data they are 
then able to use this to challenge practice, thus driving quality, challenging waste and 
implicitly promoting productivity. 
Secondly, the research indicates that the case study boards do not appear to be spending 
significant amounts of their time considering productivity or the quality agenda. It seems 
counter-intuitive, given the primary aim of FTs (as set out in Condition 2 of their terms of 
authorisation) is to run their hospitals “effectively, efficiently and economically”, that these 
two areas are not a key focus of board deliberations. Further research is therefore required to 
identify if FT boards are in fact focussing on quality and productivity but the formal board 
minutes are not recording this focus or, more likely, that the results are in fact correct. In 
which case, what do boards of directors focus upon? 
Finally, the research has suggested that NHS management may have a cultural tendency to 
look to centralised direction as opposed to the desire to have local autonomy and make local 
decisions. The policy implications of this could be significant in terms of management 
development and/or the centralisation of the NHS. Further research to ascertain whether NHS 
management performs better under conditions of centralised direction would help inform the 
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debate as to whether the NHS should revert to a more centralised command and control 
model of system management. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
EXAMPLE DOCUMENT SEARCH RESULT 
	  
Occurrence Context  September 07 
Word/Phrase 
(PbR) Payment by Results  Nil 
 
Productivity 
 
 Nil 
(SLE) Service Line 
Economics/Reporting/Management 1 1.Monitoring performance against key objectives 
 
Cost Control 
 
 Nil 
Quality/ 
Measuring quality 
2 
1 Strategic objective -improving quality of patient 
care 
2 productive wards -enabling innovation, excellence 
and ongoing quality improvement by financially 
responsive actions 
Financial Balance/ 
Management 
 Nil 
Efficiency  2 
 
1 7 key strategic objectives: improving efficiency 
2 monitor 
 
Page 2 
Monitor 8 
 
1 Chairman attended dinner hosted by Monitor Ex 
Ch 
2 Monitor doc on managing operating cash in FTs 
3. Code of Governance-duty to co-operate 
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4 NED terms of office comply with Monitor Code 
5 Board noted Monitor’s Review of 07/08 annual 
plan 
6 Board noted Monitor’s analysis of Q1 performance 
7 IA report on compliance with Monitor’s Code of 
Governance 
8 Monitor’s review of FT Sector Annual Plans 07/08 
 
Maximise income/ revenue/ output  Nil 
 
Reduce Costs 
 
 Nil 
(CIP) Cost Improvement Plan  
  
Nil 
 
Length of Stay/LoS 
 
 Nil 
 
Tariff 
 
 Nil 
 
(RCI) Relative Cost Index 
 
 Nil 
(VFM)/Value for Money  Nil 
Patient Choice  Nil 
Choice  Nil 
Competition  Nil 
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APPENDIX TWO 
EXAMPLE BOARD MINUTE RESULT 
 
BOARD MINUTE KEY 
 Elements shaded RED indicate positive search result including context 
XXX indicates deletions to protect anonymity 
 
1 of 12  
MINUTES OF THE  X MEETING OF   
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE   
X FOUNDATION TRUST  
  
PRESENT:  
  
APOLOGIES:  
  
IN ATTENDANCE:  
 
380.07 DECLARATION OF INTERESTS  
  
There were no new notifications of interest.  
  
381.07 CHAIRMAN’S REMARKS  
  
The Chairman welcomed X the Acting Director of Operations, with  
effect from 1st October to the Board meeting and wished X good luck  
for her secondment in X.  
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She asked if procedurally all questions could be placed through the Chair and that  
she intended to increase the pace of Board meetings in the light of the large  
agendas the Board were now facing.  
  
382.07 CHIEF EXECUTIVE’S VERBAL REPORT  
  
X reported the following:   
a) She had attended a dinner hosted by Dr Bill Moyes (Executive Chairman of  
Monitor) at which)XXXXXXXXXXwas  
present.  In discussion it was apparent that the Government viewed  
FTs as a successful part of the NHS organisation and that for  
the future there would be a focus on a drive towards public health and  
improving the general health of the population.  There had been interesting  
discussion about secondary care providers delivering care closer to  
patients’ homes.  XXX will be invited to visit the local area at some  
stage in the future.    
b) The Trust was meeting with the Healthcare Commission on XXX  
September to receive feedback on their review of performance in meeting  
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healthcare standards.    
c) On XXXX Lord XXXX would be visiting the Trust, together with XX  
David Nicholson the NHS Chief Executive, as part of his review of the NHS.   
Much work nationally had been undertaken towards the Darzi review  
focusing especially on clinical staff engagement.  She also reported that the  
emerging national strategy appears to mirror our own revised strategic  
directions, which was good in that it would reduce any potential tensions  
within the organisation in the future.  It would also provide a firm foundation  
on which we could build relations with our stakeholders.    
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382a.07 The Chairman asked Mr X to report on his attendance at a King’s Fund  
meeting where he had represented the Chairman.  He reported that the discussions  
had centred on the potential role of the Foundation Trust Governors Association  
where it had been suggested that one role might be to lobby Government.  There  
was concern at this as it was not widely viewed as the governors’ role.  In general,  
the feeling was that the governors’ role in relation to FTs is unclear  
and needs clarification.  
  
383.07 MINUTES OF THE LAST MEETING  
The minutes of the Board of Directors meeting held on Wednesday X  
were approved as a correct record.  
  
384.07 MATTERS ARISING &BOARD ACTIONS SUMMARY CHECK  
  
a) Review of the Action Grid.    
279/07 (Patient Pathway complexities) Complete.  A briefing paper had been  
prepared and would be issued shortly.  
358/07  (Rises in ED activity) Complete. A response was included within the  
performance briefing for this month.   
359.07  (Amendment of Infection Control Report) Complete.  
  
b) Matters Arising   
378/07 (MTAS).  X reported that the August hand over went well finally  
and no X doctors were without jobs.  However, next year may be more  
problematic.  
370/07 (Revised Complaint Policy).  X reported that changes had been  
made to the Complaints Policy as discussed at the July Board meeting.   
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Mr X reported on the issue of a document from Monitor concerning  
managing operating cash in FTs.  He requested a short statement  
from the Finance Director on how our cash holdings are invested and whether they  
are in line with Monitor’s recommendations.  He was concerned that if they were  
not, it could affect our financial risk rating in the future.  X replied that this  
information would be included in his review of financial information coming to the  
Board.    
Action:  X  
Mr X added that the Board needed to be assured that no unnecessary risks  
were being taken with investment.  Mr X confirmed that this was the case.   
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385.07 STRATEGIC INVESTMENT FUND – PROPOSALS FOR INVESTMENT 
2007/08  
  
X introduced this report by reminding the Board that the Annual Plan  
included proposals to create a fund for re-investment purposes which were to be  
appropriately allocated.  Clinicians and managers throughout the Trust had been  
consulted and asked how the money should be re-invested to achieve key strategic  
objectives and the results of these discussions were now presented to the Board for  
approval.  The Executive Directors had reviewed the proposals and all that were  
considered appropriate were set out in the paper.  
  
X then reported on the financial background.  The Trust was now  
operating on a financially sound financial basis and £3-4m had been identified for  
re-investment in the current year.  However, he stressed that items to be included  
were largely of a non-recurrent revenue nature for this year as the resources were  
	                      
206	  
already taken into account in meeting future expenditure from 2008/9.  A small  
number of recurrent items (i.e. under £500k) could be approved but these would  
inevitably form a pre-commitment on next year’s funding.  Criteria for inclusion in  
the investment fund were that:  
• Proposals should be aligned to the emerging Strategic Directions  
• Priority given to the top 5 priorities identified by members of staff and  
membership  
• Schemes must be completed before the year end  
• A maximum of £500k is available for recurrent revenue commitment in the  
next financial year  
• Proposals must aim at delivering significant benefits to large numbers of  
staff and patients.  
  
Proposals from Directorates had been reviewed and prioritised against the 7 key  
strategic objectives; namely:  
• Improving quality of patient care  
• Eliminating avoidable infections  
• Improving patient safety  
• Improving the environment for patients and staff  
• Improving staff developments and welfare  
• Reducing waiting for patients  
• Improving efficiency  
  
X explained that the allocation of £54k for reducing waiting for patients  
appeared low but was not the full extent of funding as significant additional funds  
for meeting the 18 week referral to transfer target were also available.  Therefore  
this initiative did not need as much assistance from the strategic investment fund.   
The same situation related to funds allocated to avoiding infections where further  
earmarked funding had been provided by the DH.  
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X viewed this fund as a very positive message to the Trust by providing  
visible evidence of the Trust’s intention to invest in services once stringent financial  
targets had been met.  X confirmed that he would investigate how this  
exercise may be repeated in future years.  
  
One of the largest investments was the intention to replace all the beds in the  
hospital with new state of the art electrical beds.  This will have a hugely positive  
impact for patients and staff alike.  The list includes many items submitted by  
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individual Clinical Directors reflecting the priorities for their departments and he  
commended it to the Board.  
  
Miss X added that a further £220k was available from the Strategic Health  
Authority towards infection control.  
  
Mr X fully supported the thrust of the report but was concerned that some of the  
spending would be seen as investing in the infrastructure and not strategic  
investment.  Mr X agreed but added that some areas needed attention and it  
was not possible to meet all the requirements in this area from in-year funds.  X  
 also agreed but stated that there was a need to catch up on infrastructure  
work in some areas, particularly with regard to the ongoing redecoration  
programme.    
  
The Chairman summarised that this is a one-off opportunity at present to do things  
which had been left out in the past.  Bids for funding that had not been prioritised  
were valued at less than £250k and were mainly funded from elsewhere.    
  
X supported the idea of the fund but made the following points:  
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• Funds available for investment were substantial – in the order of £40m and he  
felt that there must be protocols for both their investment and reporting to the  
Board.  It would always be a problem to decide what to do with such funds and  
he felt that a set of ‘rules/criteria’ was necessary to ensure even-handedness in  
dealing with the various bids   
• He asked whether the covered walkway from E link corridor to the northern end  
of the site would be replaced as it was an eye-sore.  In response. it was stated  
that there was no current plan to replace this walkway as although it may not  
look very cosmetically attractive it was functional. The question could be  
readdressed when future capital programmes were considered.  
  
X asked whether our surplus would cover any risk if the PCT was unable to  
pay the contractual sums it might owe the Trust in the future.  X  
considered this should not be a problem as the PCT had a funding capacity for this  
and the Trust also has a small contingency set aside.  He also asked about the  
potential shortfalls against planned budget in some of the Directorates and how this  
would be dealt with.  X responded by saying that 3 Directorates had  
forecast an overspend this year and the end of year forecast figures included this  
possibility of such an overspend.    
  
The Chairman asked X if he felt that the financial assumptions upon  
which the Trust was operating remained robust which X confirmed.    
  
Mr X asked whether this was an opportunity to involve governors by linking with  
members on this matter.  It was agreed that the newsletter and constituency  
meetings would be used to reinforce this initiative.    
  
The Board noted this report and approved the list of areas for investment.    
  
386.07 RELEASING TIME TO CARE – PRODUCTIVE WARD  
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Miss X gave a presentation on this topic which is part of a national programme  
aimed at increasing the time that nurses have available to spend on direct patient  
care.  It focused on ward teams and their processes and systems.  Nationally, the  
programme has been successfully piloted on 1 ward in 4 different hospitals.  This  
  
  
pilot programme is now being rolled out to 10 further hospitals although the X  
had not been not successful in a bid to represent the XXX.  However, there  
is great enthusiasm to take this forward within the X alongside the national  
programme.  
  
The main principles underpinning releasing time to care initiative reflect a number  
of objectives already outlined in the X strategic objectives, including:  
• Delivering care to a consistently high standard  
• Delivering services in an environment which is comfortable and friendly to  
patients  
• Reducing hospital acquired infections  
• Enabling innovation, excellence and ongoing quality improvement by  
financially responsive actions.    
  
The paper proposed that the Director of Nursing & Service Improvement would take  
responsibility as the executive lead for the project, which would be co-ordinated by  
the X Service Development Team.    
  
The outcome of the project would be to:  
• Increase the clinical time spent face to face with patients  
• Enable safer and more reliable care  
• Improve the experience of staff and patients  
• Organise wards to work more efficiently  
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• Reduce interruptions and improve communication   
• Reduce the time taken in handovers   
• Ensure clear lines of accountability  
• Limit interruption during medicine rounds thereby allowing their safer  
administration.  
  
It was stressed that this project was not about reducing the number of nurses.  
  
Funding costs were expected to be £45k for this financial year and had already  
been approved as one of the strategic investment fund allocations.  This would  
allow staff to:  
• Complete relevant training  
• Review current systems and processes  
• Implement appropriate changes  
• Evaluate results  
• Present results   
• Disseminate learning   
  
In addition, a sum of money would be made available to enable rapid  
implementation of any initiatives to facilitate changes without having to delay the  
process by going through a more bureaucratic directorate process.    
  
Mr X asked how you would ensure that the ‘freed’ time actually was spent on  
patient care and how it would be measured.  Miss X reported that would have to  
be part of the ongoing work of the project to ensure that this occurred.   
  
Mr X asked whether there was training programme to help nurses make better  
use of their time.  Miss X replied that there was no specific one but some  
techniques like videoing activities helped in this respect.    
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The Chairman was enthusiastic in her support for this initiative to help people work  
in a more efficient manner, which would ultimately be more rewarding.  
  
The Board noted the report and endorsed the introduction of the Productive  
Ward initiative across the X.  
  
387.07 PLANNING & PERFORMANCE FRAMWORK  
  
Mr X reported that this was an attempt to pull together the integrated nature  
of all our strategic planning processes in one unified process which neatly  
dovetailed within its constituent parts and was delivered on time in accordance with  
an annual cycle.  Currently planning and performance processes were not fully  
integrated and this leads to some fragmentation.  The framework would encompass  
many key elements including such items as the Trust’s Strategic Directions,  
Operational Plans, the Annual Plan and a number of efficiency and service  
development programmes.  It was based on a cyclical process running throughout  
the year which started with the review of the Trust’s Strategy; a review of both  
national and local commissioning requirements leading to the production of short-  
term plans and performance targets and budgets.  There would be consistent  
monitoring of performance towards meeting key objectives throughout the year.  Mr  
X wished to introduce this framework concurrently with the new Trust  
Strategy in October 2007.  The Service Line Management model being introduced  
across the Trust already provided a basic process to follow and the Trust business  
planning framework would mirror the 5 business case model used widely in the  
public sector.  This included:  
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• Pre-strategic outline case  
• Strategic outline case  
• Outline business case  
• Full business case  
• Post implementation review  
  
A key part of this cyclical process is to identify the involvement required from the  
Trust Board and the report recommended an annual timetable of Board  
involvement.   
  
The Chairman acknowledged that there would be a lot of hard work required in  
implementation of this framework and asked whether the benefits would justify the  
resource costs.  Mr X replied that he believed that it would, providing the  
framework was not made too complicated.    
  
X added that most of the constituent parts envisaged in the framework  
were already being done and the overall process needed streamlining, in order to  
allow a more systematic approach to be developed.  She saw this as an iterative  
process which must enhance decision-making, and not just be a bureaucratic  
exercise.   
  
Mr X endorsed the idea saying that it would provide a total picture for the  
Board on how to manage change.  
  
The Chairman added that she would be working with X and the Board  
Secretary to include the requirements of this framework into the Board business  
cycle in a sensible way.    
Action:  X 
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She concluded by thanking and congratulating everyone who had been involved in  
the development of the framework so far.    
  
The Board approved the introduction of the Planning and Performance  
Framework.  
  
388.07 PERFORMANCE REPORT  
  
X reported that the Trust was meeting all the key Healthcare  
Commission standards and targets and highlighted the following issues:  
• Performance against the 62-day cancer target had fallen for July 2007.   
However recalculation of performance by the Healthcare Commission now  
indicated that the Trust had met the target.  The numbers involved were  
very small, just 4 out of 54 patients; and therefore any delay to a patient had  
significant effects on the percentage performance figure.   
• She advised the Board that the Trust had been asked by the PCT to agree  
revised interim targets working towards the 18 week referral to treatment  
target.  The Trust had responded by saying that it would do its best to meet  
this request.   
• There had been only 1 case of hospital acquired MRSA in the last 3 months.  
• Emergency Department activity.  It had been assessed that the number of  
Walk-in Centre patients which was increasing and generating the additional  
activity in ED. (refers to Action Grid – Minute 358/07)  
• C.diff infections.  The Healthcare Commission had confirmed the data  
requirement for this year which the Trust was submitting.  
  
Delayed transfers of care.  The Trust was in discussion with the PCT about how  
systems could be improved, to ensure that patients are cared for in the most  
suitable setting.  
• C.diff infections.  The age range for reporting C diff infections had been  
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increased this year to include everyone over 2 years old as opposed to  
those over 65 years old.  This had increased the Trust’s rate of infection  
from 1.47 per 1000 bed days to 2.19 in the final quarter of 2006/07.  Despite  
this, the Trust’s level of infection were still less than the national and  
regional average, however, it may prove difficult to achieve the agreed local  
PCT target of <1.47 infections per 1000 bed days.   
  
The Board noted the Performance Report.  
  
389.07 COMPLAINTS REPORT QUARTER 1 2007/08  
  
X reported that there had been a total of 80 formal written complaints  
received during Q1 and 10 requests relating to losses and compensation.  Formal  
written complaints represent less than 0.07% of overall patient activity within the  
Trust equating to 1 formal written complaint for every 1420 episodes.  The number  
of commendations received, although slightly decreased on the previous quarter,  
was at a ratio of 19 commendations to every 1 complaint.    
  
98% of complaints were responded to within 25 working days.  There were no  
identifiable trends in any of the complaints received, although there were rises in  
the number of complaints surrounding ‘access and waiting’ and ‘clean, comfortable  
safe place to be’ categories.    
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X went on to explain that a consultation process was ongoing suggesting  
new changes to NHS (Complaints) Amendment Regulations 2006.  The  
consultation process is due to end in October 07 and the X will need update its  
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internal processes accordingly.  These proposals would place far more importance  
on rigorous local resolution of the complaint and the option for a complainant to ask  
for an independent review would disappear.  This would include greater use of  
meetings and mediation, and the new processes would require close co-operation  
between complaints, PALS and claims departments.    
  
With regard to reporting complaints activity to the Board she requested approval to  
form a sub-group to review this and recommend a revised reporting procedure.   
She requested the inclusion of a Non-Executive Director.  In her absence it was  
considered that perhaps X may be interested in joining this group.  Mr  
X also indicated his willingness to be involved in this group.  The Board  
discussed how the views of governors could be considered as part of the review  
and the Chairman suggested that they should be involved by means of a joint  
development session at some stage.    
Acton:  X  
Mrs X asked whether the new system of complaints would overcome the problem  
of vexations complainants.  Miss X felt it would probably not achieve this but it  
may help those complainants who had less confidence in the complaints system.    
  
The Board noted the content of the report and agreed the proposals to form a  
working group to review the complaints reporting procedure.  
  
390.07 FINANCE & ACTIVITY REPORT  
  
X reported a satisfactory financial position for the Trust which was now  
predicting an end of year surplus figure of £0.4m ahead of plan.  Liquidity remained  
ahead of plan and the financial risk rating was assessed at 5    
  
He referred to some potential areas of concern namely;  
• Currently the Trust was £1m under its income target for the year, mostly due  
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to a shortfall in elective activity against plan.  However, he expected this to  
pick up on account of increased activity to meet the 18 week referral to  
treatment target.    
• Underachievement of CRES was estimated to be £2m across all  
Directorates for the year.  Discussions were taking place with Directorates in  
order to improve the situation.  
• 3 Directorates were forecasting an overspend.  Work continues with these  
Directorates to achieve a balanced position by the year end.  
  
X added that there was a degree of concern nationally about the amount  
of FT surpluses being generated which were not being reinvested in service  
improvement.  The creation of the strategic investment fund demonstrated the  
Boards intention to re-invest in services for the benefit of patients.    
  
X fully supported the creation of the Strategic Investment Fund (SIF).   
He agreed that capital expenditure should be included in it, and, for the first year of  
its existence, some revenue expenditure.  Thereafter, he felt that revenue  
expenditure should be in the Trust’s operating budget and not the SIF.   
Mr X asked if future reports could show variance on the cost of capital projects  
against total planned expenditure and X agreed to include this in his  
review of how financial reporting was reported to the Board.  Mr X also asked  
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about impairment and what might be the expected outcome of the forthcoming  
review of land and property revaluation.  X replied that the likely outcome  
was unclear as the trust was currently engaged with the District Valuer in a whole  
hospital 5-year revaluation process.    
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Activity.  
Activity in overall terms was lower in August than in July but higher than in August  
2006.  The forward order book (outpatient activity) was 25% lower than July and  
9% below the level in August 2006.  Elective inpatient activity is slightly lower in  
August than July but at the same level as August 2006.  Elective day cases were  
slightly lower than July but 23% higher than August 2006.  Non-elective activity  
levels have deceased since July but were running 3% higher than August 2006.    
  
In conducting his review of how financial performance was reported to the Board X stated 
that he intended to issue a questionnaire to Board members this  
month and would then form a review group to review the results of this survey on  
proposed recommendations later in the year.  
  
The Board noted the Finance and Activity Report.  
  
391.07 GOVERNANCE ANNUAL REPORT 2006/07  
  
Mr X presented this report for last year and highlighted the following key  
achievement:   
• Ongoing development of the Assurance Framework allowing another full  
statement on internal control to be signed  
• Further development of a Trust-wide system to monitor and collate evidence  
against all core healthcare standards allowing internal audit of each  
standard with a positive sign-off  
• Further development of the Trust’s Risk Register covering all areas of the  
Trust  
• Directorate governance groups operating in all areas  
• Continuing increase in the number of staff who attended detailed risk  
management training  
• Implementation of the Health and Safety Action Plan  
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• Successful outcome of the Health and Safety Executive inspection  
• Compliance with the National Patient Safety Agency Alert notices   
• Uploading all patient safety incidents to the NPSA reporting system  
• More robust and proactive dissemination of risk management information  
• Embedding random note reviews into Directorate audit work streams  
• Work on priority national clinical audits to ensure that the Trust takes part in  
all nationally agreed clinical audits  
• Development of the national Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence  
guidance tracking system  
• Continued development of the integrated care pathways with specific regard  
to the single assessment process   
• Further development of user involvement monitoring systems.  
  
Mr X referred to a meeting the Non–Executive Directors had held with a  
neighbouring NHS Trust where it had been suggested clinical governance was a  
clinical directorate responsibility. X confirmed clinical directorates were a  
key part of the trust’s governance structure and formed part of the assurance  
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process the Board had in place to ensure effective and embedded systems. X commented 
statutory responsibility for clinical governance rested with the  
Chief Executive and it could not be devolved.    
  
In discussion, it was agreed that Non-Executive Directors should be given a further  
briefing by the Governance Manager on the governance systems in place and their  
role in the overview of the governance structure.  A future NED meeting would be  
an appropriate vehicle for this.  
Action: XX  
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X added that he had found the Governance Committee to be very  
committed to its task and that the culture surrounding governance had improved  
greatly across the Trust.  As the Deputy Chair of the Governance Committee, he  
was extremely satisfied with the governance structure in place.   
  
It was noted that in Para 4.1.1, fourth sentence, the reference to the Vice Chairman  
of the Board chairing the Committee was wrong and this would be amended by Mr  
X.  
Action:  XX  
The Chairman asked how the NSF working parties reported.  X replied that  
this was done via the Directorate structures.  Miss  X drew the Boards  
attention to the NSF element of the Directorate briefing reports that were prepared  
for the Board/clinical directorate briefing meetings.  
  
The Board received the Governance Annual Report 2006/07, noted the  
progress made to date and approved the Health and Safety Action Plan and  
the Clinical and Cost Effectiveness Plan for 2007/08.    
  
392.07 LIST OF THIRD PARTIES WITH WHICH THE TRUST HAS A DUTY TO 
CO-  
OPERATE  
  
X introduced this paper which was a requirement of Monitor’s Code of  
Governance, which required that Boards maintained a list of those third parties with  
which the Trust had a duty to co-operate.  The list had been drawn up in  
consultation with Executive Directors and was now presented for approval.  In  
discussion, it was decided that XXX Trust and XXX Constabulary should be added both of 
whom would be classed as ‘co-  
operation as required’.  It was also noted that the Commission for Racial Equality  
had now been re-titled The Equality and Human Rights Commission.  Mr X  
would amend the list accordingly.  
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Action:  XXX  
  
The Board approved the list of third parties with which the Trust had a duty to  
co-operate with the amendments above.   
  
393.07 REVIEW OF POLICY FOR THE COMPOSITION OF NON-EXECUTIVE  
DIRECTORS ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
  
Mr X introduced his paper which was a routine review of the policy.  In  
particular, he asked the Board to confirm that the skills and experience categories  
in paragraph 4 remained relevant.  He also stated that paragraph 7 concerning  
terms of office needed to be amended to align with the recommendations of  
Monitor’s Code of Governance and proposed that this should now read “Terms of  
Office will be in accordance with the guidance in Monitor’s Code of Governance”.  
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The Board approved this amendment and also made one small change to  
paragraph 4b (Commerce) where “marketing” would be included in the wording.  Mr  
XXX would action these amendments and pass the policy on to the Council of  
Governors on XX October for their approval.    
Action: XX  
  
The Board agreed the policy for the Composition of NEDs on the Board of  
Directors with the amendments noted above.  
  
394.07 MONITOR’S REVIEW OF X ANNUAL PLAN 2007/08  
  
X introduced this document.  The Trust’s risk ratings for the year were  
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confirmed as follows:  
  
• Financial - 4  
• Governance - Green   
• Mandatory Services – Green   
  
She asked the Board to note that the arrangements whereby the Trust had loaned  
money to the PCT last year were discouraged by Monitor.    
  
The Board noted Monitor’s Review of the X Annual Plan 2007/08.  
  
395.07 MONITOR Q1 ANALYSIS OF X PERFORMANCE  
  
X introduced this report.  Monitor had confirmed the Trust’s risk ratings  
following analysis of the Trust’s Q1 report as follows:  
  
• Financial – 5  
• Governance – Green  
• Mandatory Services – Green   
  
The Trust continued to operate in the upper quartile of FTs  
performance.    
  
The Board noted the Monitor Analysis of X Q1 Performance.  
  
396.07 INTERNAL AUDIT REPORT – MONITOR CODE OF GOVERNANCE  
  
Mr X introduced this item which was the first in a cycle of reviews of the  
Board’s compliance with Monitor’s Code of Governance.  A request for a full review  
of all 74 code provisions had proved too great a workload for internal audit and it  
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had been agreed that 15 provisions would be reviewed every 6 months.  The report  
had revealed that the Board is employing a sound system of oversight of the code  
provisions and that of the 15 provisions reviewed only one (F.3.2) did not comply  
with the Code.  This concerned Audit Committee Terms of Reference and would be  
addressed as part of the proposed Audit Committee function review later this year.    
  
The Board noted the Internal Audit Report on compliance with the Code of  
Governance, and agreed to the proposal to include a review of Audit  
Committee Terms of Reference within the forthcoming review of the Audit  
Committee function.  
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397.07 EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP WALKAROUNDS  
  
X presented this report for information.  Executive Directors are committed  
to regular walkarounds and visits to a variety of areas across the Trust.  This is part  
of a campaign led internationally by the Institute of Health Improvement to increase  
safety awareness throughout the NHS.  It also allowed EDs to directly engage with  
staff over a number of issues.  The report also proposed methods by which the  
walkarounds should be conducted.  Executive Directors have accepted the  
principles involved already and the first walkarounds started in August 2007.   The  
Board will be kept advised on the success of the initiative as well as any significant  
findings identified.    
  
The Board noted the report on Executive Leadership Walkarounds.  
  
398.07 MONITOR REVIEW OF FT SECTOR ANNUAL PLANS 2007/08  
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X presented this paper for information which had been issued by Monitor  
into the public domain.  It showed that the Trust continues to perform in the upper  
quartile of Acute Trusts.    
  
The Board noted the results of Monitor’s Review of FT Sector Annual Plans  
2007/08.  
  
399.07 ANY OTHER BUSINESS  
  
There was no further business to discuss.  
  
400.07 DATE OF NEXT MEETING   
The next meeting of the Board of Directors will take place on XXXXX.  
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APPENDIX THREE 
EXAMPLE TRANSCRIPT 
 
TRANSCRIPT KEY 
Black manuscript-Interviewee 
Blue Manuscript-Interviewer 
XXX Deletions to protect anonymity 
 
Director of [ non clinical] XXXXXXXXXXXX.  Before that for about three years I was an 
orthopaedic General Manager XXXXXXXXXXXX.  Before that a corporate manning role for 
18 months and before that XXXXXXXXXX, a Service Manager. 
 
Have you always been in the NHS career wise? 
 
Yes for the past 10 years pretty much so. 
 
And before that? 
 
A couple of years out and then university. 
 
OK, very easy  question to kick off with.  If you’re looking at the Trust over the last three 
years, what do you think it’s focussed its main managerial energy. 
 
It’s always been very strong performance focussed, which is waiting times, and financial 
balance and then there’s a lot of focus around getting FT status and linked to that is getting 3 
stars and then, you know, trying to get reasonable scores in the Health Care Commission, so 
very strong measurable performance. 
 
And on the performance what  was the balance between financial and clinical.  
 
The financial performance has been consistent all the way through.  The incredible attention 
to detail on the waiting list management has slightly declined but there’s been a rising Health 
Care Commission in other quality indicators and we’re just coming to our quarterly reviews 
	                      
225	  
with directorates which are actually taking much wider views, so for instance, patient 
satisfaction, as well as clinical governance, infection control.  I think more the growth of other 
measures that widen the field rather than less on the previous team. 
 
OK, on finance now, if you were to say what the balance was between finance and other indicators – 
what’s the balance do you think? 
 
Partly because the last two years have been largely problem free much more maintenance 
tasks than major changes so whilst we had a capital programme of about 3 million this year 
it’s not been as dominating an issue. 
 
 
Just talking about measurement for a little while.  If I were to ask you the question ‘what are your 
outcome measures of this Trust, what would your answer be?’ 
 
Outcomes is stemming from process measures, where we’ve got stacks and stacks of process 
measures of waiting times and things like that so mainly, I think, people tend to focus on 
clinical outcomes we talked of outcomes per se. 
 
If you make it more generic and said ‘outputs’ what would they insert then? 
 
Ok, if it was outputs then I think people would start focussing mainly on activity, and I think 
we have seen a significant increase, particularly over the last year around people, particularly 
General Managers and some of the more engaged clinicians around PbR and PbB activity and 
making the link between income and expenditure.  Very strong history over ten to 15 years of 
managing to budget.  What we’re only just beginning to get our heads around is managing 
income and expenditure in a way that’s slightly more ‘real world’ 
 
 So more sophisticated financial reporting in fact. 
 
And understanding, and there is still a bit of the culture which is partly ‘this is my income 
target and that’s it’.  There’s more work out there or less work out there it doesn’t really 
matter – that’s the income target.  The Trust corporately will smooth off the differences, and 
that’s partly driven by a couple of factors, one is some big swings in medicine, particularly in 
emergency admissions going down without the structure being refused.   But also a history of 
a dispute with PCT around what they pay for extra activity, so there’s still quite a strong 
conservative culture around going out and getting income because that’s seen as stimulating 
demand, and seen as not being a partner with the health economy.  So it’s getting that balance 
right between entrepreneurial approach to income. 
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So output measurement is broadly numbers of units produced effectively? 
 
Broadly yes 
 
If we use outcomes then we’re going to get more clinical focus. 
 
Yes 
 
At the Board, when you discuss output (including the quality measure) what kind of data is the Board 
getting on outputs generally? 
 
We do a key performance indicator paper, here, which we’ve just produced if you would like 
to have a look!  Which is very much on the Monitor key performance indicators which also 
map across to the Health Care Commissions so very much nationally set and we can add our 
local one which is our contract so these would be seen as performance indicators so incomes, 
outcomes or whatever tends to be performance indicators and then 18 weeks because that’s 
the new target and we don’t really understand it and we’re still working on it da, da, de, da 
and we’re still some way off.  And then there’s the Health Care Commission new targets 
which are the ones that feed the Health Care Commission rating we get.  That’s one set, and 
we then get the… 
 
And the Board gets this every month? 
 
Yes, the Board gets it every month and will have a bit of focus on different areas and 
particular issues and so on without the finance papers which will talk about the – in the public 
section – very limited, a couple – well one page really – of what the headlines are.  In part two 
we have the directorate reports which are very detailed in terms of income activity 
expenditure, sickness and so on, and those get quite a lot of scrutiny as well but mainly in the 
Finance Committee.  So those are the two big performance indicators, we are going to take a 
bit of a review of that but those are the main ones. 
 
So you’re using in terms of numbers are going to be about your access times and hitting those 
access times.  In terms of the quality indicators are you saying the indicators for StBH is 
basically your proxy for quality measurement?  
 
Whilst we sign that off every year, and there are pressures beneath that, underneath the Board 
there’s the Governance Mismanagement Committee which gets its own sets of data and 
there’s also the Infections Control Committee – so there’s actually quite an active Board sub-
committee structure which is where the majority of that will go on.  The thing that comes to 
the Board on a quarterly basis is the Clinical Governance Risk Report which is a really 
detailed report listing everything from Adverse Incidents Reports through to NICE 
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Compliance, audits undertaken and that’s a pretty large document that comes every quarter.  
Then we’ve got Infection Control Annual Plan and quarterly updates. 
 
So there are quality indicators in that.  What about value added indicators? 
 
Zero – well let me see – value added indicators – none that we explicitly look at in that way.  
There’s quite a lot on mortality, we score quite low on our mortality index a couple of years 
back and that’s improved significantly and the Medical Director led a large piece of work 
looking at that part of that was around the fact that we’ve got a palliative care unit within the 
Trust, which kind of makes your figures worse, but others were around a couple of areas 
where we were outlier.  So in terms of whether you would call that a value added I’m trying 
to think… 
 
What I’m getting at is say your ortho ops are doing hips, not many people, hopefully, die through hips 
but do you have evidence of functionality improvement pre op, post op – is that kind of stuff reported 
at Board level or…? 
 
No, and it would only be on a pretty exceptional ad hoc basis.  Ones that come up through the 
Health Care Commission we do see, so for instance the Stroke Sentinel Audit is one we 
looked at quite a lot where we’re pretty good on the whole, but quite poor on a few of the 16 
standards, or whatever it is.  So that’s one in particular because stroke is an area where we’re 
beacon leading edge and it is priority  of the Board taking an interest in that one.  But unless 
it’s coming through, probably one of the Audit Commission or one of those other reports, 
probably not one of our own self-generated reports.  Within the strategy have you seen our 
Fast Track Reports? 
 
The one you’ve just been working on?  No I haven’t read it yet 
 
We’re trying to get to the stage of coming out with some slightly smarter measures which we 
want to achieve against our goals so some of them are rehashes of targets that are well known 
to us a few are new and one in particular in terms of the contract is just a set of clinical 
outcome measures – now admittedly we haven’t done that yet, but it’s in there and it’s 
identified.  It’s an area where we’re pretty poor in having systems to measure outcomes 
beyond the immediate and also outcomes that are beyond the ad hoc audit.  But the biggest 
push we’ve had is in developing the Patient Satisfaction Scores is our first piece of work.  
Once we’ve got that established… 
 
As I understand it, that’s not national work that’s your own satisfaction survey 
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Yes, there’s a couple of questions that we track that are the same questions as the national one 
but we’re just trying to get that established as a culture of constantly asking … 
 
Good.  So one picking up on one… you started financial focussed? 
 
Financial and Waiting Times, yes 
 
National Agenda - Financial/National Agenda? 
 
Yes 
 
And where you’re going now is more the Trust’s agenda on quality, how are you going to measure 
that in a more sophisticated way – is that fair? 
 
Yes, I think we’re beginning to… as long as the National ‘must do’s’ are being met, yes we’re 
beginning to get head room to develop into other areas that particularly interest us. 
 
Interesting.  OK, just going to PBR now for a minute, if I may.  In the background 2004 PBR was 
introduced what impact do you think PBR itself has had on the Trust, if any? 
 
It’s got people thinking quite differently about work, so I think it has had quite a large impact 
in terms of decision making particularly by Clinical Directors, General Manages and the 
Board.  We almost had a kind of false… sorry, the first year of Foundation Trust status was 
the first year when we sort of had PBR in place and drifted into a major dispute that 
effectively blew up in year two so we kind of had a bit of a faltering start as to what the 
system was because the PCT’s view was that PBR was we set a figure of how much we want 
to spend and you live within that which is different from our interpretation and we went 
through a very painful process of actually saying ‘no it’s paying for the work we do.  So that 
kind of resolved last summer so really in many ways the understanding of the system is only 
developing over the last 12 months I would think, and that’s been further confused by 18 
weeks were pretty much, if something needs doing, do it – get on with it.  So from having had 
2 or 3 years of demark and control and trying to manage waiting list outs and various hoops to 
jump through we’re very much now way back the other way and just get on with it, treat it.  
PCT’s in very good financial health, reducing tariff price, 4% growth in the next few years.  
You see the next few years with PCT’s with lots of money demanding price when demand 
control isn’t the issue, it’s can we do it at the price?  I think people are beginning to 
understand what PBR is and almost the context in which it is working has changed for us 
locally in three distinct phases. 
 
Just to pick up your point about the 4%… 
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Sorry, this is the go forward thing 
 
Oh yes.  If you were very clear up to now that the PCT had a budget and it was asking you to 
do like  your job would therefore have been to make your processes as efficient as possible to 
deliver that activity within the budget.  Do you see the PCT with real 4% growth every year 
for the next three years as removing a constraint on the Trust? 
 
In terms of the mind set of the past 15 years, here’s your block of cash, whoever comes 
through the door you’ve got to treat.  There’s a strong incentive there, if we can avoid 
admissions, if we can drop follow-ups we can reduce demand there’s every incentive for us, 
there’s none for the GP to do that.  Now, actually that’s going to avoid referrals but can we 
afford to shut the two beds or the wards that will be a consequence of us losing that income, 
so we’re trying to get beyond that immediate knee jerk drawbridge and actually say, well if 
that money gets reinvested and we can manage in a planned way then it is possible for us to 
continue this demand management but that’s quite a difficult thing to balance.  Is the perverse 
incentives of A system which encourages greater activity because of the income and you build 
an Empire on the back of that against the PCT clearly not wanting that to happen, and lots of 
tension that could fall out of that so there’s a straightforward income, turnover, volume issue.  
However there has also been, which I think is the question you were originally asking, 
looking at our processes, can we do it at tariff, what can we do to reduce our costs and 
maintain activity or indeed grow activity at the same costs?  So we’re beginning to get there 
but it’s very uneven . 
 
If I’m saying to you, Richard, next year there’s a 4% going in we can probably therefore – if you’ve 
got a service that’s struggling a bit to break even, does the option now come of well we can trade, get 
can get more through and spread our fixed costs out and we don’t need to look at processes quite so 
much now because we can trade out way out of the loss?  
 
That’s possibly what could happen – it hasn’t happened yet but I can see it happening and that 
will be ‘can we do it by taking other Trusts’ work, can we just grow the market?  So both of 
those are possible, although I think that again there’s an issue that health care isn’t the same 
as many other markets because there probably are only so many hips you can do and whilst 
thresholds can change there comes a point where any clinicians not…  so I think there is some 
way to go but for instance our cardiology , arrangements are the best in the country well I 
think there comes a point where there are so many pace makers you can put in da, da, so the 
only example I can think of where someone has explicitly said we want to grow this because 
of the financial situation is our maternity unit where it’s midwife led – on the largest midwife 
led units in the country – but still quite small in comparison with most maternity units - and 
there we’ve got quite high fixed costs just to run a service and it has declined from about 800 
to 500 births over the last few years and is now just beginning to turn back up again and that’s 
something we’re very keen to support.  So we have a marketing strategy which includes as 
part of that supporting the maternity unit as part of that area, but we have also identified 17 
practices where we get between 30-70% referrals and we deem those to be most significant 
growth and then transferrals from other Trusts to us – 70% because of our case mix of 
services is about the right amount.  If we get maximum penetration of the services we provide 
it’s about 75%, so getting 70% of a practice’s entire practice’s , is pretty much total saturation 
so these are the ones that are next ring geographically – we identify them on geography – but 
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those are the ones if we can get a switch of 5% to us from other Trusts, would be worth the 
effort.  So there is a growth view point that… so it’s slightly more than we can simply grow 
our way out  
 
I think that’s a really good point that 4% growth will change the context in which everyone is 
operating 
 
And also that taking 2½% efficiency – taking 2½% out of the costs out of the organisation is 
pretty damn difficult every year, year on year so for the next couple of years saying we’re 
going to meet growth through productivity wise would be possible.  PCT don’t want to spend 
more with us and they would like to spend 3% less a year so there’s going to be a tension, but 
if we can do the work and it’s there to be done and people come to us then a bit of that and a 
bit of cash  we’ll be able to see our way through this. 
 
Interesting.  Going back to the PBR for a second.  Clearly it’s had an impact at Board level, in 
decision making, what impact has it had on the shop floor? …Consultant kind of delivery, what’s the 
impact of that? 
 
Without stereotyping, there’s a very strong distinction between, surgeons and physicians in 
that surgeons fully understand the market and they, in their private time, and General 
Managers understand that income has got to be earned and delivered so I think pretty strong 
impact there.  Amongst the physicians it’s slightly more difficult because of they’re not so 
much in a competitive field, they’re still very much in the mind set if we net work to get away 
that’s a good thing so I think there has been a bit of a distinction by specialty.  I think most 
people at Consultant Senior Manager, level have understood it.  We did however run a day a 
couple of weeks ago on PBR and report it because we felt actually because we’ve been going 
at this for three years and a lot of people still don’t understand the basics so there is still quite 
a large education we need to do around the rules of the game, what counts, what’s billable, 
what’s not billable and equally we’re finding GPs challenging our billing based on no 
knowledge of how PBR works at all.  So I think in clinician’s terms there’s quite a lot of 
engagement still to be done, but people can understand the basic business concept that you 
sell stuff and you buy it and you get paid for it 
 
If we were going to walk out now – lets do the medics first, and kind of ‘what’s wrong with 
this patient?’ Give the diagnosis, fine and so roughly what’s the cost of delivering that and 
we’re going to get a tariff for that, probably not in front of the patient.  What do you think the 
response would be? 
Cardiologists would be able to tell you down to the penny, the general physicians would not – 
they wouldn’t know where to begin, and probably struggle to think who to ask other than a 
General Manager.  What we’ve got here is quite behind the curve of understanding our costs, 
so I think we can understand the tariff, but what we’re less good at and have put a lot of effort 
into this year to getting from zero to SLR and SLM(sp?), is actually understanding our costs 
at a specialty level let alone an HRG level. 
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And that’s a bit of the old chestnut of apportioning fixed costs in the right way, etc. 
 
Partly that, yes 
 
So we’ve got some specialities at Consultant level understand tariff and have a pretty good 
idea… 
 
We’re getting there, but we haven’t had very high engagement in consultants’ involvement in 
the reference costs exercise, so hence that’s a big area to look at. 
 
So lets move on… 
 
The one example I was going to give you is orthopaedics what we did do was get the 
reference costs exercise for orthopaedics and the tariff income – which is now three years ago, 
four years ago probably – and were surprised that it really broke even and we’re probably the 
fourth or 5th biggest hip and knee replacement unit in the country so we kind of thought  
…making this back up.  And so we did, on the back of that, look at well Theatres, prosthesis, 
and length of stay would be the three cost drivers and, is the easiest one, or relatively easiest 
one because it meant squeezing our supplier rather than making any fundamental changes so 
we did do a pretty intensive exercise which shook out maybe 20% off the prosthesis costs and 
actually  from the surrounding Trusts on that deal and that was two current revenue years so 
that was directly driven by the fact that we thought we must be paying over the odds for the 
prosthesis because, OK we’re middling theatre utilisation, we’re OK so prosthesis just seemed 
right the area to look at  and because we kept saying, we can’t go on just this side of break 
even – because it was 2.5% reduction of share – it did actually get reasonable amount of 
engagement from reasonably astute financially individuals and that I think was a critical 
element so that was a very genuine example of us taking PBR tariff… 
 
And did the Consultants…? 
 
The Clinical Director understood within a second and a year’s work to get the tendering and 
to get colleagues on line and to get them to reduce their range of prosthesis used, and there’d 
been some discussion for years and years so there was kind of an impetus to bring that 
forward. 
 
Does PBR have an effect on the quality agenda?  Clearly it has an effect on taking costs out of 
the agenda – what impact, if any, does it have on the quality agenda do you think?  
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At the moment it’s either those where it’s perverse incentives so quality in its widest sense is 
now … having spent 15 years telling people to reduce their follow-ups – it’s a bit of money 
for old rope, so there’s a bit of a disincentive on things like that – and one-stop clinics – 
there’s no incentive to do those, telephone advice services currently there isn’t.  Currently 
we’re trying to engage the PCT in saying, well look rather than us making some reverse 
decisions and brining those people back to clinic.  In terms of where I hope it will go is in the 
length of stay agenda where it has definitely led us to looking at length of stays and at the 
moment we’re looking at the fairly easier – relatively easier – areas of, for instance, day 
admission rather than brining them in one or two days before just to protect the bed.  So we 
now have major projects who bring in a ‘day of surgery’ admission area so we get rid of the 
whole issue of pre-op bays, and that’s partly driven by the length of stay issues and needing to 
drive those down where I hope it will go is areas like complications and medication areas and 
other things that will reduce it down. 
 
And I suppose by looking at the pathway… 
 
By looking and the pathway, by looking at the trim points – and again it’s a bit of a perverse 
incentive excess bed days on length of stays which is where we’re on £50 a day – we’ve lost 
£3m income three years in a row now by reducing length of stay and losing excess bed day. 
 
Really 
 
We’ve taken that on the chin because it’s kind of the inevitable way things are going to go, 
it’s got to be better for patients.  We haven’t quite reduced the bed base to reflect that 
reduction so… 
 
Have you reduced the bed base at all? 
 
By about 20 beds, so.. 
 
20 out of? 
 
900, so it’s only peanuts [do you want me to shut the blinds?]. So we’re looking at length of 
stay going down partly it’s just trends, partly is practice and partly it’s we’ve been pushing 
this for years and years and we’re not going to stop this juggernaut, but this really had a 
serious financial impact for us partly recycled into intermediate care and so on partly PCT but 
really there’s got to be some shake out with the number of beds and secondly the quality 
agenda we’re trying to show investments that deliver… that makes sense within PBR, sort of 
stacks up in that you massively reduce the stay you get the same tariff and you get a slight top 
up next year.  It doesn’t quite add up but it’s beginning to get there – you’ve got a few things 
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you can chuck in to say that this helps to support the costs, but broadly there aren’t that many 
ways that PBR currently supports clinical outcomes, probably one of the main argument 
we’ve got is that if you can win under PBR you can get surplus and if you get surplus you can 
invest in the things you want to do.  So we’ve invested heavily over the next five years in 
capital, we’re using that surplus and we’re investing heavily in non-income generating areas 
this year so A & E, IT and outreach and others because it’s a good thing to do and we can do 
it because we’re financially sound,  
 
OK.  So you’re saying PBR and the quality agenda, if anything, as we are now is creating 
disincentive on quality because it’s perverse behaviour by the provider in some cases? 
 
Yes, it doesn’t encourage you to change , more on the patient satisfaction level – things like 
one stops, and [inaudible], and things like that. 
 
Just as a side issue, as there been an indicator from the PCT that they’re going to make the 
tariff more sophisticated by giving bonus for high performance on outcome? 
 
No, I think if that’s going to happen, it’s going to happen nationally. 
 
OK 
 
Future PBR talked about quality indicators.  I’m trying to engage the PCT in actually 
becoming a development site for PBR and trying to get them to generate some ideas but partly 
because of this dispute and partly because of the reorganisation they’re only just now 
beginning to get on to what should have happened three years ago, so may be in a year or 
two’s time that might start happening, but at this stage there’s a very clear set of levers which 
is they basically beat us round the head if we’re missing a target and that’s how quality is 
driven rather than through the financial systems. 
 
Terrific - you mentioned this variation in terms of clinical understanding of PBR and you 
mentioned it is by speciality [inaudible], is there anything in personal – I’m going to get 
personal about this – can you pick a trend up in the consultant body which are more engaged 
with an understanding of PBR or is there something that comes to mind? 
 
Age isn’t a particular characteristic I don’t think, it’s that financial astuteness – there are those 
that take to it naturally, there are those, particularly from private practice, that understand 
naturally more, there are those who want to develop a service and then kind of, not 
begrudgingly, but just want to understand ‘how do I make the case’ and there are a few of 
them who wouldn’t naturally come to it but… 
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There’s an understanding in this Trust is there, if you want to develop a service then prima 
facie its got to stack under PBR is that the case? 
 
It’s got to stack under PBR or it’s got to be a really strong quality argument, and we have an 
annual ‘bun fight’ whereby these are the one that the Trust is investing in – they don’t 
generate income, but we’re investing in because they are the right thing to do, so there’s a big 
investment in A & E with no income on the back of that but our patient satisfaction scores, 
our wait time are pretty much all the standard work – this was the, service in investments to 
try and bring that up so those are the two routes.  It probably isn’t quite so clear in the 
clinician mind that that’s part of the …, but pretty much wherever they go there’s going to be 
the message ‘this ain’t going to fly’ unless we can make it stack up and there’s a huge naiveté 
as to what income they can generate as in ‘is the work there’ you can make it stack up if you 
can do 1,000 extra endoscopies then yes you can generate the money to pay for extra 
consultants but, are there 1,000 extra to be done out there?  Actually, it’s not that 
sophisticated a question to say is the work out there? Where’s it going to come from?  So it’s 
developing, but in terms of characteristics… the other one I was thinking about was whether 
the clinician worried that theirs was going to be the directorate that was under tariff… was 
losing money and what does that mean?  And so a couple of examples, maternity was 
mentioned, gynae where the reference costs that they were losing money – well they crawled 
over it and tried to understand what was going on -  and orthopaedics, so there are a few 
where they’re driven to it because they’re seen to be… you know they might manage on 
budget for years and years and years and therefore never been a problem and never appeared 
on the radar and suddenly they’re losing money against tariff – well they’ve got to and I think 
there’re been a fairly genuine engagement part of it’s been understanding and being able to 
rubbish the figures because we can always rubbish reference costs. Part of it was 
understanding, well are there changes in practices, are there changes in coding, are there 
changes in things that will better represent what I do?  So that I don’t have to worry about 
whether… We’ve not ever yet seriously looked at this invest in any services, but they kind of 
know that that’s not impossible and whilst that’s a threat is probably more effective than any 
driver. 
 
Than another driver 
 
So then characteristics, it’s more circumstance I think 
 
That’s very interesting, that figures with other stuff as well.  Just before we leave the 
consultant body there’s a couple of other issues I want to just look at.  We’re looking at PBR 
and the understanding of PBR and we mentioned the Clinical Directors.  Who holds the 
budget – I presume you have the old triumvirate of the… 
 
Yes, the Senior Nurse reports to the General Manager… 
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So it the duo? 
 
Yes, the duo 
 
Who signs off the money? 
 
The organisation diagram says the General Manager is managed by the Clinical Director.  In 
reality the Clinical Director will be sat next to the General Manager and be shot at if things 
are going awry so it very much is a shared… and that will vary on personalities as to who 
really understand the budget.  I think both feel responsible, I don’t think there’s a Clinical 
Director or General Manager who don’t feel responsible – there are degrees, but they’re all 
responsible.  Some will say it’s circumstances, what can I do?  But generally those are the two 
who will be the key. 
 
If I’ve got your orthopods OK and we come in at the Director at £1.5m over budget and we 
haven’t taken corrective action during the year through quarterly reviews and I’m sat there 
and I’m the General Manager with the Clinical Director sat next to me who’s going to be the 
one who takes the can for the performance issue? 
 
The General Managers will tend to have shorter total careers whereas the consultants will tend 
to have their whole working life although Clinical Director’s on a three-year term and failure 
to engage in… if it’s a significant variance, action’s not been taken, then the situation will 
become intolerable, I guess, for the Clinical Director so their more likely to go back to a job 
in consultants – stage one, but then the General Manager is more likely to be looking for a 
new job which is probably more of a mind focusser than… 
 
So the Clinical Manager physically signing off or… 
 
Both will tend to but I think the General Manager up to £25k and the Clinical Director up to 
£50k but the vast bulk of them would be signed off by both… 
 
OK, the actual budget at the start of the year? 
 
That would be jointly negotiated again the General Manager doing the bulk of the work but 
the Clinical Director definitely being involved in the meetings. 
 
Does he sign off on the… 
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Yes they both sign on the dotted line, this is the budget, this is the income target. 
 
Useful, OK so they’re both signing off, it’s a joint responsibility; the Clinical Director has 
probably got a bigger safety net if anything goes wrong… 
 
Yes, he’s got the day job to go back to. 
 
Absolutely 
 
As far as I know I don’t think any Clinical Director has been sacked as such, but it would tend 
to be the honourable thing… 
 
Just talking about objectives for a second, the way this is going now is what we’re trying to 
[inaudible], are there any incentives which are not aligned between General Managers and 
clinicians?  That’s what I’m trying to get at. 
 
Clinicians in general or the Clinical Director? 
 
I’m thinking particularly about consultants, because let be honest about it consultant  
Managers are really the key to drivers.  So thinking first about the consultant body what 
drives these guys? 
 
It varies, the… in terms of them not being aligned… do you want me to answer that bit or do 
you want me to answer the general question about what drives them? 
 
General question first about what drives them, then I’m going to ask exactly the same 
question about managers and then we can conclude by is there actually anything that is 
fundamentally out of line therefore? 
 
OK, you kind of work on the basis that consultants will want to varying extents want to have 
a sold base in their NHS base as in quality, reasonable risk avoidance, they don’t want to be 
all over the papers, whatever.  So sit back having the base secure some will then want to go on 
to become clinically excellent recognised within the Trust, within the region, nationally etc. 
and that’s either quality, publication or involved with national bodies and so on there’s then 
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there’s a competitive streak in just being better than others, which particularly surgeons seem 
to be more competitive than the physicians often – although not always.  In the environment 
in which they work and how much they can improve the stats there are clearly those who want 
to go into management to shape the environment in which they work to drive things forward, 
etc. so it’s the usual mix of security allowing you to be a bit more available or competitive or 
whatever you want or to build a service with a team to create the environment you want. 
 
Do you think the building of the service is an important one for the majority? 
 
Yes, most of them want to be part of a successful service.  Most of them have their ambitions 
as to what they want to grow or specialise or whatever. 
 
So they can then become… if I’m a cardiologist I’m interested in cardiology – not really what 
the orthopods,  
 
Yes, yes,, by about 40% over the last 4 or 5 years whereas it used to be about 80 people who 
kind of knew each other and be a village and they were more generalists within their field 
you’ve now got 14 orthopds who are so sub-specialised they hardly talk to each other let 
alone the cardiologists. 
 
Let’s just talk about the managers then. Eight private practice, because you’re in the South-
East how significant is that? 
 
Pretty significant, particularly orthopaedics, ophthalmology cardiology is quite large private 
practice.   
 
Which are the ones who engage quite a lot in understanding PBR as well 
 
Yes, yes. 
 
So let’s go to the managers then.  You can talk about these, being one of them. Looking at 
your colleagues, particularly below Chief Executive – they’re a breed unto themselves aren’t 
they?  What drives your colleagues do you reckon? 
 
Here, in this particular Trust, there’s quite a large group of long-serving General Managers 
which is actually quite unusual for a lot of Trusts where managers are only here for 2 or 3 
years if you’re lucky.  We’ve got General Managers who’ve seen lots of different changes and 
	                      
238	  
systems.  So there’s something about loyalty and continuity to the team as well as to the Trust 
and so on.  So I think there’s very much a strong streak running through which isn’t 
represented in the other Trusts where I’ve worked, necessarily – or to such an extent.  There’s 
also a lot about not being at variance so as long as you’re ‘on target’ or slightly above, then 
your’re given the head room, you’re not going to be pulled in front of the Headmaster every 
five minutes because you’re overspent or because you’re missing that target so there’s very 
much a compliance with the targets culture and I think a lot of them get satisfaction out of 
seeing services develop – seeing there was a problem about a year ago and now we’ve solved 
it.  Whilst that’s not celebrated, that’s probably the bits that keep you going on the hard bit. 
And then there’s the social network of being in a community doing a public service that gives 
you that motivation that gets you through the dross and the hassle. 
 
You didn’t mention money once in that really because it’s not a key… 
 
No, no the General Managers are saying they should be re-banded so it’s a factor.  We don’t 
have any performance related pay but we did use to have a system that was consolidated 
about 4 or 5 years ago – there’s obviously a whole PhD in , pay and so on.  No one gets in the 
organisation I don’t think that’s particularly dented our appetite for performing the issue is 
more around where we can align objectives if you’ve got PRP it’s pretty clear everyone’s 
earning the money and therefore everything must be bought at once.  But I think everyone is 
reasonably clear that, you know, stay on the right side of income and expenditure, hit these 
targets and do the other stuff – the quality stuff.  But I think as an organisation there’s very 
much a sense that we’re trying to get to the stage where we’ve got the head room to do the 
things we want to do  
 
Do you think there is anything that you’ve not mentioned yet, or you have mentioned that you 
think are conflicting drivers or incentives between Consultants and General Managers? 
 
Private Practice is a big factor and managing waiting times, waiting list initiative payments or 
worker going to private sector and there’s increasingly Consultants setting up their own 
private chambers which they want to bid for work and we haven’t quite got to that stage 
where there’s an explicit conflict of interests, but there’s had to be a lot of marking of 
territories and saying that is undeniably a conflict of interest – don’t go there – so far it’s not 
been brought to a head but we don’t really want to be placed in a test case where the Trust can 
or cannot say that’s a conflict of interests. 
 
Can you give me a flavour of that? 
 
The ophthalmologists, the radiologists, the anaesthetists at the moment all have their own 
private companies set up.  They are set up to bid for work whether it’s private or NHS whilst 
they don’t have facilities currently then it’s pretty limited what they can bid for but they could 
take work direct from GPs which would be income that would have been coming to the Trust 
so… 
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But that hasn’t materialised yet? 
 
It hasn’t materialised yet, but the one area where it has – not from a company – but from 
Consultants operating en masse about £1.5m worth of work that’s being going through the 
Nuffield private hospital for the last three years the Consultants get BUPA rate minus 20% 
but they’re still getting 3 or 4 grand for a morning’s work.  We would only pay them £600 for 
a morning’s work as overtime, if they did it within their core session they’d only be paid £100 
or something, so it’s pretty massive incentives to not  manage waiting lists at base therefore 
the work has to be outsourced and the same guy’s going it so very big conflict of interests 
there. 
 
Do they declare that? As a purely governance point, how is that managed? 
 
Well we know the cases that go to the Nuffield because we broadly send them there and 
within their job plans they’re meant to identify the private sessions that they do, but beyond 
that…it’s managed in the sense that as a Trust we recognise that this is necessary to meet the 
targets and that the Consultants effectively have some fair shares and if there seems to be 
blatant go slow on the day job then there’d be a pretty severe talking to but it’s very much a 
gentleman’s club. 
 
OK, so Private Practice potential divergence of interests.  What else do you think – is there 
anything else? 
 
The clinical quality agenda versus ‘we need to make it stack up’ is potentially always there 
that kind of assumes Managers are only interested in money and they’re not interested in 
quality and so on often it’s the other way round, and often it’s mixed so there’s that, and 
probably also working practices in that if it’s a convenient working practice for a consultant, 
it might not be best for the team or the patient or the system and how they use the theatres 
might be highly convenient to the consultants how they use the theatre time – might not be for 
the patient. 
 
Yes, interesting – is there anything else you want to mention ?   In your perception of say the 
last couple of years has quality been basically at a constant level or has it been declining? 
 
Overall quality in a sense? 
 
Yes 
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OK.  I’d probably say it’s been improving, partly moving to a more consultant led service 
partly the whole ….. led agenda, measurability, accountability.  I think out time per clinic 
appointment is probably gone up, our degree of sub-specialisation has gone up markedly and 
these are all signs I take as being quite good indicators of quality.  We haven’t had swingeing, 
short notice slash and burn cuts so there has been continuity in service and, dare I say it, long 
term planning but reasonable forward planning I think, on service developments.  Infection 
control has been increasing, although our rate of infection control has actually got worse this 
year, we’ve been consistently amongst the best in the country for MRSA and c. diff and so I 
think on a lot of indicators we’re pretty…specialist nurses, and the softer side of particularly 
cancer care and others, I’d say pretty marked improvement. 
 
What’s been the driver for that then?  Was it PBR, but we said not?  
 
Probably the trend started way before PBR and we’ve probably more in spite of – been able to 
invest in some areas.  I think it’s more the clinical governance, the accountability, as well as 
broader trends in the Health Care Sector around , etc. 
 
Has the Board had an impact on…? 
 
It’s difficult to say over the 20 months I’ve been going , the systems are established and the 
quality agenda clearly has an infrastructure – we actually, probably about 3 or 4 years ago, 
appointed quite a strong Clinical Governance Manager so whereas there’s a lack of corporate 
processes prior, individuals like that setting up systems, a strong nurse and Clinical Director 
have meant that we have actually got the systems that we can measurably see that we are 
making progress.  I think the Health Care Commission ratings are pretty hit and miss as to 
whether they’re a good indicator of quality but in the absence of anything else they are a 
bench marking process and combined with the really detailed Audit Commission in depth 
studies of diagnostic services for instance last year means we are getting, I think, a better, 
more evidence based – and National Service Framework , is another driver and more evidence 
based comparable measures of quality. Where I think we’ve got a blind spot is the patient 
satisfaction aspect of quality,  
 
OK, let’s leave that like that, that’s useful.  We’re just at the mopping up stage now.  If we 
had a bunch of clinicians in this room now and a bunch of managers and what we’re trying to 
do, is the Health Care Commissioner’s coming and we want to show clinical and managerial 
engagement – that’s our objective – and we have to set an agenda.  What issues would you put 
on the agenda that would have those clinicians completely engaged with your managers? 
 
So that both sides are as interested in it?  I think some of the quality indicators we’re 
developing I think around infection control and other areas where people can see that…I think 
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of the whole agenda, I can’t see every clinician and every manager being as interested in 
every aspect, so I can probably only give you ones that would get the majority interested. 
 
OK 
 
And of those, I think it’s probably around quality measures, Health Care Commission,  
18 weeks, you know the measures whereby… of success because I think the vast majority of 
clinicians and probably all of the managers will see that we’ve got to get these ones right to be 
able to progress, so anything that’s on the key point indicators you… we get a bit of kick 
back, but not significant kick back, it’s just the target for target’s sake.  So while that’s a 
fairly easy cop out most people do actually accept that, to meet the target than it is to mess it 
up.  So I think reasonable engagement on that.  What is interesting, and I don’t know whether 
I’ve mentioned it, is that we’re getting Quarterly Reviews with Directorates which would 
be… one interestingly several of the Clinical Directors want to bring Consultant, Senior 
Nurse and several other colleagues from within the Directorate to actually review the 
Directorate and speak up on behalf of it and the Exec Team and that agenda is interestingly 
being formed and we’ve got a sort of skeleton of performance indicators that we’ll be using 
and those are – I’ll just give you a – we’re just working on that at the moment but it kind of 
gives a mix of quality indicators, finance, , performance indicators, patient survey type stuff, 
as well as the traditional things.  So that’s the beginning of where we’re trying to get a data 
set which is more comprehensive of what’s going on in the Directorate and where we can 
measure it of which we have really only discussed the exceptions. 
 
Yes, OK, so that agenda is, hopefully working for the Directorates saying oh, the Execs are 
interested , would you say?  So you’re using that as a tool really to take the management 
agenda forward, with the clinicians?  
Yes. 
 
Interesting, is there anything else that you want to put on that agenda? 
 
What for the Management, Consultants meeting?   
 
Yes, say we had just the orthopods… 
 
Yes – to get them interested – the service developments, the strategy where we’re going as a 
Directorate which is the other part of the agenda for those meetings. 
 
Yes 
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We’ve got things set out in here. How are you doing against the ones your Directorate has 
kind of got a lead on?  Personally I’d also be pushing the patient centric agenda around – and 
there’s a chapter on “putting patients first” which is around resolving some of the issues that 
don’t necessarily bubble up anywhere else, but patients keep telling us ‘why is our discharge a 
bit disjointed’ , so there’s a range of very clear areas where we’re trying to progress making 
improved patient satisfaction. 
 
So it sounds to me that it’s about patients – patient focus.  How patient focus can lead to the 
development of the speciality that’s how you keep ‘I’ll be hitting the national targets and 
stuff’ so they keep the nurses clear to do the development as well, so it’s all quite linked is it? 
 
Yes 
 
OK that’s interesting.  Who is responsible for the quality agenda in the organisation? 
 
Exactly, it is the Nurse Director.  I will pick up aspects around the information and patient 
satisfaction and so on we’re doing a customer care type programme and we’ve got to rename 
it, but something around that.  So I’ll tend to lead on the marketing, softer side, Belinda will 
lead on  the governance side and the Medical Director will lead on a lot of the other aspects 
particularly NICE compliance, mortality as well as being very involved in the Risk 
Management Committee and governance and so on and appraisals but the define lead is 
Belinda. 
 
OK, and who would you say runs with the quality agenda practically within the organisation 
if you had to kind of…? 
 
Well we’ve got a head of governance and risk management so in terms of the more traditional 
risk management, manual handling, that agenda will sit with one of Belinda’s deputies who’s 
the head of governance risk management. 
 
Does the Chief Exec have any act on…? 
 
Yes, yes that’s narrowed down to a few individual, I think you you’ll see it’s much, much 
wider.  I think the Chief Exec’s role will tend to be more around if there’s an indicator going 
off or there’s a strategic service development which is about, take a for instance, the Chief 
Exec is very involved with the redevelopment of our cancer unit where the physical facility is 
still very cramped and poor so he’s has got very involved in championing redevelopment etc. 
so there will be lots of issues where there will be champions outside the traditional kind of… 
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And do you find that Managers will run… kind of support that? 
 
Yea, yea, 
 
Managers will run with kind of quality, or will it be clinicians who tend to run with quality 
issue and then the managers kind of pick it up? 
 
Managers wouldn’t tend to facilitate, they will be stronger at the systems and facilitation and 
so on, it would tend to be… the Consultants would tend to focus on the hard end of equality, 
the Managers will – and particularly nurses, Essex Care… Quality and Infection Control will 
tend to… and Education and so on…and Skills Development, will tend to lead on different 
aspects of quality – I can’t quite understand why – the education aspect will tend to be 
nursing staff and the Medical side the Medical Staff so I think the Managers will tend to be 
more holding the ring and external influences will probably be a wider driver in that ‘this 
must be done’, or ‘this standard must be met’ rather than at this stage developing whole new 
concepts of quality as such. 
 
On the money side, who tends to run with the money issues? 
 
General Managers are ultimately going to be day to day making decisions as to levels of staff 
you can recruit and so on and writing the budget, so they all do the vast bulk of the keeping 
the budget. 
 
OK, and at the Board level who tends to pick up the money? 
 
The Director of Finance will report on it, in terms of the strategic decisions – it would tend to 
be the Finance Committee sees the business is roughly £50k or whatever or £100k so they 
will give detailed scrutiny therefore the Board probably isn’t seeing anything other than the 
oversight and assurance of that process unless it’s a big financial decision so for instance we 
have a lot of Board time debating buying the Derwent which was a private hospital site which 
the Board has now dedicated to a knee and hip replacement unit on the NHS.  Lots of time 
spent going through that which was a whole Board decision because there were a lot of 
strategic implications as well as just ‘does it add up financially?’   
 
Did you borrow to buy it? 
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No we did that from our capital plan 
 
So there was no borrowing, you just bought it cash on…? 
 
Yes 
 
Very nice too!   Excellent.  OK, just to turn to the Regulator.  Has the Regulator – and I’m 
talking about Monitor, here, everyone does – Have they had any impact at all on the 
organisation in terms of productivity and efficiency arguments? ,  
 
The setting of our criteria for your financial risk rating has had a profound impact on our 
budget strategy so in other words therefore we’ve gone out of this liquidity, so those matrix 
have definitely fed through so we can’t afford that capital as well as our annual saving target 
which is going to rise to £5m the year after next so that’s pretty worrisome as to how we’re 
going to meet that before any tariff changes that are on top of that.  So in that sense profound, 
although you wouldn’t ask more than five people in the organisation to see that link, but it’s 
there.  Obviously the need to stay the right side has focussed the entire Board and other than 
that the organisation.  What we haven’t quite got across is the argument why you need a 
surplus and that is something we’re working on as to how a surplus is not only nice, it’s 
essential and that’s probably driven harder by the Regulator’s requirement than probably… I 
mean naturally NHS break even is fantastic you know the idea of having £2m or £5m 
slopping around at the end of the year seems a bit… goes against the grain.  So that’s a culture 
change we’ve not really got to yet.  There’s a huge embarrassment about declaring any 
surplus so it’s very much an issue they don’t discuss publicly, but if we do it’s because we 
want to invest in next year’s capital plan.  Those are probably the two… and then of course 
there’s the fear of being hauled up in front of the Monitor particularly the RNE(sp?) and 
Peterborough where you get the wrong side of the numbers and the message from the 
Nuffield’s Trusts little case study for me I took away from that ‘Um they thought the, came 
out 3-4% lighter on staff for the same activity”, well we don’t really want to go there if we 
can do that incrementally without going through the headlines to get there fine, well inevitable 
really, well you don’t really want to do that in one year with a lot of pain and… 
 
For you guys then Monitor has been a case of you’ve never had a harsh discussion with 
[inaudible], on the… 
 
 Yea,  
 
…never had that harsh discussion but in the back ground it is an every present concern about 
making the system efficient to be able to deliver the projected services? 
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Yes 
 
OK, Service Line Reporting, have they had an impact on you guys doing that, or is that just 
you guys ‘we need to get there’ what’s your view on that? 
 
They kind of said it was essential, they were pretty ‘this is best practice, but you will do it’ 
there was a pretty clear message that they would view it in a bad light if you didn’t do it.  So 
we’ve put the effort in – it’s not perfect yet – but it’s work improved, getting to Service Line 
Reporting.  I think seeing Trusts that have done it that it is actually pretty sensible so I 
suppose it’s a mix of it being logically the right thing to do and because naturally people want 
to ask questions ‘that’s my budget, that’s my income, is that right, are we a profitable 
service?’  And the clinicians who talk about ‘are we making a profit?’ And then the next 
question is ‘Where is the profit going?’  Fair enough, you know. 
So monitor has had an impact but it’s not one of those impacts that is so clear that when I look 
at Board minutes and stuff like that it will be omnipresent?  You’ll have your quarterly 
reporting… 
 
I think it’s one of the cultures, so it probably won’t be in the minutes – minutes tend to be 
quite succinct and action orientated – but very much there’s that everyone knows if we don’t 
get this right, we’re out so… 
 
Concluding bits now.  We’ve gone round the edges of efficiency, productivity etc. but no 
one’s said what it is… 
 
Yes we’ve got involved in cultural issues on the side … 
 
What do you guys consider productivity to mean to this organisation – what does it mean? 
 
Probably if you asked the majority of the general managers, clinicians, consultants etc, it’s 
about staying in the black by whatever means – that means more productivity will take some 
costs out but that’s what it means, you know, so probably as simple as that and not getting 
into huge theoretical arguments about what productivity is just staying in the black – and why 
it’s quite difficult to move into surplus territory.  To me I say it’s around trying to understand 
– Service Line Reporting will hopefully inform that and again there’s a growing pool of 
people probably in the organisation see this as at least knowing how we compare and we’re 
miles away from  by directorate kind of thing but it’s got to come, you know.  So I think 
that’s the simple measures.  If you then ask them, ‘well how do you achieve that?’  
Interestingly this morning we had a financer saying, ‘well for years we’ve always done a 
central cost improving programme where we’ve got the great and the good have come up with 
ideas  and it’s not been consistent so some Directorates will deliver huge and some will stay 
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very quiet.  This year you guys say, you’ve got six months to come up with your plan to 
deliver 3% by directorate and that’s quite a challenge, quite a kind of… and of course there 
are those who say ‘we’ve over delivered, we’ve always been the guys who deliver on savings 
or credit awards or whatever, and now we’re being forced to deliver 3%’.  So without Service 
Line Reporting there’s actually a strong argument to say, ‘we’re asking everyone to make a 
saving’, which might be disproportionately difficult for some rather than others but this year 
we’re going to ask the directorates to take the lead on that and the corporate centre will 
support.  We’re just cutting it a different way as they’ve asked probably three, four or five 
years it’s been a central one.  What we haven’t squared off yet is the difference between cash 
releasing and productivity gain – we need to do a bit of both but we haven’t quite set out what 
we want and that’s partly about the uncertainty of the market. 
 
So you haven’t got to the position yet where you’re doing your cost improvement programme 
you kind of say ‘hold on, let’s just dump the cost improvement programme – let’s just sit back 
and say productivity is about holding input constant and getting greater output than we can 
charge for, or sometimes it’s increasing inputs and getting greater out put – so you’re not at 
that level where people are sitting back?. 
 
No, I think what happens… traditionally yes it has been just take some costs out because on 
block contracts you’d ask for a bit bigger block and get the buggers to sweat a bit more!  It 
would cover itself off, so you’d take some money out of the system and you’ve got some 
extra income from the block so you always had those, but it wasn’t in your face explicit 
because there was a deal done with the SHA.  We’re now moving to a stage at a Directorate 
level we’re going to have to make that decision at directorate level where I think I can do 100 
more hips for next to nothing and that will contribute this… 
 
So it can be, in your terms cash releasing either by not reducing costs, but by creating cash? 
 
Oh sorry, cash releasing, I mean by reducing the inputs we actually take cash out of 
someone’s budget.  So deliver us 100 hips but at £98 instead of £100 so there’s a bit of that 
which is, you know, bit of procurement, reduced head count  so closing things, shutting 
things, whatever, reducing things and maintaining input but what we haven’t really got into is 
explicitly saying ‘for the same inputs, or a slight increase, we can proportionately increase the 
level of activity.  We’ve kind of done it corporately as a Trust, but at directorate level or an 
HRG(sp) basis actually working out ‘I can do that at a really low marginal rate’.  So we 
haven’t got into marginal rates much really, probably since resolving… 
 
So when you’ve given the directorates the inevitable 3% you’re probably really expecting 
therefore traditional cost improvement plan solutions rather than greater output? 
 
I’d say we’re probably going to do a bit of both I’m more confident that we’d see the cash if 
the cash is released and because of the uncertainties of the market you don’t want to put all 
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your eggs into just growing your business to just increase your margins or to maintain your 
budget. 
 
Right,  
 
So we’re kind of at that stage of not knowing whether we’re going to have a PCT clamp down 
when the 18 weeks of over – you know, crash of activity, we don’t want to buy secondary 
care thank you very much and therefore we’re going to have to shrink; or whether we can just 
grow a bit, or grow strategically bits, that will generate the cash. 
 
OK, so final productivity is in there and bottom-lining then, how much of a focus is 
productivity, for the organisation?   
 
In some ways it’s everything and in some ways it’s nothing – I mean it’s come up every day 
can we get this work through this list, sort of pressure and shove and push but in terms of a 
corporate process and handle and development work I think that’s a big area where we need 
to grow our ability, our capacity to think and do that stuff.  So I think the next six months will 
be interesting as Directorate is trying to struggle with this and corporately I’m trying to 
strengthen our business planning information function so that we can actually work with 
directors and say well if you do less of these and if you change that practice then its actually 
not driven by anecdote of whatever but actually some hard evidence that says the bench mark, 
should be two days less , as I say, that’s beginning to happen so much as we hate it the NHS 
institutes productivity measures have started a debate and that led to lesser stay in pre-
admission in surgery leading to what could be quite a major service change – and in 
cardiology where we’ve got a lot of patients sitting in beds waiting for a procedure so 
although the metrics are rubbish and how you can as a Trust save £5m on reducing pre-op bed 
days, we might save £200,000 and so there is some productivity metrics driving change. 
 
If I was to say ‘OK, I’m going to work for you Richard for six months’ – you wouldn’t want 
me as an employee by the way I’m crap – I’ll come and work for you and we’re going to find 
out what work productivity improvements are happening here – where would you send me? 
 
To watch them happen, or… 
 
To actually find evidence that they have happened ?   
 
It would be interesting to look at Outpatients where there’s been a very big focus on reduced 
DNA special clinic utilisation; I think that would be quite interesting.  In terms of 
cardiology’s use of their lab time and the work they are beginning to get into around the 
waiting in beds for a procedure that would be good, and also, although it’s going back three or 
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four years looking at how they improved], catheter labs.  That’s reasonably well written up 
but that would be good – slightly dusty – but a good area to look at.   I mean our procurement 
departments - in the widest sense,  input costs has quite a lot of well evidenced better 
procurement practice.   I think our HR management is mixed but a reasonably strong effort 
over several years on sickness management has reduced the inputs on that because there’s 
some HR practice in some directorates isn’t particularly good and some practice around 
length of stay reduction OK. 
 
Where would you say particularly? 
 
Particularly in surgery… 
 
General surgery? 
 
Yes, General surgery. 
 
And, sorry I should say in orthopaedics where we’ve halved the stay at the new centre, and 
investment in OP physio.  So as a case study the OP dedicated to epidemia would be really 
interesting because there’s a whole load of practices which we knew made sense, but were 
really, really difficult to get change in practice, we moved into a new building and given some 
tight deadlines and expected measurements for moving into a swanky new building and in 
actual fact we’ve certainly seen the change in practice there is sill some debate about what is 
the most efficient use of theatres but that would be a good case study about putting dedicated, 
high volume, high value it’s about 5% of the Trusts income, working to a dedicated facility.  
Does that take out the complexity of theatres which are set up to do anything from a toe nail 
to , bypass to cardiovascular surgery and the just cope with everything.  Now that’s great from 
the flexibility view but not necessarily  
 
 
A final question.  Is there anything that I haven’t mentioned that you think is a driver for 
productivity? 
 
Well, there is something you didn’t mention which I’m surprised you didn’t, which is the 
efficiency index or the… 
 
Opportunity… 
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No the… when PBR came in the Trust was measured against the 100 as to its… 
 
Cost index? 
 
Yes, so we were 88 – I don’t know whether that was… did you look at that in the 4 Trusts? 
 
Yes 
 
OK, I was just surprised that you didn’t ask why you think we were 88 
 
Well, I suppose all this is about what the drivers are to those kind of outcomes but… 
 
88 was pre PBR  
 
Indeed. 
 
So we got to 88 without PBR so in many ways we’ve got this A1 surplus which we can’t 
spend on quality and other things and we actually had quite a lot of internal tensions around 
‘well why can’t we just spend it?’  And a spend did happen last year on quality obviously it 
can never be big enough but… and the Trust that became FT, particularly the early ones were 
all the right side of the line because they got the transitional relief, so and for me, there’s a 
particularly rich seam of work - I don’t know who productive you know, it would be, to 
actually see its not just your costs and inputs but your measurement of your outputs that drove 
a lot of that so I think we’re particularly fortunate in the way we’re set up in having a 
relationship with Poole Hospital which a) meant specialisation services on each site rather 
than two trying to do everything and also a slight peculiarity of the PBR system meaning that 
work transferring between the two would generate a new tariff.  So, if we were one Trust on 
two sites we would probably lose – I’ve no idea what the figure is but probably 2-3% - maybe 
not that much, but a significant chunk of income… 
 
 
Interesting.  Thank you very much 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
EXAMPLE INTERVIEW RESPONSE SHEET 
 
Interview Response Sheet……………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
No 
 
Main Question Response 
2 Gentle Intro Question 
Could you confirm how long you have 
been with the  organisation, your 
current role and previous positions held 
within the Trust? 
 
 
3 Where would you say the  organisation 
has  focussed its main managerial 
energy since becoming an FT? For 
instance quality, design, efficiency? 
 
 
4 In the transition to FT did you perceive 
any change in focus? For instance, 
patient focus, governance 
 
 
5 How does the  organisation measure its 
output (quantity and quality)? 
 
 
6 In your experience, do you think there 
has been any change in how outputs are 
measured in the last three years, and if 
so, how and why? 
 
 
7 In your opinion has the introduction of 
PbR had a material impact on costs, 
efficiency or quality within this 
 organisation? 
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No 
 
Main Question Response 
8 What other main factors do you think 
have had an impact on costs, efficiency 
and quality within this period and how 
important where they relative to PbR? 
 
 
 
9 What is the level of clinical 
understanding, and engagement, with 
PbR.? 
 
 
 
 
10 Do clinicians have responsibility for 
delivering their service to a budget 
within this  organisation? Has this 
changed over time? 
 
 
 
11 Which kind of personalities are most 
engaged with PbR within the 
 organisation? 
 
 
 
12 How would you  summarise the 
objectives of clinicians in this 
 organisation? Has this changed over 
the last three years? 
 
 
 
13 What are the objectives of managers in 
this  organisation? Has this changed 
over the last three years? 
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No 
 
Main Question Response 
14 What do you understand by quality of 
service? 
 
 
15 What has happened to clinical quality in 
the  organisation in last three years? 
 
 
16 If a change in quality has occurred what 
do you think have been the drivers of 
that change? 
 
 
 
 
17 Who is responsible for the quality of 
care in this  organisation? Has this 
changed over the last five years? 
 
 
 
 
18 Who is responsible for the efficient 
delivery of care in this  organisation? 
Has this always been the case, if not 
what has changed? 
 
 
19 How engaged are managers in the 
agenda around quality of care in this 
 organisation. Has this changed over 
the last five years? If yes, what is the 
driver of this change? 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
Has the introduction of PbR had any 
impact upon clinical/managerial 
behaviour for instance cost, planning, 
and quality focus? 
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No 
 
Main Question Response 
21 On what issues do clinicians and 
managers engage most upon? Has this 
changed in the last three years? 
 
22 Do you consider regulators to have had 
any impact on the  organisation, and if 
so, how? 
 
 
23 What does the  organisation understand 
by productivity and does your view 
differ in any respect? 
 
 
 
 
24 To what extent is productivity a focus of 
the  organisation? For instance, within 
the board, divisions and clinical teams? 
 
 
 
25 In which areas do you think productivity 
has increased most within the 
 organisation and what has been the 
key to this success (if any)? 
 
 
 
 
26 Is there anything we have not discussed 
which has driven productivity in this 
 organisation? 
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APPENDIX FIVE 
       INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
No Main Question Prompts Time  
Estimate  
(Mins) 
1. Researcher Introduction: 
 -subject  
-process 
Approx one hour 
Permission to record 
Outline objective 
 
2 
2. Intro Question 
Could you confirm how long you 
have been with the organisation, 
your current role and previous 
positions held within the Trust? 
 
 
Limit to last ten years 
Focus on experience breadth 
 
1 
 
 
3. Where would you say the 
organisation has focussed its 
main managerial energy since 
becoming an FT? For instance 
quality, design, efficiency? 
 
Service re-design 
Improving quality 
Improving efficiency 
 
 
3 
4. In the transition to FT did you 
perceive any change in focus? 
For instance, patient focus, 
governance structures, cost 
control? 
Patients 
Governance 
Cost control 
Board capacity 
Clinical Development 
 
 
2 
5.  How does the organisation 
measure its output (quantity and 
quality)?  
Access 
Mortality 
Re-admission 
FCE/FFCE/Spells 
 
2 
6. In your experience, do you think 
there has been any change in how 
outputs are measured in the last 
Value added measures e.g. 
SF36/EuroQuol etc 
Improved data collection 
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three years, and if so, how and 
why? 
3 
7. In your opinion has the 
introduction of PbR had a 
material impact on costs, 
efficiency or quality within this 
organisation? 
Financial focus 
Focus on cost 
Focus on quality 
Long term service planning 
Proactive/reactive thinking 
Clinical pathway protocols 
 
 
2 
8. What other main factors do you 
think have had an impact on 
costs, efficiency and quality 
within this period and how 
important where they relative to 
PbR? 
National targets 
Regulators 
Financial position 
 
 
2 
9. What is the level of clinical 
understanding, and engagement, 
with PbR.? 
 
 
Conceptually understand 
Validate their cost data 
Coding issues 
Pathway review 
 
 
 
2 
10. Do clinicians have responsibility 
for delivering their service to a 
budget within this organisation? 
Has this changed over time? 
Do clinicians: 
 budget set; 
 know their service capacity; 
 have input into SLA’s; and 
 accept responsibility for 
financial     outcome of 
service. 
 
 
 
 
3 
11. Which kind of personalities are 
most engaged with PbR within 
the organisation? 
Age 
Specialty 
Training 
Experience 
 
3 
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12. How would you summarise the 
objectives of clinicians in this 
organisation? Has this changed 
over the last three years? 
Personal technical 
development 
Career progression 
Clean hands 
Financial reward 
Social justice beliefs 
Status 
Health promotion 
Patient care 
 
 
 
5 
13. What are the objectives of 
managers in this organisation? 
Has this changed over the last 
three years? 
Career progression 
Clean hands 
Financial reward 
Social justice beliefs 
Status 
Health promotion 
Patient care 
 
4 
14. What do you understand by 
quality of service? 
Clinical process 
Clinical outcome 
General patient experience 
Timely access 
 
2 
 
15. What has happened to clinical 
quality in the organisation in last 
three years? 
Sufficient/insufficient data 
Improve/decrease 
Who reviews 
Clinician/managerial 
ownership 
 
 
 
2 
16. If a change in quality has 
occurred what do you think have 
been the drivers of that change?  
DoH Targets 
Regulatory 
Quasi-markets 
Clinician drive 
Managerial drive 
Cost control 
Productivity drives changing 
 
 
3 
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pathways 
Patient influence 
Commissioner quality 
targets 
 
17. Who is responsible for the quality 
of care in this organisation? Has 
this changed over the last five 
years? 
Medical Director 
CEO 
Board 
Everyone 
Difference between 
official/practice 
 
 
2 
18. Who is responsible for the 
efficient delivery of care in this 
organisation? Has this always 
been the case, if not what has 
changed? 
Exec Team 
Medical Director 
Everyone 
Finance Director 
 
2 
19. How engaged are managers in the 
agenda around quality of care in 
this organisation. Has this 
changed over the last five years? 
If yes, what is the driver of this 
change? 
Outcomes 
Patient Experience 
Measurement 
Value added 
Clinical influence 
Central direction 
 
 
5 
20. Has the introduction of PbR had 
any impact upon 
clinical/managerial behaviour for 
instance cost, planning, and 
quality focus? 
Understanding cost base 
Review of outlier services re 
tariff 
 
 
3 
21. On what issues do clinicians and 
managers engage most upon? Has 
this changed in the last three 
years? 
Organisational breaches of 
targets 
Service redesign 
Expansion plans 
Clinical quality 
Productivity and cost issues 
 
 
2 
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22. Do you consider regulators to 
have had any impact on the 
organisation, and if so, how? 
 
 
Monitor 
Healthcare Commission 
Quality 
Cost control 
Data quality 
Clinician/managerial co-
operation 
 
 
5 
23. What does the organisation 
understand by productivity and 
does your view differ in any 
respect? 
Costs 
Inputs (patient) 
Outputs 
Cost reduction versus 
productivity 
 
2 
24. To what extent is productivity a 
focus of the organisation? For 
instance, within the board, 
divisions and clinical teams? 
 
Work streams 
Clinical teams 
Divisional management 
Board 
Reporting systems 
 
 
3 
25. In which areas do you think 
productivity has increased most 
within the organisation and what 
has been the key to this success 
(if any)? 
A and E 
Orthopaedics 
Ophthalmology 
 
 
 
 
1 
26. Is there anything we have not 
discussed which has driven 
productivity in this organisation? 
People 
Other drivers 
 
 
2 
27. Closure 
 - appreciation 
  
1 
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  Time Estimate 69mins 
 
 
 
